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STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY

SUMMER 2008

VOL. 2, NO. 2

An Airman's Perspective: Air, Space, and Cyberspace Strategy for the Pacific

Gen Howie Chandler, USAF

Ballistic Missile Defense: A National Priority

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Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq: Making Strategy after 9/11

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STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY

*An Air Force–Sponsored Strategic Forum for
Military, Government, and Academic Professionals*

VOLUME 2

SUMMER 2008

NUMBER 2

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Understanding Requirements of Future Strategy

As our founding fathers of American aerospace power have done over the past century, it is critical we continue to evolve our knowledge and understanding of aerospace power. Our greatest asset remains the minds of our people. More than any specific weapon system, investment in the minds of our people will result in the greatest payoff for any given outlay we might make. *We must invest in the minds of our Airmen, advancing our understanding of aerospace power, or face decreasing relevance in future national security strategy.*

To do this we must understand our aerospace history, to include our core competencies. After mastering this understanding, we must integrate it with an awareness of how the global security environment is changing. Then, armed with both comprehension of our aerospace past and knowledge of the security environment, we must focus on developing four key aspects of maximizing air, space, and cyberspace power: *continuum ability*—effectiveness along a greater spectrum of operational engagement; *integration ability*—more effective integration with other actors, including military services, governmental departments, nations, and nonstate actors; *cyber ability*—an improved mastery of the information realm; and *temporal ability*—the ability to function much faster.

Airmen must evolve in these four areas so we can best and seamlessly integrate air, space, and cyberspace to optimize our global vigilance, reach, power, and partnering. While addressing these aspects as distinct areas of focus, in reality they overlap and affect one another. This is not a comprehensive list of areas to advance our understanding of the aerospace discipline—many areas require continued development; however, these are high-priority aspects Airmen must nurture if we are to optimally exploit the incredibly capable weapon systems we are now fielding.

Continuum is the need to operate effectively along the entire spectrum of operations, from routine diplomacy to global nuclear warfare. The Air Force has not been relieved of previously assigned missions and has been tasked to accomplish additional ones. The bulk of our thought, education,

The author gratefully acknowledges the significant contributions of Lt Gen David A. Deptula, deputy chief of staff for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, Headquarters US Air Force, Washington, DC.

training, and equipment remains focused on conventional combat while we maintain our nuclear deterrent and strike capability. However, we spend a very limited amount of effort on learning and practicing operations for unconventional warfare. More time and thought must be placed on how we become more effective in areas such as unconventional warfare, counterterrorism, disaster relief, and conflict prevention/preemption.

Integration is required not only with other military services, nations, and governmental departments but also with the myriad cultures and nonstate actors that comprise an ever-shrinking world that defines our operating environment. In operations other than conventional/nuclear war, the military role may fall under the auspices of other governmental agencies. We must educate, equip, and train ourselves to integrate with these other governmental components. In many instances, other departments will not have the resources, experience, organization, or training to accomplish the task without our support. The Department of Defense remains by far the best resourced component of the US government.

Although significant progress has been made since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, much still remains to be accomplished to integrate into an effective joint organization. We also need to improve how we integrate with other nations. The sharing of information with allies remains a significant change and a great source of frustration among many of our friends. Perhaps more than anything else, we need to integrate better with nonstate actors and other cultures. Only by understanding other people and cultures can we know how our efforts will have an impact.

Cyber operations in all forms have become essential—from achieving successful tactical operations to accomplishing desired strategic effects. John Warden noted in Operation Desert Storm that the degree of success of the strategic attacks was in large part dependent upon our strategic information operations. The winners in any war of information are the ones who master the power of the offense, not the defense. Today, we must balance the offense and the defense. Instead of building information castles and demanding that our offensive information operations adapt to the defense, we need to challenge our cyber defenders to find ways to protect our information use while enabling the offense. We must protect critical information but not at the expense of our offensive cyber corps, which includes operators, staff officers, educators, support personnel, and leaders. Today, we should be at the leading edge of information technology and exploitation. Unfortunately, our offensive use of information has become significantly restricted—this

must change. US government computer users are often restricted while our adversaries are not limited.

The key element of information today is speed. Dissemination of information was increased an order of magnitude with the invention of the printing press in the fifteenth century. It increased another order of magnitude when useful electrical transmissions (telegraph and telephone) were invented in the nineteenth century. A third-order-of-magnitude increase occurred with the invention of movies and a fourth with television. Today, due to the microprocessor, we routinely accelerate information capacity and capability. However, with the balance of offense and defense heavily weighted on the latter, we often settle for adequacy that sacrifices future capability. We have progressed from the industrial age to the information age. We now must advance from the information age to the “process age.”

Temporal ability and the capacity to operate within an adversary’s ability to act have always been important aspects of conflict. Today, in physical and cyber realms, the potential to orient, observe, decide, and act is an order of magnitude beyond our abilities of just a decade ago. Speed is essential in collecting, analyzing, disseminating, commanding, and executing operations. We possess outstanding operational and tactical capability in the Air Force today. Operationally we are able to strike thousands of targets precisely within very short periods of time—mass precision. With this capability, aerospace power not only has the ability to execute multiple simultaneous operations (parallel warfare) but also has the potential to execute multiple simultaneous strategies—parallel strategy. Parallel strategy is a viable way to compress the temporal dimension. Often a single strategy may fail or not work well. If we employ a series of compatible but different strategies at the same time, once one is found to be most effective, resources can be refocused to best exploit it.

In addition to mastering our ability in these four areas, we must be able to assess before, during, and after engagement better than we have previously. We have not yet fielded systems that enable assessment to keep pace with our operations. In the absolute sense, assessment is objective and straightforward. Historically, we have counted the number of military weapon systems we destroy and, after reaching a specific percentage of adversary destruction, determined when the enemy capitulates. In reality, effective assessment is much more arduous and subjective. Destruction of all of an adversary’s primary weapons may not be adequate to realize our desired policy effects—and victory. In fact, some attacks could be un-

necessary in realizing the military objectives and even counterproductive to the desired political end. This does not mean objective assessment is irrelevant. On the contrary, the best objective assessments are essential to both subjective and overarching understanding. Most subjective assessments in conflict begin with an understanding of the objective measures. Prior to engagement, assessments are critical to developing strategy, planning, and positioning forces. During engagement, timely assessments are required to determine progress and adjust strategy. The ability to collect, analyze, and disseminate useful information rapidly is paramount to successful command, control, and operations.

Closing

We are an aerospace nation. As a nation, we have the ability to understand and best exploit operations across the air, space, and cyber domains. It is incumbent on us as Airmen to lead our nation in this endeavor. I offer the following as elements to guide aerospace strategists as they develop potential strategies for future conflict:

- Understand aerospace power fundamentals.
- Understand campaign strategy and execution processes.
- Understand allies, other agencies, available assets, and how to integrate.
- Acquire knowledge of potential adversaries in all their forms.
- Identify desired political effects/end states.
- Recognize constraints—military, political, and social.
- Translate policies into military objectives.
- Establish aerospace campaign objectives.
- Develop an aerospace strategy.
- Select targets—kinetic and nonkinetic—that support specific objectives.
- Establish a robust evaluation process, and adjust as required.

While we need to continue to learn from military thinkers of the past, we must also look to the future and take advantage of the potential of aerospace capabilities. While some aspects of conflict never change, others change rapidly with little warning. Aerospace power and how it is used within a campaign is changing the character of warfare. However, accepting change is not easy.

Thomas Kuhn suggested that, outside a crisis, accepting new paradigms only occurs when the old ones die off. In his book *Firing for Effect* (1995), Lt Gen David Deptula offers, "The challenge for a military steeped in the traditions, paradigms, and strategies of the past is recognizing the change, embracing it, and capitalizing on it before someone else does. Machiavelli said: 'There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things.' He might also have added that there is nothing more worthwhile" (p. 19). Have courage and move forward, embracing proven continued strengths while evolving them to best address our ever-advancing world.

A handwritten signature in dark ink that reads "P. Mason Carpenter I". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly stylized font. The "P" is large and loops around the "M". The "I" is a simple vertical stroke. A horizontal line is drawn underneath the signature.

P. MASON CARPENTER I
Colonel, USAF

An Airman's Perspective

Air, Space, and Cyberspace Strategy for the Pacific

Howie Chandler, General, USAF

America's opponents often base their demands on their perception of our ability to fight and win wars. . . . Above all, the US military must prevent major-power opponents from believing they can benefit from using their military power against America's vital interests.

—Michael W. Wynne
Secretary of the Air Force

WHILE THE United States has long been a Pacific nation, it has also been an air, space, and cyberspace nation. The interests and strategic challenges that concern our nation in this vast region are inexorably linked with our air, space, and cyberspace capabilities. Those enduring interests in the Pacific span the entire spectrum of economic, political, and security relations. America has paid a significant price in blood and treasure to fight aggression, deter potential adversaries, extend freedom, and maintain the peace and prosperity of this part of the world. Our engagement in this region has been critical to both regional and global security for many decades and will become increasingly so in the decades to come.¹

It is in the United States' interest to support and encourage the free movement of goods and services throughout the Asia-Pacific region—one that encompasses 105 million square miles, 39 countries, over four billion people, and an economic footprint that rivals the European Union. Not including the United States, Pacific nations comprise 37 percent of the gross world product and three of the top 10 global economies: China, Japan, and India. Approximately 33 percent of the world's oil and 20 percent

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of the world's sea-borne trade transit the Strait of Malacca.² Moreover, our economies are increasingly interrelated; Asian and American capital markets and our burgeoning cross-Pacific trade have great influence upon our respective economies.

While our posture in the Pacific clearly guarantees our interests for the time being, we cannot afford to rest on present successes at the expense of future security. Every strategic interest in the Pacific relies on some aspect of air, space, and cyberspace. Consequently, every threat to our interests challenges our cross-domain dominance. Some examples of this complex relationship include

- nuclear proliferation,
- the growing proliferation of sophisticated antiaccess weapons combined with the modernization of regional conventional forces,
- emerging and aggressive space capabilities including space denial systems and a growing space presence among regional powers,
- cyber activities—routine and benign, ambiguous, covert, and overt aggressive intrusions aimed at our economic, government, and military cyber systems, and
- irregular activities that range from full-blown insurgencies to sporadic terrorist attacks to weak governments that need partner assistance.

There can be little doubt that the regional security and economic prosperity we have enjoyed in the Pacific region over the recent decades have been underpinned by the stabilizing presence of the US military. Even so, some have suggested that the United States may be neglecting its security strategy in the Asia-Pacific because it has been too focused on Iraq, Afghanistan, and conflicts in other regions of the world. Others are concerned that overall US military strategy and resource decisions are overly devoted to addressing current threats at the expense of being prepared to deter and, if necessary, fight future adversaries that might threaten our national and international security in the years ahead. America can and must be able to do both.

From the Pacific Air Forces perspective, we address this complex strategic environment through three interdependent endeavors: Posture our Forces; Prepare and Provide Immediate and Responsive Combat Capability; and Promote Regional Security and Stability.

US Posture in the Pacific

While the Pacific region is not at war, neither is it at peace. No challenge illustrates this better than the challenge of nuclear proliferation. Efforts through the Six-Party process (North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States) aim at the eventual denuclearization of North Korea, but for the present, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea regime remains reclusive and unpredictable and now has the potential to leverage nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons in attempts to threaten its neighbors and our allies.

The USAF, along with our regional partners, must maintain the lead in air, space, and cyberspace capabilities that monitor, deter, and defeat these types of threats. By 2012, the Republic of Korea (ROK) will assume wartime operational control of its forces while US Forces in Korea transfers to US Korea Command (USKORCOM) in a doctrinally supporting relationship to ROK armed forces.³ For its part, Japan will take more of a leading role for its air and missile defense by relocating its Air Defense Command to Yokota Air Base to strengthen early warning and bilateral command and control.⁴

These changes, backed by the speed, range, and flexibility of existing US airpower forces in the region coupled with a new USAF Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)-Strike Task Force based on Guam, have enabled a strategic rebalancing of our regional force posture to re-deploy large numbers of US ground forces to the mainland or within the theater. Thus, in the Pacific region, the Global Reach, Global Power, and Global Vigilance provided by the USAF enables diplomatic, economic, and informational initiatives aimed at countering nuclear proliferation.

High-end military competition is growing and will be a challenge to the United States. Fueled by a booming economy that delivers \$321 billion worth of goods to the United States, China is modernizing its military.⁵ The Chinese are rapidly moving forward with significant aerospace developments based on improvements to existing foreign technologies.

Like China, Russia's defense spending has significantly increased as the Russian Federation rises to become one of Europe's largest economies. A resurgent Russia is now flexing its military muscle as evidenced in Pacific air activities reminiscent of Cold War behavior. Between 2001 and 2007, Russia quadrupled defense spending and has been at the forefront of developing advanced fighter technology.⁶ Both its MiG and Sukhoi fighter programs continue to push the air superiority envelope.

In addition, modern advancements in integrated air defenses threaten the ability of US legacy fighters to dictate the time, place, and tempo of modern air warfare. Both Russia and China are ready and willing to export advanced conventional technologies to anyone willing to pay for them. These and other advances mean that the cross-domain dominance that US forces have come to depend on is no longer assured.

Dominance is the calculus of any combat, whether it involves a one-versus-one engagement or the final outcome of an air campaign. We must be equally concerned about the ability to operate freely in space and cyberspace. For the first time since the establishment of an independent Air Force, the joint war fighter's ability to move freely throughout the battlespace is in jeopardy because of these advancements in technology.

Competition for access, use, and dominance in space is heating up. China clearly recognizes the United States' dependence on space assets and is bolstering its counterspace capabilities. By testing an antisatellite (ASAT) weapon in January 2007, China demonstrated that it can threaten US space assets.

But the recent attention paid to Chinese space activities has concealed space proliferation activities across the Asia-Pacific region. For more than a year, headlines have indicated stepped-up space initiatives from a wide range of countries in the region. For example, South Korea announced plans to develop an indigenous space launch and sustainment capability, with \$3.6 trillion earmarked for satellite and launch development over the next 10 years.⁷ In July 2007, Russia launched a German military reconnaissance satellite into orbit.⁸ In December 2007, the Russian space force commander announced plans to launch a retransmitting satellite intended to collect and relay telemetry data on launch vehicle operations no later than 2009.⁹ Shortly thereafter, in January 2008, India announced that it intends to collaborate with Russia for an unmanned lunar expedition that will employ a rover-type vehicle to collect and analyze soil, atmospheric, and rock samples.¹⁰ Also, India recently completed a contract to launch an Israeli advanced synthetic aperture radar imaging satellite from its Sriharikota Launching Range.¹¹ And in February 2008, Russia announced plans to improve the accuracy of its Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) global positioning constellation by establishing ground-monitoring stations. The long-range plans aim at reducing errors from the current 10 meters to centimeters.¹² Taken separately, each of these events portrays a robust effort on the part of several countries to expand their

space capabilities. Viewed in the context of the Pacific region and through the lens of the increasingly crowded space domain, what today may not be a security challenge could likely become one of the defining challenges for the region in the near future.

Cyberspace has joined surface, air, and space domains as a contested region. Our adversaries recognize America's dependence on cyberspace, the domain characterized by using the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructure, as a center of gravity and are actively seeking ways to exploit our reliance upon it.¹³

The normal and usually benign activities that occur every minute of every day as part of commerce and information exchange provide concealment for ambiguous, covert, and overt aggressive intrusions aimed at our economic, government, and military cyber systems. The intelligence community assesses that both nonstate actors and nation-states, including Russia and China, have the technical capabilities to target and disrupt elements of cyberspace and to use it for intelligence collection.¹⁴

Since Thomas Friedman's book *The World Is Flat* described how cyber activities have compressed economic activities across the globe, corporations have intensified outsourcing programs to take advantage of the cyber domain to increase productivity and profits.¹⁵ A recent report indicated that Indian dominance in the outsourcing industry has begun to slow down as other countries compete in this fast-paced industry. According to one source, countries like China, Russia, and Brazil lead an estimated 30 other countries vying for contracts in the cyber-industrial marketplace.¹⁶ Japan has even begun recruiting in Burma for computer-savvy workers for its software, mobile phone, and other electronic and telecommunications devices.¹⁷ India expects to more than double its revenue from outsourcing and cyber activities to reach an estimated \$80 billion by 2011.¹⁸ These activities appear as a normal part of the global economy at the moment, but should competition increase, the previously benign economic activities could turn hostile as critical programs and infrastructure become vulnerable to cyber attacks. At the moment, the USAF has no assigned role in protecting commercial systems, but that could change dramatically as the cyber domain experiences more intense competition. Even now, political movements that coalesce in cyberspace migrate with alarming speed into real demonstrations and protest movements across the region.

We face irregular transnational security challenges that range from full-blown insurgencies to sporadic terrorist attacks to weak governments that need partner assistance. Global terrorism extends to this region of the world where terrorists seek financing, recruit followers, and continue to plot against the United States and our partners and allies. The phenomenon of suicide terrorism now prevalent in the Middle East and in other regions first arose in Sri Lanka, a country still embroiled in a 20-year-long battle against violent separatists. Piracy threatens the flow of commerce through the Strait of Malacca, which would not only affect the regional but the global economy as well. Avian flu and illicit narcotics continue to be serious challenges to governments throughout the region.

We know that long-term security cannot be achieved without respect for human rights, the rule of law, and strengthened government capacity. In Burma, a military junta continues to harass and oppress thousands of Burmese who seek a free and democratic government. Three military coups in seven years have resulted in a government in Fiji that continuously teeters on the brink of dissolution. And natural disasters will continue to strike, killing hundreds and leaving thousands homeless as we have recently seen in Bangladesh, Indonesia, and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Each of these areas presents air, space, and cyber forces with new and non-traditional challenges that demand the utmost in innovation, flexibility, and dedication—our Airmen are up to the task.

Providing Immediate and Responsive Capabilities

The keys to confronting the challenges presented by the complex Pacific region require presenting capabilities that embrace airpower's Global Reach, Global Power, and Global Vigilance.

In the first place, this requires the ability to command and control our forces. Throughout airpower history, Airmen have learned that the most effective way to employ air, space, and cyber power is under a single-theater joint force air component commander (JFACC).¹⁹ The USAF Command and Control Enabling Concept enhanced airpower by providing the JFACC with a standardized organization and set of capabilities under a component numbered air force (C-NAF) equipped with an air and space operations center (AOC) and an Air Force forces (AFFOR) staff. The purpose of the C-NAF is to provide a robust operational presentation

of air forces to each combatant commander. The complexity and the sheer size of the Pacific region make achieving this robust command and control construct a daunting task. Recent improvements have significantly enhanced the PACAF's ability to operate in all three domains.

The most mature and well-known Pacific C-NAF is Seventh Air Force in Korea, which operates the Capt Joseph McConnell AOC, where for over 30 years US and Korean Airmen have developed the model for conducting combined air and space operations for the US-ROK Combined Forces Command. Similarly, there is also a tailored AOC in Alaska to synchronize air, space, and cyber operations for the US Northern Command and North American Air Defense Command.

The stand-up of Thirteenth Air Force in Hawaii as the C-NAF for the PACOM AOR is a key element of Air Force strategy in the Pacific. Now, for the first time, PACOM has a standing JFACC to plan, command and control, and execute an integrated air, space, and cyber campaign for the theater and, with the C-NAF, the capability to lead a joint task force if required. The Maj Richard Bong AOC synchronizes all air, space, and cyber missions during peacetime with Soldiers and Sailors working side-by-side with Airmen every day, cementing habitual relationships with sister-service components. The 613th AOC will have close ties with the new Japanese bilateral air operations center being built at Yokota AB, Japan, and will also work with the Australian air operations center in Canberra.

With robust command and control capabilities, our air forces are postured for persistent involvement in the region to address the full spectrum of challenges described above. PACAF works closely with many of these nations through a robust set of theater security cooperation (TSC) events.²⁰ The PACAF TSC program promotes interoperability between air forces and establishes the relationships required to promote coalition partnerships, lessen the chance of conflict, and promote stability in the region.

Each year, PACAF participates in approximately 30 international exercises, ranging from bilateral exercises like Cope India to multilateral exercises like Red Flag-Alaska. Red Flag-Alaska leverages the tremendous joint training opportunities of the Pacific Alaska Range Complex and the newest Air Force aggressor squadron at Eielson AFB to provide the joint and combined war fighter with realistic combat rehearsal training in a stressful threat environment. Each summer at Red Flag-Alaska, PACAF leads the Executive Observer Program (EOP), where partner-nation senior airmen observe Red Flag activities firsthand and discuss coalition operations and training

requirements, which in turn allows PACAF to tailor future scenarios to meet those objectives. In 2007, 18 nations from air forces around the world attended the EOP.

In 2006, the CSAF expanded the Unified Engagement (UE) program beyond the Washington, DC, area to provide opportunities for engaging regional partners such as Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and India in a variety of bilateral and multilateral scenario vignettes, exercises, and discussions to further assist PACAF in promoting regional stability. These scenarios are set 10 to 20 years in the future with topics covering the full spectrum of conflict, including counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, ISR, and irregular warfare. In Europe, NATO provides forums for similar discussions—in the Pacific, PACAF uses UE to promote regional security and stability with our partners across the region.

We must maintain high-end capabilities while conducting low-end operations. Low-end operations can often produce the goodwill that contributes to long-lasting stability in the region. For example, in February 2008, Hawaii- and Alaska-based C-17s delivered 225,000 pounds of food, medicine, and cold-weather supplies to Shanghai, China, to provide relief for Chinese citizens across 19 provinces during their most severe winter in 50 years. Within 18 hours of the secretary of defense's mission approval, 18 cargo pallets were delivered to mainland China.

Last year, PACAF deployed a C-17 with a joint team of 50 Air Force, Army, and Navy medics, dentists, and civil engineers to the remote Pacific islands of Vanuatu, Kiribati, and Nauru. In just 96 hours, the team cared for over 4,300 patients and trained over 1,000 local civilian, police, fire, customs, and nursing personnel on basic life support skills.²¹ In both cases, PACAF's rapid responsiveness and flexibility to provide much-needed materials and services delivered the lasting and positive effects that characterize partnership and goodwill.

Promoting Regional Security and Stability Air, Space, and Cyberspace Power's Role

When the PACOM commander describes the Pacific, he proclaims, "The guns are silent."²² Clearly, the Air Force, working with sister services and partner nations, has been a key driver of this silence. However, improve-

ments to USAF force structure and capabilities in this region are the only ways to guarantee this state of affairs continues in the future.

Global Vigilance operations in the Pacific cut across air, space, and cyber-space and are the eyes and ears of commanders, saving American lives and helping to defeat our enemies before they can act. These ISR operations also inform national security policy and allow the combatant commander to position combat capabilities when and where required. Recent ballistic missile and underground nuclear testing by North Korea, successful antisatellite operations by China, and the increased number of Russian long-range bomber missions in the Arctic have further emphasized the need to remain vigilant.

While ISR collection operations are critical, the culturally astute intelligence analyst's ability to provide the war fighter context for decision making is equally important. PACAF recently hired a State Department-trained foreign policy advisor for this very purpose. While the Air Force must continue to invest in more ISR assets to provide the appropriate level of coverage for the region, it must also continue the professional development of regional affairs specialists and support requirements for more human intelligence capability. PACAF is also collaborating with our regional partners to share information in areas of mutual concern. Without a multilateral alliance such as NATO, information sharing in the Pacific tends to occur bilaterally. Opening the information-sharing aperture to multiple nations was exactly the purpose of the Global Hawk Capabilities Forum, held in April 2008, when multiple Pacific nations came together to discuss how they could share information during humanitarian assistance or disaster relief scenarios.

Global Reach allows the Air Force to bridge the distances in the Pacific to deliver effects in operationally relevant timeframes of hours, not days or weeks. Basing USAF C-17 airlift assets in Alaska and Hawaii shows the increased emphasis the Air Force puts on improving our ability to respond more rapidly in this region. Bases in Alaska and Hawaii serve as critical components for humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, or combat operations. In addition, C-17s in Hawaii and Alaska have brought unprecedented levels of organic, flexible airlift to PACAF. The Army rarely travels lightly. Hawaii- and Alaska-based C-17s are strategically collocated with Army units, allowing PACOM to respond immediately with a joint force to any type of contingency worldwide.

Gen T. Michael Moseley said, “*Everything we do, whether it’s disaster relief, humanitarian relief, global vigilance, global strike, or global mobility—the thing that makes you ‘global’ is the jet tanker.*”²³ Given the size of the AOR, PACAF’s tanker aircraft enable our joint and combined military teams to project combat capability anytime, anywhere throughout the Pacific and around the world. KC-135 tankers permanently based in Alaska, Hawaii, and Japan, as well as rotational tankers on Guam, make up the air bridge required to move fighters, bombers, and other assets throughout the theater. In short, they allow us to dissuade, deter, and, if necessary, defeat any potential adversaries.

An equally important part of Global Reach for the joint team in the Pacific is the combination of communications, navigation, and positioning capability provided by Air Force satellites. Many of these satellites have outlived their designed endurance. We have begun the task of replacing some of our aging systems, and this April (2008) the first Wideband Global SATCOM-1 was launched, providing upgraded communications capability with coverage from PACOM to the West Coast of the mainland. Over the next 10 years, the Air Force must recapitalize all of these systems to maintain the advantage our space capability provides our nation.

USAF fighters and bombers attain strategic effects by striking anywhere in the world. Replacing aging fighters and fielding the next-generation, long-range bomber are a strategic imperative for the nation. As discussed earlier, over 30 nations operate fighter aircraft that are at parity or exceed the capabilities of our F-15 and F-16 fleet. In addition, our legacy fighters are increasingly expensive to maintain and less reliable to fly.


Our Air Force took the first critical step to enhance regional Global Power by placing three of its seven programmed USAF F-22 Raptor squadrons in the Pacific to provide immediate response to crises. The Air Force is also considering future basing of the F-35 Lightning II at key Pacific locations such as Eielson AFB, Alaska,²⁴ and Kadena AB, Japan.²⁵ It is important to note that the F-22 and F-35 work as a team, with the Raptor “kicking down the enemy’s door” for the Lightning II and other aircraft to undertake their respective missions. The F-22 serves as an air-dominance fighter with air-to-surface capabilities, while the F-35 will be an air-to-surface workhorse with the ability to defend itself . . . both having the ability to collect and share information. Both fighter programs must remain on track if the USAF strategy is to succeed in the Pacific.

Advances in integrated air defense systems throughout the world not only highlight deficiencies in our fighter force but also threaten our bomber force's ability to hold any target at risk, anywhere, anytime. Since 2004, the USAF has rotationally deployed a continuous bomber presence of B-1, B-2, or B-52 aircraft to Andersen AFB, Guam, to enhance regional security, demonstrate US commitment to the western Pacific, and provide integrated training opportunities. Their range and payload, combined with precision, lethality, survivability, and responsiveness, provide the backbone of this viable, strategic military deterrent. Eventually the technological gap our B-2 stealth bomber enjoys today will be bridged by advancements in antiaccess technologies. This, coupled with the fact that the current bomber fleet is becoming more expensive and difficult to maintain, highlights the need to develop the next-generation, long-range bomber by 2018. The new bomber will feature stealth, payload, and improved avionics sensor suites and will incorporate advanced technologies to ensure our bomber force's ability to fulfill our nation's and the combatant commanders' global requirements.

Finally, while Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power in the Pacific requires modernizing the fleet, it also requires new infrastructure on Guam. Guam has become an important piece of DoD force-structure transformation in the Pacific and is a critical part of the USAF strategic triangle of bases on US soil in Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam. In addition to the ISR-Strike Task Force at Andersen AFB, PACAF is in the process of standing up a contingency response group (CRG) composed of Red Horse civil engineers, security forces, combat communications, and airlift mobility support squadrons—all the elements required to open an airfield. PACAF consolidated these units from bases around the Pacific to create a single unit under one commander that will train together and be able to deploy rapidly worldwide. Overall, the Air Force buildup on Guam will stress the island's construction capacity from 2009 through 2014. The Guam infrastructure buildup will require a coordinated effort involving the government of Guam, the DoD, federal agencies, and private businesses to implement innovative cost-sharing, privatizing, and commercial solutions.²⁶

To overcome worldwide advancements in fighter technology and air defenses, the nation must enable the Air Force to field the F-35, combat search and rescue (CSAR)-X, and next-generation, long-range bombers to ensure our strength in the Pacific. The Air Force needs the new tanker fielded immediately in a theater where tankers make or break the ability

to deliver Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power. In addition, the Air Force needs to continue to focus its ISR, space, and cyber capabilities on the region. Finally, there are substantial investments in infrastructure required at PACAF bases, especially Andersen, which has become a key base for delivering sovereign options for the nation.

The Air Force has come a long way in the Pacific, both in how we posture our forces and how we have engaged with our partners. We are in a marathon—not a sprint—but we must also realize that to remain ahead we must maintain the pace. The relative calm we find today in the Pacific is due in large part to the resources and support provided to the military and the Air Force by America. This support has been critical to the Airmen before us who worked hard, and at times fought hard, to build the security and stability we enjoy today. We cannot afford to do less in the coming days as this region is too important to our national interest and our future as a great nation. 

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Ballistic Missile Defense

A National Priority

Jeff Sessions

A SIGNIFICANT ANNIVERSARY in our nation's history passed recently, although most Americans probably did not realize it. 23 March 2008 marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), or "Star Wars," speech. Addressing the American people from the Oval Office on prime-time television, President Reagan challenged the notion that the security of our nation had to rely entirely on so-called mutually assured destruction (MAD). The president argued that "the human spirit must be capable of rising above dealing with other nations and human beings by threatening their existence." While acknowledging the technological challenges inherent in missile defense, often compared to "hitting a bullet with a bullet," Reagan nevertheless "call[ed] upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete." President Reagan's SDI speech a quarter century ago was certainly one of the highlights of his great presidency. The speech galvanized the American people, and the White House was overwhelmed with phone calls from the general public, over 80 percent of which were supportive of SDI.¹ The Soviets also took notice, publicly denouncing the speech in hysterical tones while, internally, wondering what it meant for the future of their crumbling Communist system. As Vice President Cheney recently said, "Reagan's vision of missile defense surely helped accelerate our victory in the Cold War. There was simply no way the Soviet Union was going to defeat an America so confident in its purposes and so determined to defend itself against nuclear terror. This outcome alone is enough to place Ronald Reagan among our greatest presidents."²

Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL) has served in the Senate since 1996. He is a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and serves as the Ranking Member on the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, which handles all missile defense, nuclear, and space issues. He is also a member of the Judiciary, Budget, and Energy and Natural Resources Committees. Prior to his service in the Senate, Senator Sessions served as United States Attorney for Alabama's Southern District and Alabama Attorney General.

The anniversary of President Reagan's momentous speech has caused me to reflect a great deal on the subject of missile defense—what we have accomplished and what we have yet to do. In the pages that follow I would like to discuss the nature of the threat America faces from ballistic missiles, the Ballistic Missile Defense System that we have built, the technologies for the future, and the political environment facing missile defense today.

The Evolving Missile Threat

Opponents of missile defense today often argue that foreign ballistic missiles are not a serious enough threat to justify the effort and expenditure required to deploy antimissile defenses. Terrorists and rogue states, these skeptics argue, are more likely to use unconventional means to deliver weapons of mass destruction, such as container ships or so-called suitcase nukes. But many hostile states are actively pursuing sophisticated ballistic missile capabilities. There were over 120 foreign ballistic missile launches in 2007, which greatly exceed what has been seen in recent years. North Korea and Iran have recently demonstrated the ability to undertake complex missile operations requiring multiple and simultaneous launches of different ranges of missiles.³ Other nations, such as Syria and Pakistan, are expanding the number and range of their missiles.

North Korea is perhaps the most dangerous of America's enemies because it has long-range missiles, a demonstrated nuclear weapons capability, and a history of selling sensitive technologies to other rogue regimes. Calling North Korea's missile program "a threat which cannot be ignored," Gen B. B. Bell, commander of US forces in Korea, recently told the Senate Armed Services Committee that "as a leading supplier of missile-related technologies with known export programs to Syria, Iran and other nations of concern, North Korea continues to build missiles of increasing range, lethality and accuracy, bolstering its current stockpile of 800 missiles for its defense and external sales."⁴ This assessment was backed up by retired vice admiral Mike McConnell, our Director of National Intelligence, who testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee that "we assess that North Korea's Taepo Dong-2, which failed in its flight test in July 2006, probably has the potential capability to deliver a nuclear-weapon-sized payload to the continental United States."⁵ Our global missile defense system is now available to neutralize this threat to the US homeland.

Iran also poses a growing threat to the US homeland, our allies, and our forward-deployed forces. Gen Bantz J. Craddock, commander of US European Command, recently stated that “Iran already possesses ballistic missiles that can reach parts of Europe and is developing missiles that can reach most of Europe. By 2015 Iran may also deploy an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capable of reaching all of Europe and parts of the U.S.”⁶ The United States currently has no means of protecting our territory, or that of our NATO allies, from such missiles launched from Iran. For that reason, President Bush has proposed, and the Congress has supported, the building of a ground-based missile defense system in Eastern Europe (often called the “third site”). Plans call for a powerful missile-tracking radar to be moved from the Pacific theater and placed in the Czech Republic, along with 10 ground-based interceptors based in silos in Poland. Our government continues to make progress on basing agreements for this system, and I am hopeful that we can get it up and running by the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) stated goal of 2012. Because our intelligence community believes that Iran may have a nuclear-armed ICBM deployed by 2015, any delay in the third site could mean that we would be unprotected when the Iranian threat matures.

Clearly, our enemies’ expanding missile programs are meant to be directed at some target. If Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Il believe that ballistic missiles are still relevant in the post-9/11 world, it would behoove us to act as if they are. Today we face a much broader range of missile threats than we did during the Cold War, posed by a much more diverse, and less predictable, group of enemies. Can Iran be counted on not to launch an ICBM at the United States or our allies, or not to pass it to a terrorist group that would? Without defenses in place, we may face the unenviable choice between preemptively attacking states with ballistic missiles and leaving our population vulnerable to them. The good news is that today’s rogue regimes do not have, and probably never will have, anything approaching the number of ICBMs that the Soviets held at the peak of their power. Missile defenses can therefore have even more deterrent and defensive power against these regimes.

Progress to Date

Though we have accomplished much over the past 25 years, we spent much of that time hamstrung by the strictures of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The treaty, negotiated with the Soviet Union in 1972, limited the signatories to two interceptor sites within their national territories, and the parties eventually agreed to cut that number to one each. The central purpose of the treaty was to prohibit the deployment of a national missile defense system. Thankfully, after consultation with Russian president Putin and other foreign partners, President Bush took the decisive, essential step of withdrawing from this outdated agreement in 2002. Facing down those with fevered brows, he recognized the reality that we needed to deploy a missile defense system and that it could not be done with the treaty in force.

The Missile Defense Agency now employs more than 8,000 full-time and contract staff dedicated to defending America from ballistic missile attack. In 2002 President Bush charged the MDA with developing and deploying missile defenses as rapidly as possible. He gave it special flexibility in its acquisition processes so that missile defense would not get bogged down and drawn out like so many other defense programs have in the past. The results speak for themselves. The MDA has fielded an initial missile defense capability built upon four tested and proven programs: Ground-Based Mid-course Defense (GMD), Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), and the Theater High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. As General Obering recently testified: "None of this capability existed as recently as June 2004. This rapid fielding would never have been possible unless I had the integrated decision authority over requirements, acquisition, and budget. I think it is fair to say that this capability would have taken 2 to 3 times longer to field under standard Department practices."⁷

Unlike earlier missile defense systems such as Nike-Zeus, Safeguard, and the first-generation Patriot missile, today's missile defense platforms all operate on the principle of "hit-to-kill." These systems must and do work flawlessly in real time, a monumental accomplishment that some have compared to that of landing a man on the moon. As of today, the MDA demonstrated hit-to-kill in 34 of 42 attempts since 2001. In 2007 it conducted 25 major tests and successfully met its primary test objectives in 18 of 20 flight tests. Of those 2007 tests for which a missile intercept was the objective, success was achieved in 10 of 10 attempts.⁸ According

to Charles McQueary, the Pentagon's chief weapons tester: "Hit-to-kill is no longer a technological uncertainty; it is a reality, being successfully demonstrated many times over the past few years. The challenge now is to demonstrate hit-to-kill in more complex target scenes that include not only target deployment artifacts but countermeasures as well. [MDA director] General Obering has this in his future test plans."⁹

The centerpiece of the present architecture is the GMD system, consisting of 24 ground-based interceptors sitting in silos at Ft. Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg AFB, California. GMD is tied together by a command and control suite and cued by a host of powerful radars based on land, sea, and space. When the North Koreans prepared to launch their Taepodong-2 missile in July of 2006, the GMD system was placed on alert 24 hours a day. The North Korean missile ultimately failed early in flight, but the demonstration of American defensive capability marked a signal success for the MDA. Though the North Korean test was a failure, Admiral McConnell has testified that, with continued testing, the Taepodong-2 "probably has the potential capability to deliver a nuclear-weapon-sized payload to the continental United States."¹⁰

Our allies and forces deployed abroad are currently protected, in part, by 17 Aegis BMD warships capable of long-range radar surveillance and tracking, of which 12 are also capable of missile intercepts. Aegis BMD warships fire the Standard Missile-3, which has achieved more successful intercepts than any other missile defense system in our inventory, including a recent test against two targets at once. Aegis and the SM-3 missile are perhaps most notable as the duo responsible for the February 2007 tracking and shooting down of a malfunctioning reconnaissance satellite that was set to crash to Earth, possibly spreading its toxic fuel in a populated area. Aegis warships can also fire the SM-3 Block IV, which can intercept the kinds of short-range missiles that are proliferated all over the Middle East.

PAC-3 and THAAD are theater defense systems, providing protection against short- and some medium-range missiles. PAC-3 engages short-range missiles inside the earth's atmosphere (endoatmospheric) while THAAD can destroy short- and medium-range missiles either inside or outside (exoatmospheric) the atmosphere. Together, they will provide our forces abroad and our allies with protection against a range of threats. The MDA has also worked closely with allied nations on missile defense projects, and the agency currently is engaged with some form of cooperation with 18 nations.

The Future of Missile Defense

Looking to the future, I believe that we will see important agreements signed with our allies in Poland and the Czech Republic, allowing us to base elements of our ground-based system in Eastern Europe as a defense for all of Europe and the United States against the growing Iranian threat. Maintaining funding for the European site is one of the most important battles we will have to fight this year, but it is a battle we must win. It is one of the highest legislative priorities for the Bush administration, and for me personally. It is unconscionable to me that we would pull the rug out from under allied governments and leaders who have courageously stood with us against the protests of their domestic leftists and the intimidating behavior of Putin's Russia. And I don't think we will.

Just over the horizon is a new generation of even more powerful missile defense technologies, including more capable SM-3 missiles; better defenses against short-range rockets, artillery, and mortars (counter-RAM); and the development of Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI) that can strike missiles as they are boosting off the launchpad. We may also see boost-phase missile defense applications for directed energy weapons as well, via the Airborne Laser (ABL) program. Our midcourse interceptors will be more capable in the next decade. Multiple-kill vehicles (MKV) that place multiple interceptors on a single booster will better allow our missile defense systems to overcome countermeasures, such as balloons and decoys. Ultimately, protecting this nation from ballistic missile attack may also require putting defense assets in space. For reasons that elude me, some of my colleagues in Congress continue to prevent us from even funding basic research into these space-based BMD technologies.

The president's total missile defense funding request for fiscal year 2009 is \$10.8 billion. That is a significant sum of money, to be sure, but by no means is it out of proportion to other critical national defense programs. By way of comparison, \$8.8 billion was requested this year for defense satellite programs, \$4.6 billion for a next-generation aircraft carrier, and \$6.9 billion for the Joint Strike Fighter. Our momentum must not be lost through further cuts to current levels of missile defense funding. Our systems must get more robust and more capable because history teaches us that our enemies will not stand still. It is also important to note that, as the Government Accountability Office recently found, cost growth on MDA programs has averaged only around 5 to 6 percent.¹¹ So-called Nunn-McCurdy rules, which require the

Defense Department to issue waivers for programs whose costs are spiraling out of control, do not kick in until cost growth reaches 25 percent.

The Political Environment

When President Reagan unveiled his Strategic Defense proposal 25 years ago, he faced a torrent of reflexive, antimissile defense rhetoric from the liberal intelligentsia in this country. The Atlanta *Constitution* criticized Reagan for “raising the remote possibility of a sci-fi defense against Soviet missiles” and argued that, in the process, Reagan “risked destabilizing the U.S.-Soviet military balance—already dangerously tenuous.”¹² Kosta Tsipis, codirector of a program in science and technology at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, called the program “a cruel hoax,” and physicist Howard Garcia said that “if [the SDI] is finally developed or even pursued in earnest, it surely will engender the most counterproductive, senseless waste of intellect, labor and treasure in human history.”¹³ A group of former foreign policy eminences, including Robert McNamara and McGeorge Bundy, predicted that “unless it is radically constrained during the next four years [the SDI] will bring vast new costs and dangers to our country and to mankind.”

These self-proclaimed “experts” made arguments that were, on their face, self-contradictory. They argued that missile defense would be ineffective—that it was a technological impossibility. Yet, in the next breath, they would claim that missile defense was going to destabilize the US-Soviet nuclear balance and drive Moscow to take drastic measures. How both of these things could be true is beyond me. In fact, both arguments proved false. America pursued missile defenses while simultaneously improving relations with the USSR.


President Reagan believed that American unpreparedness was the greatest threat to peace and stability. While many of his opponents felt that investing in missile defenses would lead to a destabilizing “spiral” of arms racing, Reagan argued in his SDI address that “we can’t afford to believe that we will never be threatened. There have been two world wars in my lifetime. We didn’t start them and, indeed, did everything we could to avoid being drawn into them. But we were ill-prepared for both. Had we been better prepared, peace might have been preserved.” Reagan turned out to be right, of course. His pursuit of defenses may have hastened the downfall of the Communist regime, the arms race was no worse after than it had been before the speech,

and Reagan's signal of determination to prepare was taken as an unambiguous sign of American strength by the Soviets.

Well, our missile defense systems may have come a long way since 1983, but the arguments of the naysayers have not. In 2002 Prof. Ted Postol of MIT claimed that the MDA had "concealed from the American people and Congress the fact that a weapon system paid for by hard-earned tax dollars to defend our country cannot work." Yet, after dozens of successful tests, Dr. Postol now claims that our proposed missile defense site in Europe may be so capable that it could make Russia insecure. He wrote in October of last year that, in the future, "the European defense might be able to engage many hundreds of targets, thereby, in conjunction with other U.S. systems, threatening Russia's nuclear deterrent."¹⁴ Once again, these criticisms are both self-contradictory and demonstrably false. Missile defense works, and it is a force for stability rather than instability in the world.

While some continue to oppose even funding basic research for some of these technologies, the good news is that, unlike in Reagan's time, voices like Dr. Postol's are few in number and no longer part of the mainstream debate on either side of the aisle. We have, I believe, crossed the Rubicon. The Democrats on our defense committees have used their newly gained majority to nibble away at some missile defense funding, but not to slash it. In their first year back in charge, the Democratic majority cut the Missile Defense Agency request about 3 percent. Their decision speaks volumes: it says missile defense is now not just a conservative cause, a Reagan star wars vision, but it has become a national commitment that we must complete. The American people want this security, and the Congress will not deny it to them.

This hard-won consensus would never have been possible if not for the vision of Ronald Reagan, just as the incredible capabilities we have developed over the past quarter century would not exist without the dedicated military and civilian personnel of the MDA and its predecessor organizations. The United States is the world leader in missile defense technology and is dedicated to expanding its ever-improving defensive umbrella to friends and allies around the world. As Ronald Reagan saw well before most, missile defense is a potent force for security and stability in the world. It is a powerful weapon for peace-loving nations that refuse to be bullied by despots and dictators armed with weapons of terror. Edward Teller, the famous Hungarian scientist who originally convinced Reagan of the need to launch SDI, put it this way: "I love my grandchildren. I

want to be sure that they will be able to live out their lives without facing the terrible choice between slavery and Armageddon.”¹⁵ Today the Missile Defense Agency and its supporters around the country are making sure that we can all live in such a world. 

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The Drawdown Asymmetry

Why Ground Forces Will Depart Iraq but Air Forces Will Stay

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The Language of Iraq Strategy

The common language used to describe Iraq often obscures reality. Nowhere is this more evident than in the descriptions of the “surge strategy.” Some assert that the surge is not really a strategy at all because it focuses on the *means* employed in Iraq and ignores the *ways* and *ends* of coalition policy there.¹ Others argue that the surge strategy did, in fact, include a modification of the *ends* (political reconciliation was identified as a key goal, and multiple, measurable benchmarks were proposed to guide the Iraqi political process) as well as the *ways* (coalition troops established multiple joint security stations where they, along with their Iraqi counterparts, lived among the people they were responsible for securing).² The element that attracted the lion’s share of the attention, however, was the increase in the *means*, specifically the addition of thousands of US ground forces into Iraq.

While many elements of combat power have increased in and around Iraq over the past year—including sea, air, and space power—both public officials and members of the media have described the increase in military force almost exclusively in terms of major ground units.³ In fact, the most common description of the surge highlights the increase in brigade combat teams (BCT) from 15 to 20.⁴ The current debate over Iraq strategy centers on the questions of when, and how rapidly, forces will be reduced in Iraq, and it continues to revolve around major ground units. It seems likely that this trend will continue. Discussions of when and how the US

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Army BCTs will leave Iraq will dominate the discourse about the coalition's future in Iraq.⁵

For all of the discussion about force levels and combat units in Iraq, it is surprising that one important aspect of the coming drawdown has not been discussed widely—until now. While major ground units will soon begin leaving without replacement, air units in the region cannot do so. Air forces must stay behind to protect and support the coalition forces that remain. They must also control and protect the sovereign airspace over Iraq, as the Iraqi air force is many years away from being able to do this. Over time, this will manifest itself in a *drawdown asymmetry* that will have weighty implications for coalition policy in Iraq as well as for the long-term health of the organizations tasked to provide these air forces, chiefly the US Air Force. Ultimately, the consequences may manifest themselves in such a way that the term *drawdown asymmetry* will become a key element of the language used to discuss Iraq strategy.

Major Ground Units Must Leave

Major ground units are leaving Iraq, and they will not be replaced. Those knowledgeable with the current state of the US Army and the Marine Corps realize this was inevitable.⁶ The two services could not sustain the required level of effort much longer without incurring unacceptable risks to the health of their forces. Prior to implementing the surge, the Army and Marine Corps faced significant challenges in the areas of deployment scheduling, recruiting, retention, and equipment. As early as 2004, some were describing the Army as "broken."⁷ The years that followed saw increased pressures placed on units as their tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan were extended routinely, and their recovery time was cut short. When the surge added more stress to this baseline, the challenges grew considerably.⁸ Maj Gen Michael L. Oates, commander of the 10th Mountain Division, describes the current situation in this way: "[Our soldiers] are also very tired. A 15-month tour is very difficult on soldiers and on families, especially if you're on your second or third tour. The strain on soldiers and their families is not cumulative, it is exponential."⁹

The stress on the Army and Marine Corps is unsustainable over the long run. Coalition leaders, including the president, always intended these policies to be a short-term approach to increase security in order to buy time for the political process to improve. While the surge in military forces appears to have mitigated the sectarian violence that has gripped Iraq since the bombing of

the Golden Mosque in Samara in early 2006, progress on the political front has been painfully slow.¹⁰ It now appears that Iraqi politicians will have until summer of 2008 to take advantage of the temporary surge in troops. By then, the surge will have pushed the ground forces to their limits, and ground forces will continue coming home.

But the United States Must Stay Involved in Iraq

Some call for an “immediate” exit from Iraq, and others argue that the surge is working and should continue. The only meaningful question, however, regarding ground force levels is determining the best plan to attain a sustainable force level until the coalition is ready to leave. This plan must avoid extremes. Just as current force levels are unsustainable, the United States cannot withdraw forces abruptly—there are numerous physical limits to preparing and transporting the equipment and people.¹¹ Any feasible plan will withdraw forces over a significant period such that a graph depicting force levels versus time will resemble a glide path (see fig. 1).




Figure 1. The Withdrawal “Glide Path.” (Adapted from House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees, “Charts to Accompany the Testimony of GEN David H. Petraeus,” *Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq*, prepared by Gen David H. Petraeus, commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, 10–11 September 2007, <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Petraeus-Testimony-Slides20070910.pdf>.) This figure uses the same force levels and ambiguous timeline General Petraeus presented (see fig. 2).

At some point on this glide path, the United States will reach a ground force level that is physically sustainable in the long term (i.e., the United States can keep the forces in the field at moderate cost in terms of lives, finances, and opportunity costs to other missions and global commitments). Once physical sustainment is possible, political sustainment in Washington, DC, becomes possible as well. It is at this point that the next major Iraq debate will take place, as politicians and their advisors ask, should the United States see the operation in Iraq through to a logical conclusion or cut its losses? In other words, should we stay or should we go?

The most likely answer is that the United States will stay. Once US ground force levels in Iraq are both physically and politically sustainable, the United States is most likely to conclude that as long as the central government of Iraq is weak, continued engagement is preferable to complete withdrawal. There are several reasons for this. First, an Iraq with no US forces in place will probably descend into chaos. During his testimony to Congress, General Petraeus cited the conclusions of a Defense Intelligence Agency report addressing the consequences of a rapid withdrawal from Iraq:

A rapid withdrawal would result in the further release of the strong centrifugal forces in Iraq and produce a number of dangerous results, including a high risk of disintegration of the Iraqi Security Forces; rapid deterioration of local security initiatives; al Qaeda-Iraq regaining lost ground and freedom of maneuver; a marked increase in violence and further ethno-sectarian displacement and refugee flows; alliances of convenience by Iraqi groups with internal and external forces to gain advantages over their rivals; and exacerbation of already challenging regional dynamics, especially with respect to Iran.¹²

This report makes the case that a failed Iraqi state is a prime candidate to provide sanctuary and strategic bases for transnational terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. An Iraqi state in chaos would be advantageous for al-Qaeda as it would offer the group a large Islamic population in which to hide, relatively easy access to transportation and lines of communication, and large numbers of potential recruits. In today's global security environment, any failed state with a large Islamic population is a threat to become a hotbed for terrorism. Iraq is no exception, and it is not in the United States' or coalition's interest to walk away from Iraq and allow al-Qaeda free access.¹³ This is a major reason why coalition nations are likely to keep forces in (or near) Iraq for many years to come.

In addition to offering sanctuary for transnational terrorist groups, an Iraq in chaos is fertile ground for Iran to extend its influence over large areas of Iraq, including areas that contain large oil fields. Iran is undoubtedly

exerting itself in Iraq today. General Petraeus described this in his testimony: "It is increasingly apparent to both Coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the Qods Force, seeks to turn the Iraqi Special Groups into a Hezbollah-like force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq."¹⁴ A total withdrawal would leave this activity unchecked—not a good outcome for the United States or many of its coalition partners.

While the United States is not profiting directly from the war in Iraq, there are strong economic reasons to stay engaged there, and the chief consideration is the oil market. US oil imports from Iraq comprise only a small percentage of the total, but oil supplies are so tight that any disruptions in supply can have major repercussions for the global market.¹⁵ Even though the coalition actively protects Iraq's oil infrastructure, there have been hundreds of insurgent attacks on pipelines, pumping stations, and other components.¹⁶ Iraqi oil production is a key component of the supply provided by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and analysts believe this production will rise over the next year.¹⁷ Analysts have already factored these expectations into their market forecasts, and sudden shocks to oil supply, even if only in the short term, could result in price spikes that have the potential to affect the global economy for months to years. In addition, oil revenues are critical for the continued progress of the Iraqi government, and this gives the government's enemies ample reason to continue attacks on oil infrastructure. Remaining engaged in Iraq is the best way to minimize this risk.

In addition to protecting US and coalition interests, there are several other reasons for staying engaged there. First, some make a strong moral argument that the United States should not walk away from Iraq. From a security and economic standpoint, many Iraqis are worse off today than they were under the Hussein regime. Many believe that the United States has an obligation to stay until Iraqis enjoy a decent opportunity for a better future. As James Dobbins comments, "Having toppled Saddam Hussein and dismantled his government, the United States has assumed weighty responsibilities for about 28 million people whom we cannot in good conscience shirk."¹⁸ Anthony Cordesman agrees when he writes that by invading Iraq, the United States put "28 million lives at risk and is morally responsible for the outcome."¹⁹ Second, the United States has invested a great amount of emotional energy in Iraq. Hundreds of thousands of US citizens, from the lowest-ranking soldiers to the most senior officials, have forged personal relationships with Iraqi people—walking away from them

will be emotionally difficult. As an example, Marine gunnery sergeant Terry Walker, an instructor who trains Iraqi security forces, expresses his frustration at the suggestion that coalition forces would leave Iraq, "Are you telling me that after five years, we would cut the fish loose as soon as we got him to the boat?"²⁰ Third, historical analogies are important to policy makers, and the most easily available analogy is the US withdrawal from South Vietnam.²¹ As many perceive this as a mistake, it will bolster the argument to continue the US involvement in Iraq.²² Finally, the best line of reasoning for a rapid withdrawal from Iraq is that continued involvement is a strategic overcommitment that jeopardizes US interests in other areas of the world. In the absence of a clear threat, however, this argument is unlikely to hold sway. For all of these reasons, the United States is likely to remain engaged in Iraq for many years to come, albeit with a much smaller ground force.

Transitioning From "Go Big" to "Go Long"

With the ongoing redeployment of ground forces, a major shift is underway from a short-term surge to a significantly smaller force that is sustainable in the long term. At least one Pentagon planning group predicted this shift. In late 2006, as the Bush administration searched for a new direction in Iraq, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Peter Pace, formed a policy advisory group that identified three main options in Iraq. The advisory group concluded that the United States could send more troops to try and break the cycle of sectarian violence (nicknamed the "go big" option), withdraw troops and transition to a long-term training and advisory function ("go long"), or withdraw all forces from Iraq ("go home"). In addition, the group identified a hybrid plan dubbed, "Go big but short while transitioning to go long." This option included a short-term buildup followed up by a drawdown to a sustainable force level.²³ It is now apparent that the United States is executing this option, and barring the unexpected, 2008 will be the year where the transition from "go big" to "go long" will take place.

The "go long" force will be much smaller than the surge force that is in Iraq today, and its mission will fundamentally change. In his testimony to Congress, General Petraeus summarized this shift in the title for his recommendation for Iraq's future: "Security While Transitioning: From Leading to Partnering to Overwatch."²⁴ He also depicted this simulta-

neous drawdown and transition in his slide titled “Recommended Force Reductions and Mission Shift” (see fig. 2). While the majority of coalition forces are currently “in the lead” when conducting counterinsurgency missions, the slide depicts how they will eventually step aside and let Iraqi units do this for themselves. As an interim step, many major ground units have taken on a “partnering” role, where they pair up with an Iraqi unit.²⁵ These partner units conduct joint operations, with the coalition unit assuming a mentoring role. Once the Iraqi units are ready to stand on their own, their partnered units will step aside. Instead of leaving altogether, however, some ground forces will stay in an “overwatch” role—they will be available to shore up the Iraqi units when contingencies arise, but they will increasingly be out of sight to the average Iraqi. General Petraeus’s planners have identified three levels of overwatch—tactical, operational, and




Figure 2. Recommended Force Reductions and Mission Shift. (Reprinted from House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees, “Charts to Accompany the Testimony of GEN David H. Petraeus,” *Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq*, prepared by Gen David H. Petraeus, commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, 10–11 September 2007, <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Petraeus-Testimony-Slides20070910.pdf>.)

and strategic—corresponding to the level of oversight required and the rapidity at which the coalition unit could respond if needed.

It is interesting to note what General Petraeus's slide does not show—it does not depict a complete exit from Iraq. According to this plan, the withdrawal of US ground forces stops at five BCTs. These remaining BCTs will serve two major functions. First, they will be available to conduct counterterrorism missions in Iraq (and beyond, if necessary). Second, they will be present in case things go poorly for specific Iraqi units or for the Iraqi government in general. In order to accomplish these two functions, not all of these BCTs will need to be in Iraq, but it certainly appears that some of them will.

While major ground units appear to be poised to draw down to a sustainable level, another type of military unit will increase dramatically over the next few years. These small units are the transition teams—the key link to successful training for Iraqi forces. These teams typically consist of 11–15 members, each of whom brings key specialties to the team such as intelligence, logistics, and communications.²⁶ Transition teams embed within their assigned Iraqi unit, and their role is to advise, coach, and mentor these units, especially through interaction with the Iraqi unit commanders.²⁷ Transition teams also act as the link to key aspects of coalition support, including intelligence, fires, and medical evacuation.²⁸ Transition teams come in several varieties, depending on the type of Iraqi unit they support. For example, there are military transition teams assigned to Iraqi army units, border transition teams assigned to border security forces, special police transition teams assigned to Iraqi police units, and air transition teams for the Iraqi air force.²⁹

The US Army has made a tremendous investment in training transition teams, devoting an entire brigade (the 1st BCT of the 1st Infantry Division based at Fort Riley, Kansas) to the task of organizing, equipping, training, and supporting transition teams.³⁰ This unit is currently preparing numerous transition teams for service in Iraq. As additional transition teams deploy, they will travel with their assigned units and operate throughout the country. The result will be that, as major ground units consolidate in central bases outside the major population centers (and most leave Iraq altogether), scores of transition teams will disperse throughout Iraq.

Despite their importance, there has been remarkably little discussion in the debate over Iraq policy about the roles, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of the transition teams as compared to the major ground units, especially the Army

BCTs. Another form of military power—airpower—will be critical for these transition teams' safety and effectiveness, but it has been absent from the discussion as well. This will soon change, however, as policy makers realize that while major ground units can come home, the air units in Iraq cannot.

Major Air Units Must Stay

Unless the coalition is prepared to accept major risks to both its forces and objectives in Iraq, the air forces currently supporting operations there, with a few exceptions, must stay in place. There are two central reasons for this. First, coalition airpower is necessary to support and protect the ground forces that remain, especially the dispersed transition teams. Second, coalition air forces are necessary to control, protect, and defend the airspace above Iraq. Failure to ensure the safety of coalition forces or the sovereignty of Iraq's airspace would have such severe consequences that decision makers will conclude that air forces cannot leave at the same rate as ground forces. This drawdown asymmetry is likely to continue until the transition teams stand down and the Iraqi air force stands up.

Support and Protection for Coalition Forces

As long as significant numbers of coalition ground forces are present in Iraq, they will need the support and protection that airpower provides. They will need airlift to move people and supplies both into and around the battlespace. They will need the above-ground perspective provided by intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, as well as numerous other assets such as fighters equipped with advanced targeting pods. They will need lethal effects provided by fighters, bombers, unmanned aerial vehicles, or attack helicopters to engage the enemy when necessary. They will need combat search and rescue to recover isolated personnel, and they will need access to aeromedical evacuation in case of life-threatening injuries. They will need airborne platforms to relay critical communications (as they must overcome chronic shortfalls in their communications equipment). Today, airpower provides important—and at times essential—effects throughout Iraq. As the mission endures, the need for these effects will remain. Consequently, air forces must stay.

This is true despite the fact that there will be fewer ground forces to support, and the amount of support required will decrease. There are two key reasons for this. First, Iraq is a large country, and the tyranny of dis-

tance drives air and space solutions to the problems of logistics, fires, and communication. This is especially applicable to the dispersed transition teams. These small teams will operate across Iraq in unpredictable ways as they mentor and train their Iraqi partners. Due to their small numbers and lack of heavy equipment, they will be vulnerable, and airpower is their insurance policy. The transition teams must have the ability to rely on logistical support through airlift and airdrop. If things go poorly and their units get into trouble, they will need to be able to call for lethal effects through close air support (CAS). Depending on their communications equipment, they may need persistent communications relay from the air. The requirement, therefore, from an air strategist's perspective, does not depend on the amount of support required as much as it does on the acceptable coverage in terms of distance and the response window in terms of time.

Two examples help illustrate the challenge of covering all of Iraq in a reasonable time with airpower. Regarding airlift, even if the needed supplies are relatively modest in volume, the dispersal of the transition teams will mean that logisticians must develop a complex system to support all of the teams. While ground transport will be a major part of the solution, it is reasonable to conclude that sizeable numbers of airframes will be required to make this system both responsive and reliable. Responsiveness is an issue for lethal effects as well. When the transition teams call for CAS, they need it as soon as possible. This drives the requirement for significant numbers of airframes on ground or airborne alert. Even though coalition forces may need only a small number of fighters at any one time, the possibility that the need may arise anywhere from Basra to Mosul drives the requirement for a complex system—one that will rely on numerous fighters on ground alert at multiple bases and/or airborne alert at multiple holding points. It is unlikely that a system could meet this requirement for coverage with significantly less airpower than is in Iraq today.

In addition to the requirements for coverage and responsiveness, the demand for airborne ISR will remain high, even as major ground units leave. A characteristic of counterinsurgency operations is an insatiable demand for intelligence. This is certainly true in Iraq. It is common for coalition forces to conduct operations for the primary purpose of gaining intelligence.³¹ While much of the most reliable intelligence in counterinsurgency operations comes from person-to-person interaction (human intelligence), military commanders have found that the above-ground perspective is critical to success. Commanders use information gained

from airborne sensors to build pattern-of-life information on potential bad actors, observe high-threat areas such as roads and base perimeters, create products that help them plan out future operations, and maintain situational awareness of both friendly and enemy actions during battle.

The most influential thinkers in both the Army and Marine Corps believe that airborne sensors should be responsive to the needs of commanders at the lowest levels.³² Every day, requests from low-level commanders for ISR support flood into the Central Command Air Forces' air operations center. Unfortunately, there are not enough assets to fill all of these requests (in fact, to respond to this demand, some ISR systems have been deployed at a rate that is unsustainable, and this is discussed later in this article). This is especially true of platforms that provide full-motion video—continuous video that acts much like a security camera in the sky.³³ Even if major ground units leave and their requests for ISR decrease accordingly, the transition teams are likely to continue asking for ISR support for many years to come. Operations throughout the Middle East, especially in Iraq, are going to continue to pull a disproportionate amount of airborne ISR assets from the national pool. Except for the systems that are on the verge of breaking, these assets will need to stay.

Controlling and Protecting Iraq's Airspace

In addition to meeting the support requirements for ground forces that remain in Iraq, there is another reason why air forces cannot leave. For the time being, coalition air forces must control and protect Iraq's sovereign airspace. Airspace control in Iraq is an extremely complex activity, as air controllers must strike a balance between ongoing military operations and civilian air traffic. As an example, the air sector over Baghdad is one of the busiest in the world. At any moment, there may be a civilian airliner awaiting takeoff at Baghdad International Airport, a military airlift platform on final approach with a priority delivery of human blood, multiple helicopters transporting high-ranking officials, fighter aircraft performing CAS for a patrol in southern Baghdad, a communications relay platform positioned over the city for maximum coverage, international civilian traffic transiting over Iraq, and scores of ISR platforms—both manned and unmanned—feeding the appetite for intelligence information. Add in the complexity of deconflicting artillery fire with aircraft and you have one of the most challenging air control problems in history. The USAF has dedicated a large contingent of air controllers (with expensive radar and

communications equipment) to Iraq, and they will not be coming home anytime soon.³⁴

The same is true for those responsible for defending Iraq's sovereign airspace. Iraq is in a strategic position, both literally and figuratively. It is a historic center of political power in the Middle East, and this history remains important to people in the region. It contains the world's most volatile nexus of Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish populations. It possesses large reserves of strategic resources, including oil, which continue to grow in value as demand increases. Its eastern border is a physical manifestation of the deep divide between the Arab and Persian peoples. The world's most active Islamist terrorist groups view it as the critical front in their war against the West. Civilian airlines and transport services use its airspace extensively as an aerial trade route (and they pay sizeable fees for this privilege). Iraq is valuable, and many covet the ability to exert influence within the country.

Another interesting fact is that every one of Iraq's neighbors owns a relatively modern air force. Iran and Syria operate modern Soviet-style fighters. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey, and Israel all possess modern fighters made in the United States. In addition, several of these air forces have experience fighting in Iraq's airspace.

If the coalition were to leave Iraq with no credible air defense, Iraq may or may not be attacked through the air in coming years. It is very likely, however, that its neighbors would attempt to coerce the Iraqi government by leveraging their superior air capabilities. Even with coalition airpower in place, countries such as Turkey and Iran endeavor to coerce the Iraqi government, and Turkey has conducted air attacks into Iraq.³⁵ If countries are willing to threaten and conduct air incursions today—with coalition air forces in place—it is very likely that these threats will increase in the absence of a credible air deterrent. The Iraqi government cannot enjoy freedom of action unless its sovereign airspace is secure.

Defending Iraq's airspace, however, is not a simple task. As stated earlier, Iraq is a large country, and air defense assets must operate throughout its territory to be credible. Defense forces need to react with a reasonable response time, and this requires a combination of surveillance posts, air bases, ground defense sites, and airborne assets. Some may assert that the coalition can defend Iraq's airspace from bases outside of Iraq (such as in Kuwait), but this is unlikely to be totally effective as the reaction time required in certain scenarios (an Iranian incursion into northeast Iraq, for example) is so great that the

deterrent is not credible. This is especially true if situational awareness is low due to the lack of a comprehensive air picture.

Defending Iraq's airspace requires a considerable amount of military power inside Iraq with the capability and expertise to offer a credible air deterrent. These forces do not have to be dedicated air defense forces, although they could be. Multirole fighters, alternatively, could accomplish support missions for ground forces while maintaining the ability to intercept and engage hostile aircraft. This is how the coalition fields an air deterrent today, allowing it to meet multiple requirements with a smaller force. This force, however, must stay in place, or the Iraqi government will be open to coercion by its neighbors.

What about the Iraqi Air Force?

The obvious question is, why can't the Iraqis control and protect their own airspace? After all, the Hussein regime possessed an air force that was capable of a wide spectrum of air missions. The need for major coalition air units to remain in place would largely evaporate if the Iraqi military possessed a capable air arm. The coalition, unfortunately, is still in the early stages of developing a new Iraqi air force. Compared to the progress made in building the Iraqi army, the Iraqi air force lags significantly behind, and this gap is growing. There are many reasons for this, and some of them deserve a brief mention.

The 1991 Gulf War, the intervening years of no-fly-zone enforcement, and the invasion of 2003 left the Iraqi air force completely devastated. With the exception of some air base infrastructure, almost nothing remained to build upon. In the invasion's aftermath, the coalition faced the daunting task of building a national air force from scratch. While many coalition members had experience in helping other nations develop their air forces, the coalition forces in general, and the US Air Force in particular, never developed a capability to conduct a project of this magnitude. At first, Airmen were overwhelmed at the scale of the task. Additionally, as the coalition organized itself for the post-invasion period, the task for rebuilding the Iraqi air force did not fall on the senior Airman in theater, who controlled the preponderance of air forces, nor was it given to Air Force special operations forces, who possessed significant expertise and experience in building indigenous air forces.³⁶ This task fell to the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (also called MNSTC-I, pronounced min-stick-ee), the coalition organization responsible for standing up all of Iraq's military

forces.³⁷ MNSTC-I created an entirely new organization, called the Coalition Air Force Transition Team (or CAFTT, pronounced caff-tee), to oversee the creation of the Iraqi air force. This organization has taken some time to mature.³⁸ Added to this, for reasons that are justifiable, the coalition has always placed the top priority on developing Iraqi ground forces. At first, MNSTC-I dedicated almost all of the available resources to the stand-up of ground units. The result of all of this was a delayed start for the Iraqi air force. In its recent report, the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq describes the delay: "In 2004, the Iraqi Air Force had 35 people and possessed no aircraft. This meager beginning and late start as compared to the new Iraqi Army help put in context the progress the Air Force has made since then."³⁹

There has been significant progress in building a capable air force for Iraq. A solid plan is in place, recruiting is up, training programs are ongoing, the budget is growing, and more aircraft are arriving. Unfortunately, it is going to be quite a while before the Iraqi air force is ready to operate independently. This is partially due to the late start mentioned above, but it is also because it simply takes longer to build capable air forces than it does ground forces. It takes a tremendous amount of time and effort to create the necessary logistics support systems and provide the required technical training. The Jones report explains it this way:

The delayed start up of the new Iraqi Air Force resulted in a considerable lag behind the Iraqi Army's current level of maturity. Moreover, the creation of effective operational, maintenance, and support systems for an air force, with its advanced technical requirements, demands a longer period of development. The net effect of this asymmetry is that Coalition support will likely be required for a longer period for the Iraqi Air Force than for the Army. Despite steady progress and its strong future potential, today's Iraqi Air Force is heavily reliant on Coalition forces for support and training; and though its capabilities are improving, it remains far from operational independence.⁴⁰

The Iraqi air force and the CAFTT are currently concentrating their efforts on building the capacity to conduct missions that support counterinsurgency operations directly. These include ISR and air-transport capabilities. The ability to conduct attack missions in support of ground forces is still many months away, as the Iraqis have no fixed-wing aircraft and few helicopters capable of ground attack. The Iraqi air force is many years away from being able to deter incursions into its sovereign airspace.

Unless the coalition is willing to leave Iraq and assume the risks mentioned above, its air forces will have to stay in and around Iraq for many

years, even as major ground units go home. Eventually, the way out for these air forces is a viable Iraqi air force with the reliable equipment and trained personnel enabling it to support Iraqi ground forces and defend its airspace. In the meantime, coalition forces will shoulder the burden, and this will have major implications for policy in Iraq as well as for the organization most likely to assume the majority of this workload, the US Air Force.

Major Implications of the Drawdown Asymmetry

The drawdown asymmetry will have major implications for the mission in Iraq as well as for the health of the air forces that must sustain the effort there. Some of these implications will be negative—they will increase the risk to the mission, people, and resources. Other implications may be positive—there could be opportunities to help the Iraqis and pursue coalition interests with a reduced footprint. The following discussion addresses these risks and opportunities. It focuses on the US Air Force because it seems likely that it will bear much of the burden of the drawdown asymmetry. This is still an open question, however, and the potential contribution of other services as well as partner nations is addressed in a subsequent section.

Risks

The US Air Force is facing a crisis. Its inventory of aircraft is in critical condition, and the drawdown asymmetry will worsen the situation unless something fundamentally changes. While the soul of any military force is its people, Airmen rely on air and space platforms in a way that is necessarily different from ground forces. Without tanks and artillery pieces, there is still a US Army. Without airplanes and space platforms, there is no viable US Air Force.

On paper, the Air Force's aircraft are old. In reality, they are even older than the numbers show. It is a fact that military equipment wears out faster in the harsh environment and high operations tempo of the Middle East. The heat, sand, and wind combine to create one of the harshest climates on Earth, especially for high-tech equipment. All services are dealing with the consequences. Key pieces of US Army equipment, for example, are wearing out at "up to nine times the rate in times of peace."⁴¹ This is true for airplanes as well. The US Air Force deployed forces in reaction to Iraq's

invasion of Kuwait in the fall of 1990, and it has been engaged in major combat operations in Iraq since the spring of 1991. During the last 17 years, its airplanes have flown at a much higher rate than was originally planned. Although the maintainers have done an excellent job in keeping them flying, they are exhibiting serious symptoms of chronic stress. It is common for Airmen to fly, and for soldiers and Marines to trust their lives to, airplanes that have known defects such as cracks in the wings or risky imperfections in the engines. "This can't go on," says Secretary of the Air Force Michael W. Wynne. "At some time in the future, they will simply rust out, age-out, [or] fall out of the sky."⁴² Indeed, the secretary's words have proved prophetic, as this has already started to happen. In November 2007, the in-flight disintegration of an F-15 fighter aircraft led to the grounding of the entire F-15 fleet for a short time, and it appears that a sizable portion of that fleet may be grounded permanently.⁴³

US Air Force senior leaders have taken drastic steps to turn the tide, including cutting thousands of Airmen in order to free up funds to recapitalize the fleet. To this point, their efforts have only slowed the rate of decline.⁴⁴ Secretary Wynne recently expressed his deep concern about the inability to turn things around, rhetorically asking, "What does that mean to an industrialist? It means you are going out of business. It is simply a matter of time."⁴⁵ Operating in Iraq for several more years will only make things worse. Unless something changes, the United States is likely to have a "broken" air force before it finally leaves Iraq.

In addition to the risks to equipment, the drawdown asymmetry will also present new risks to coalition air bases. As often happens, a step taken to lessen the risk to one area will increase the risk in another, and this is the case in Iraq. Drawing down ground forces will have the effect of reducing the overall risk to coalition forces in Iraq. Major units will pull out of their small stations in the population centers and consolidate in large bases, and many will leave. The air units left in place will also help reduce the risk to the forces left behind, specifically the transition teams. As major units withdraw and forward operating bases are closed, however, extremists will view the main air bases left in Iraq as the most visible symbol of what they perceive as a US occupation of Muslim lands. They are likely to increase attacks on these bases using common methods of indirect fire such as mortars, rockets, and improvised explosive devices (IED). They are also likely to attack airplanes on departure and arrival because the runway orientation makes for predictable flight paths, and

aircraft are generally slower and more vulnerable at these times. Insurgents are able to obtain sophisticated weapons such as shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles, and they have used these weapons to attack coalition air assets repeatedly. Such incidents are likely to increase during the period of drawdown asymmetry.

The result is that force protection at the major air bases inside Iraq will grow in importance. This is a joint problem, as many of the major air bases left in Iraq will also be home to ground units that remain there. Dedicating sufficient forces to conduct air base ground defense can mitigate the risks, and it is probable that the best solution will include joint teams made up of Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps units. Specific force protection measures might include expanding the base perimeters and establishing secure areas beneath the departure and arrival corridors. One of the major air bases in Iraq, Balad Air Base, has a mature base protection scheme that may serve as a valuable model for joint cooperation in base defense.

In addition to these discrete risks to people and equipment, the drawdown asymmetry will also test the Air Force's ability to field certain high-value weapons systems that include both people and equipment. The challenges of no-fly-zone enforcement after the 1991 Gulf War forced major changes in the way the Air Force presents its forces for sustained use by combatant commanders. After a few painful years of haphazard deployments for its combat units, the service realized that it needed a change. It then adopted the air and space expeditionary force (AEF) structure. The entire Air Force was organized into 10 "buckets" (called AEFs), and each of those was placed on a schedule to deploy for four months out of every 20.⁴⁶ The new structure allowed a degree of professional and personal predictability for Airmen. Commanders knew how much time they had to rest and reconstitute their units before they were to deploy again, and individuals could make personal plans knowing that their schedules were relatively firm. Remarkably, the Air Force has adhered to the schedule for the most part, and it remains on schedule today. The result is that many of the deployment pains that come with ongoing operations are now bearable. Air Force people are tired, no doubt, but this tiredness is more chronic in nature (the result of multiple short-term deployments over 17 years) versus the acute issues that many in the US Army and Marine Corps are now experiencing. This success story is a main reason why the drawdown asymmetry is even an option. The US Air Force is unique among the world's air forces in

its ability to sustain major air operations halfway around the world for years at a time.

The AEF concept did not ease the stress on all weapons systems in the Air Force, however, and the drawdown asymmetry will expose weaknesses in the ability to sustain certain specialized capabilities. There are enough of certain types of air units (fighter units, for example) to be comfortably divided into the 10 AEFs. Unfortunately, this is not true of specialized systems such as ISR platforms or airborne command and control assets. These weapons systems bring capabilities that are very popular with ground commanders, and they are often referred to as high-demand, low-density (HD/LD) systems. Many of these systems began surging long before the current strategy was put into place, and some are on the verge of breakdown. Due to the high demand for their capabilities, the Air Force has curtailed training programs for the aircrews that operate systems like the E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) because almost all of the airframes capable of flying are in the Middle East. Consequently, JSTARS crews are constantly away from home, and there are no fresh crews to help ease their load. Air Force leaders refer to this phenomenon as "busting the pipeline," and it will lead to major problems for these systems in the future. Just as the surge in ground forces is unsustainable over the long run, the same is true for many of the HD/LD systems. While many air units will stay in place, some of the HD/LD units will have to come home, and leaders must find ways to decrease the demand for their capabilities or do without them altogether. Otherwise, these capabilities will not be available for other dangerous contingencies around the world.

This leads to a discussion about one more important risk brought about by the drawdown asymmetry. There is an opportunity cost to pay for a high level of commitment in Iraq for two decades or more. Just as the United States incurs risks to its interests in other parts of the world when its ground forces are overcommitted in Iraq, it will also run similar risks as it continues to operate air forces in Iraq for many years. Stated simply, air forces that are "spent" in Iraq will not be available to answer the call in other areas of the world. One example is air refueling. The most important capability that separates the US Air Force from the rest of the world's modern air forces is its ability to project power over tremendous distances and maintain persistence over the battlespace for long periods. This is only possible through air refueling. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan require air-refueling aircraft to fly at a very high rate, and this is taking a toll on

the fleet. For many reasons, unfortunately, the replacement to the KC-135 tanker (the workhorse of the fleet) will be delayed. In the meantime, these aircraft will continue their high pace of operations, and this increases the probability that they will become unsafe and require grounding before their replacements arrive. Almost every conceivable contingency throughout the world that calls for airpower solutions will require significant air-refueling capacity, and the drawdown asymmetry will increase the risk that it will not be there when needed.

The same is true for aircraft that specialize in electronic warfare. These HD/LD aircraft—many of which the US Navy and Marine Corps own—have been surging in Iraq and Afghanistan for years as they play a key role in defending soldiers and Marines from IEDs. Unfortunately, many of these aircraft systems are on the brink. If the United States burns these systems out now, it cannot count on them to fulfill the important roles they play in major contingency operations. Without these aircraft operating at full capacity, the United States will be at a major disadvantage when the need arises to penetrate a modern air defense system or support a major ground operation.

These examples show that the most dangerous consequence of the drawdown asymmetry is the risk it poses to a major contingency elsewhere. The continued investment in the irregular warfare of Iraq may pay off one day in the attainment of coalition objectives there, although many believe this is unlikely. It is sure, however, to come at a significant cost to the ability to participate in a traditional conflict in the medium term, should it become necessary.

Opportunities

While the risks discussed above are serious, the drawdown asymmetry offers several opportunities as well. The challenge is to relieve pressure on ground forces without abandoning Iraq.

Primarily, the drawdown offers the opportunity to extract ground forces from Iraq while leaving reduced forces in place to mitigate some of the less desirable occurrences. This will allow ground forces an opportunity for recovery as well as limit the exposure of coalition men and women to daily combat risks such as IEDs and other lethal attacks. In this way, the drawdown asymmetry and the resulting force posture may allow the coalition to realize some of its interests in Iraq at much less risk and cost

in terms of lives. It may even help instigate progress by forcing Iraqis to assume many of the burdens that coalition ground forces shoulder today. A ground force of five BCTs will look a lot less like an occupation to the citizens of Iraq than one comprised of 20 BCTs, and this may be helpful as well.

What Is the Future Role of Airpower in Iraq?

In analyzing the possibilities, three questions need answers: What are the limits of airpower in Iraq? What things can airpower accomplish? What might airpower be able to accomplish?

What Airpower Cannot Do

In framing the discussion, leaders must realize that there are four broad categories of things that airpower cannot do, and the first is that it cannot win a counterinsurgency. Alone, airpower cannot defeat the multiple groups of insurgents in Iraq, but this is true of ground power as well. Military power cannot win a counterinsurgency struggle. It takes the skilled application of all forms of state power to meet the needs of the population in question, thereby increasing the government's legitimacy and undercutting the insurgent's strategy. The primary need of the population is security, however, and this is where military power, including airpower, is essential.

Second, airpower cannot contain a spread in sectarian violence. There is a real danger that the sectarian violence that has gripped portions of Iraq could spread both within the country and beyond its borders. This could be especially troubling for some US allies in the region, such as Kuwait and Bahrain, which have significant Shia minorities. Airpower, in isolation, cannot stop this expansion if it begins—although as is discussed later, it may be able to mitigate some of the worst manifestations of this, including the discouraging of large formations of armed militia.

A third limitation of airpower is that it cannot act as a direct substitute for ground forces. In parts of Iraq, people perceive airpower as distant, impersonal, and frightening to citizens on the ground, especially those who have endured attacks on their families and tribes. Airpower cannot offer the visible, personal presence that a soldier on the ground provides. When assuming a policing role in a populated area, ground forces reassure innocent people and deter potential enemies in a way that air forces cannot.

Finally, airpower cannot stop illegal border crossings into Iraq. Airpower can offer several valuable capabilities to help prevent and deter the flow of people, money, supplies, and weapons in support of insurgent operations, including persistent ISR and precision strike. It cannot stop this activity, however. The main reason is that, while airpower is particularly good at detecting suspicious activity in the rural areas between border stations, the majority of the illegal activity enters Iraq through legal checkpoints. So far, neither airpower nor coalition ground forces nor the Iraqi Border Police have been able to stop these critical supply networks.

What Airpower Can Do

Fortunately for the coalition, there are several benefits that airpower can offer in the context of Iraq. Although the threat of surface-to-air fire from insurgents is real, the coalition enjoys relatively free access to the airspace over Iraq while the insurgents have no access. This affords the coalition an important asymmetric advantage in ongoing operations. The coalition can exploit this advantage by using airpower to accomplish its objectives in five key ways. First, airpower can increase the capability of and decrease the risk to remaining coalition forces. Airpower makes ground forces much more effective while mitigating the worst dangers they could face by allowing them to move faster, travel lighter, maintain awareness, and employ accurate firepower when they encounter the enemy. When fully integrated with airpower, ground forces can devote fewer resources to specific missions while maintaining levels of risk that are acceptable.

In addition to increasing the capability of friendly forces, airpower can prevent the enemy from adopting tactics that require the massing of forces. Airpower in general, and the US Air Force in particular, are well suited to find, fix, and finish massed forces, including both stationary and mobile forces. While this may not seem especially relevant to the current situation in Iraq, it is important to remember the options that airpower denies to potential adversaries because they cannot gather their forces. The enemy employs guerilla tactics because it has no better alternative. If it could mass forces, it would, as this would increase the likelihood of accomplishing its objectives. Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan established numerous bases in the 1990s to help build its capabilities. Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia has never enjoyed the luxury of major bases because they would not survive, and this has hindered its ability to train and operate. Because the insurgents cannot mass their forces, they are in a perpetual state of stagnation.

In writings that remain widely studied today, Mao Tse-tung asserts that a combination of regular and guerilla forces is essential to ultimate victory in an insurgency. In *On Guerilla Warfare*, he explains:

The concept that guerilla warfare is an end in itself and that guerilla activities can be divorced from those of the regular forces is incorrect. If we assume that guerilla warfare does not progress from beginning to end beyond its elementary forms, we have failed to recognize the fact that guerilla hostilities can, under specific conditions, develop and assume orthodox characteristics. An opinion that admits the existence of guerilla war, but isolates it, is one that does not properly estimate the potentialities of such war.⁴⁷

An insurgency cannot reach its full potential without regular forces. While al-Qaeda continues to desire an Islamic caliphate, it can never establish one without developing and massing these regular forces, and this will not happen as long as airpower stands in the way.

A third way that airpower contributes to coalition objectives is to deter regional adversaries from conventional military operations. The long-term presence of coalition air forces in Iraq can provide a credible deterrent against a potential conventional operation such as an invasion. As was stated earlier, Iraq's neighbors have many reasons to extend their influence into the country. Iraq's military forces are not yet a viable deterrent. Coalition forces, including those stationed both inside Iraq and throughout the Middle East, must stand in this gap until the balance of power is restored through a credible Iraqi military. Coalition air forces will be able to hold any conventional attack at great risk, even if ground forces draw down to low levels.

While deterring conventional attack is essential to long-term stability in the Middle East, airpower can also promote worldwide stability and security by striking terrorist targets if necessary. Airpower also offers the ability to hold terrorist targets at risk anywhere on the globe. The air forces that remain in place will ensure valuable options for combating terrorism through the air, including the ability to strike targets quickly within Iraq and throughout the region if necessary. This would be especially important in a time-critical scenario involving the perilous nexus between terrorist organizations and weapons of mass destruction. If the United States obtains information about the possibility of terrorists acquiring these weapons, and decision makers conclude that military force is necessary to prevent it, air forces in theater can provide a speedy alternative to a long-range strike.

While applying military power directly against terrorists remains an important option for the coalition, airpower can also produce positive effects, including promoting the legitimacy of the Iraqi government through the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Airpower can be a powerful tool in building confidence and goodwill among the population by providing nonlethal effects such as delivering critical supplies, especially in emergencies. It can also do this by evacuating wounded and sick civilians to capable treatment facilities. While coalition forces are capable of performing these actions on their own, it is much more effective to accomplish them in partnership with the Iraqi government. In addition, airpower can contribute in unique ways to Iraq's prosperity by promoting economic development through transportation and industry as well as sparking interest among Iraqi citizens in science and technology.

What Airpower Might Be Able to Do

In considering options for the coalition and its use of airpower, there are several beneficial roles that airpower could play, but these roles are controversial and represent significant departures from the status quo. First, air units can partner with Iraqi air units in a mentoring role. The air units that stay in Iraq can serve as mentors for Iraqi air force units as they pursue operational status. Until now, frontline air units in Iraq have not engaged in the training mission. They have concentrated on their own demanding mission sets, and the Iraqi air force has not yet matured to a point where partnership would be helpful. As the Iraqi air force develops, however, coalition air units can be partnered with sister units in the Iraqi air force to form a constructive relationship. This will be especially appropriate as the Iraqi air force fields units that have similar missions to coalition air forces in Iraq, such as airlift and CAS. Coalition ground forces have enjoyed success with a similar initiative, as conventional units assigned to Multi-National Corps-Iraq, not MNSTC-I, have partnered directly with Iraqi army units, and both have benefited from the relationship.⁴⁸ As air units are likely to remain in place for several years, they will have the time necessary to build the personal relationships and trust that is critical to effective cooperation. Although coalition air units are not specifically trained in the intricacies of building a foreign air force, they are comprised of bright, professional airmen with considerable experience in their fields. With solid leadership, these airmen can overcome the culture and language barriers to be effective mentors. In addition, Iraqi airmen bring

invaluable knowledge of the human terrain that could be of great benefit to coalition units. The long-term partnering of Iraqi and coalition air units appears to be a win-win scenario, but it will require a deliberate effort to make mentoring a major part of airmen's duties while deployed to Iraq.

Another controversial role for airpower is that it can enable a ground-force posture more conducive to long-term success. The presence of American troops on the ground in Iraq elicits a variety of responses from the Iraqi people. The soldiers reassure some, but others resent them. In many areas of Iraq, the visible presence of US troops is inflammatory. Islamic extremists portray the large numbers of coalition ground forces as a military occupation, and they use the resulting outrage in Muslim communities to help them recruit followers.⁴⁹ For these reasons, a drawdown that results in less visibility for coalition ground forces can be beneficial, and airpower can play a major role in ensuring that the forces remaining behind are able to protect the Iraqi government and coalition interests in the region. While airpower cannot serve as a direct substitute for ground troops, it can provide capabilities that enable a very different force posture—with a greatly reduced number of ground troops—while still remaining viable as a combined force. In short, airpower may make a long-term commitment possible with a force in Iraq that is sustainable at lower cost and risk.

A third controversial role for airpower is that it can project coalition military power to areas where there is limited or no ground presence. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, there are significant areas with no coalition ground presence. Some of these areas have become sanctuaries for the enemy. Airpower has the ability to challenge these sanctuaries in order to make it more difficult for insurgents to challenge the coalition and Iraqi government. When necessary, air forces can deliver precise lethal effects into these safe havens. The greatest "growth industry" in airpower's contribution to irregular warfare, however, is the skillful combination of information operations and air presence to produce disruptive effects without "going kinetic." Over the past year, coalition strategists have designed operations to communicate threatening messages to insurgents and reassuring messages to local populations in these safe havens through a combination of broadcast messages, leaflets, and airborne shows of force. For the latter, aircraft are flown in ways designed to communicate different messages. A low-altitude flyby over a known insurgent compound at just under the speed of sound conveys an entirely different message than a medium-altitude holding pattern over a populated area, but both can be ex-

tremely effective. The goal is to disrupt enemy activities to the point where they have difficulty projecting power into the major population centers. An interesting development in recent military thought has been a lack of appreciation for battlefield depth in counterinsurgency. It is possible that airpower can conduct operations in the deep areas of the battlespace to help create numerous benefits in close areas like Baghdad, Fallujah, and Basra, but it will require commanders to release air assets from the very tight leash of control that they are on today.

A fourth possibility for coalition airpower is that it can directly support Iraqi units in the fight against the common enemy. Although this is not happening today, it is possible that coalition airpower can work directly with Iraqi ground units to make them more effective. This has been a controversial subject among Airmen. While every Airman realizes the importance of helping the Iraqi army units secure their own country, they are understandably wary of providing direct support to the Iraqis for three key reasons. First, the forces in-theater are sized to support coalition ground forces, and meeting the requests and requirements levied by the ground units is extremely challenging. Adding support requirements from Iraqi units would be a tremendous burden, as many types of air support are fully spoken for now. Second, the Iraqi units do not have the technical training and experience to interface directly with coalition air units. Not only are there language and cultural barriers to communications, but there are also many required skill sets that Iraqis do not possess. For example, there are no Iraqi joint tactical air controllers (JTAC). These skilled operators are the key links between coalition ground units and airpower, but no Iraqis are in training to accomplish this role. Finally, there is a real fear that Iraqis could use airpower to do things that would not be consistent with coalition objectives. While the Iraqi military contains many professional commanders, it is possible, if not probable, that some of the less professional commanders would use airpower to silence their enemies or exact revenge. For these reasons, the coalition provides airpower support, in its lethal and nonlethal forms, through personnel embedded in the transition teams. These team members act to check each request for airpower. The day is approaching, however, when providing direct support to Iraqi ground units will seem attractive to the United States and other coalition partners. Depending on the situation, this may be appropriate, but it will require that Iraqis receive the technical training necessary for successful

cooperation. It will also require a relationship built on mutual respect and trust that comes from years of fighting a common enemy.

Perhaps the most vital—and the least discussed—role that coalition air-power can play in the coming years is to dissuade Iran and Israel from air attacks against each other. The most direct path between Israel and the highest priority targets in Iran is through Iraqi airspace. Having the world's most capable air forces operating day and night in this airspace provides one more reason for Iran and Israel to refrain from launching direct attacks on each other. This benefits all parties in the Middle East and beyond, as a confrontation between Israel and Iran has the potential to disintegrate into bloodshed throughout the region and, even worse, trigger the exchange of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.

Further Questions

As leaders consider what the drawdown asymmetry will mean for Iraq, the Middle East, and the coalition, several questions remain. The answers will shape the nature of the continued presence of coalition forces in Iraq as well as determine the residual capabilities of the combined force. Each of these questions deserves further thought and discussion.

Will US Navy Aviation Assets Continue to Fly in Iraq?

The US Navy has been a vital partner in the overall coalition air effort. Electronic attack aircraft have been stationed in Iraq continuously, and many more aircraft—including strike, ISR, and command and control assets—have flown from land bases in Iraq and aircraft carriers operating in the Arabian Gulf. If US Navy assets continue to fly in Iraq, it will help attenuate the burden placed on the US Air Force by the drawdown asymmetry.

Will Coalition Air Forces Continue to Fly in Iraq?

Other countries in the coalition have made significant contributions to the air effort. The Royal Air Force, for example, has played a major role in air operations by providing air transport, ISR, and strike support. If coalition air forces stay in place, they will continue to ease the burden on US air units.

Will US Army Aviation Assets Remain Behind?

The US Army has deployed a large amount of air assets to Iraq, including a combat aviation brigade that contains scores of capable attack helicopters. Army units also employ large numbers of unmanned aerial systems. If these assets remain in Iraq, they will provide many important air capabilities.

Will Marine Air Assets Remain in Iraq? If So, Who Will Task Them?

While Marine electronic attack assets fly in support of the coalition ground forces and receive their tasking from the combined force air component commander, Marine attack and air refueling assets are limited to flying in support of troops in the Multi-National Force-West area of operations. The vast majority of the forces they support are, unsurprisingly, Marines. It is reasonable, given the history of the Marine Corps, to assume that these assets will stay while Marines are on the ground, but it remains an open question what they will do if the Marine expeditionary force leaves Iraq.

Will Other States Help to Build the Iraqi Air Force?

The United States has borne the lion's share of responsibilities in building and training the Iraqi air force, but this does not have to be the case. Many of the world's successful air forces, including several in the Middle East, have capabilities and experiences that can be extremely useful in this effort. Will the United States ask for help, and if so, will other countries respond positively?


Will Iraq Devote the Resources Necessary to Have a Full-Spectrum Air Force?

Ultimately, the Iraqis must devote the resources necessary for an air force capable of the spectrum of missions required of a regional power in the Middle East. Air forces are expensive, and resources in Iraq are scarce. It remains to be seen whether Iraqi politicians will make the commitments necessary to build a strong air force.

Will the United States Devote the Resources Necessary to Maintain Its Dominant Air Forces?

It is ironic that the United States is planning an increase in the total force levels of the Army and Marine Corps, yet these increases will take effect as these services leave Iraq in large numbers. In the meantime, the air units of the Navy and Air Force will continue their engagement in Iraq for years. This continued commitment will threaten the viability of US air forces, and it remains to be seen if the administration and Congress take action to reconstitute the air forces that will continue to be "spent" in Iraq in the same way that they are allocating resources to ground forces that will be disengaging from the conflict there.

A Drawdown Asymmetry for Years to Come

These questions illustrate some of the uncertainty surrounding the future of Iraq. All indications are, however, that many ground units will redeploy without replacement in the near future, but air units will stay behind to accomplish two functions. First, they will support and protect the ground forces that remain, especially the transition teams. Second, they will control and defend Iraq's sovereign airspace while the Iraqi air force matures. This drawdown asymmetry brings significant risks and opportunities to coalition policies in Iraq. The greatest opportunity is the promise that the coalition can still pursue long-term objectives in Iraq while allowing ground forces a crucial recovery period, but doing so will require an acceptance of risk to the well-being of coalition air forces, especially the US Air Force. In the end, the burden will fall on the Airmen, many of whom have been deploying regularly to the Middle East since the fall of 1990 and will serve their entire careers in a force engaged in the skies over Iraq. 

Notes

1. As an example, Gen Anthony Zinni, USMC, retired, commented on the surge: "Increasing the number of troops is not a strategy, it's a tactic. The administration is getting off the hook for something they haven't had in five years, which is a strategy for Iraq." Alex Spillius, "General Zinni Attacks Lack of Strategy in Iraq," *UK Telegraph*, 4 September 2007.

2. David Kilcullen, a key advisor to Gen David H. Petraeus, top military commander in Iraq, writes, "The key element in the plan, as outlined in the President's speech, is to concentrate security forces within Baghdad, to secure the local people where they live. Troops will operate in small, local groups closely partnered with Iraqi military and police units, with each unit permanently

assigned to an area and working its beat. This is different from early strategies which were enemy-centric (focusing on killing insurgents), or the more recent approaches that relied on training and supporting Iraqi forces and expected them to secure the population." Kilcullen, "Don't Confuse the 'Surge' with the Strategy," *Small Wars Journal*, 19 January 2007, <http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2007/01/dont-confuse-the-surge-with-th>.

3. In the months following the president's announcement of the surge, the Marine Corps fielded another Marine expeditionary unit, the Navy committed an additional aircraft carrier and support vessels to the region, and the Air Force sent additional fighter, electronic warfare, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft.

4. This common description of the surge is interesting for at least two reasons. First, by focusing on Army ground units, it fails to acknowledge the other forms of combat power that have surged. Second, it represents a major sign that the Army's transformation plan is working, as a major goal of that plan is to move from a force where the primary unit of combat power is the division (approximately 12,000 soldiers) to one that is more "modular" by focusing on the smaller brigade combat team (approximately 3,000–4,000 soldiers).

5. This is especially true after General Petraeus, commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq, declined to make recommendations for drawdown past July of 2008. In his September testimony, he stated:

In fact, later this month, the Marine Expeditionary Unit deployed as part of the surge will depart Iraq. Beyond that, if my recommendations are approved, that unit's departure will be followed by the withdrawal of a brigade combat team without replacement in mid-December and the further redeployment without replacement of four other brigade combat teams and the two surge Marine battalions in the first 7 months of 2008, until we reach the pre-surge level of 15 brigade combat teams by mid-July 2008. I would also like to discuss the period beyond next summer. Force reductions *will* continue beyond the pre-surge levels of brigade combat teams that we will reach by mid-July 2008; however, in my professional judgment, it would be premature to make recommendations on the pace of such reductions at this time. (emphasis added)

House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees, *Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq*, prepared by Gen David H. Petraeus, commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, 10–11 September 2007, <http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/pet091007.pdf>.

6. As Graham Allison and Kevin Ryan write, "What all of this debate about withdrawal missed, however, is that the driver is not conditions in Iraq or politics in the United States but the hard realities of Army and Marine Corps readiness. As the troops' extended 15-month tours of duty end, the Army and Marine Corps simply don't have more troops to replace them. The withdrawal will be, in effect, the flip side of the surge." Graham Allison and Kevin Ryan, "No Choice—Withdrawal Starts in '08," *Los Angeles Times*, 11 September 2007.

7. For example, Thomas White, Secretary of the Army from 2001 to 2003, answered the question, "Is the Army broken?" in this way: "Yeah, I think so. We're on the brink. We are in a situation where we are grossly overdeployed, and it is unlike any other period in the 229-year history of the Army. We have never conducted a sustained combat operation with a volunteer force, with a force that we have to compete in the job market to hire every year. Every other force that we've ever done this with, going back to the Vietnam period to something comparable, has been a draftee conscript force. So what we are all worried about is that the manpower situation will come unglued." Thomas White, interview, *Frontline*, 12 August 2004, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/interviews/white.html>. Col Douglas McGregor, author of the book *Breaking the Phalanx*, gave this answer: "I think it is. I think it is, absolutely. The stop losses are symptomatic of it. People inside the force are very frustrated and very unhappy. The 12-month tours are a catastrophe. No one wants to

enlist to do that sort of work." Douglas McGregor, interview, *Frontline*, 23 July 2004, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/interviews/macgregor.html>.

8. Gen Barry R. McCaffrey, USA, retired, adjunct professor of international affairs, US Military Academy, to Col Michael Meese, professor and head, Department of Social Sciences, memorandum, "After Action Report: Visit Iraq and Kuwait, 9–16 March 2007," 26 March 2007, http://usnews.com/usnews/images/blogs/news_blog/AARMcCaffreyIraq0326071.pdf.

9. Hart Seely, "10th Mountain Commander: We're Tired," *Syracuse Post-Standard*, 18 September 2007.

10. As General Petraeus wrote in a letter to the people of Multi-National Force-Iraq, "One of the justifications for the surge, after all, was that it would help create the space for Iraqi leaders to tackle the tough questions and agree on key pieces of 'national reconciliation' legislation. It has not worked out as we had hoped. All participants, Iraqi and coalition alike, are dissatisfied by the halting progress on major legislative initiatives such as the oil framework law, revenue sharing, and de-ba'athification reform." Gen David H. Petraeus, commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, "Commanding General's September Message [to the] Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and Civilians of Multi-National Force-Iraq," 7 September 2007, http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14089&Itemid=176.

11. For two interesting discussions of the limitations of a rapid withdrawal, see Deborah Gage and Kim S. Nash, "How to Leave Iraq," *Baseline*, 28 August 200; and Lawrence J. Korb et al., *How to Redeploy: Implementing a Responsible Drawdown of U.S. Forces from Iraq* (Washington, DC: Center for American Progress), September 2007.

12. House Committees, *Report to Congress*.

13. Rep. Alan Putnam of Florida writes, "It would be reckless, then, for us to walk away from Iraq and hand over to al Qaeda and its radical militant Islamist associates a strategic base where they can consolidate their gains, train their newest recruits and plan fresh attacks on Americans." "The Risks of Running Away," *New York Post*, 14 September 2007.

14. House Committees, *Report to Congress*.

15. Energy Information Administration, "Crude Oil and Petroleum Imports: Top 15 Countries," December 2007 Import Highlights: 3 March 2008, http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/company_level_imports/current/import.html.

16. Margaret Coker, "Navy Protects Iraq's Lifeline in Persian Gulf," *Boston Globe*, 16 October 2007.

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Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq

Making Strategy after 9/11

Jeffrey Record

The conviction that Saddam Hussein was an imminent threat to America and therefore necessitated removal by force began as a kind of communicable agent to which some in the administration had great resistance and others not. Its host bodies belonged to, among others, Vice President Dick Cheney; his chief of staff, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby; Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz; and Douglas J. Feith, undersecretary of defense for policy. The agent resided in these four men, and in lesser hosts, well before September 11. But after the attack on America, the contagion swept through the Beltway and insinuated itself into the minds of many—including the White House national security adviser and the president of the United States.

—Robert Draper

Dead Certain: The Presidency of George W. Bush

THE UNITED STATES is headed into the sixth year of an exceptionally frustrating war whose consequences so far have been largely injurious to America's long-term national security. Preoccupation with that war understandably has obscured the original decision for launching it. That decision cannot be repealed, and the controversies surrounding it offer little guidance to those grappling with the political and military challenges confronting the United States in Iraq today. Knowing the way into Iraq is not knowing the way out. That said, it is critical that Americans come to understand how the United States came to invade and occupy Iraq, if for no other reason than to inform future discussion of whether, when, and how to employ US military power. Understanding how we got into Iraq may help us avoid future "Iraqs."

Americans have been treated to an avalanche of finger-pointing over who is responsible for the war and its consequences. The blame games between

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Democrats and Republicans, hawks and doves, military leaders and their civilian superiors, and Congress and the executive branch seem headed for extra innings. What Americans deserve, however, is a reasoned, dispassionate debate over why and how the United States found itself in a bloody and protracted war in the middle of a country that posed no significant threat to the United States. They deserve an objective, no-holds-barred examination of the motivations and assumptions behind the George W. Bush administration's decision for war. That decision brought us to where we are in Iraq, and failure to understand it could encourage disastrous future decisions.

Indeed, why the United States invaded Iraq in the first place is perhaps the most perplexing of many perplexing questions about the Iraq War, and one that is likely to bedevil historians for decades to come. "It still isn't possible to be sure—and this remains the most remarkable thing about the Iraq War," observed George Packer in *The Assassins' Gate*, his best-selling indictment of America's misadventure in Iraq. "It was something some people wanted to do. Before the invasion, Americans argued not just about whether a war should happen, but for what reasons it should happen—what the real motives of the Bush administration were and should be. Since the invasion, we have continued to argue, and will go on arguing for years to come."¹ John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt are no less stumped. The "decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein even now seems difficult to fathom. . . . In the aftermath of 9/11, when one would have expected the United States to be focusing laser-like on al Qaeda, the Bush administration chose to invade a deteriorating country that had nothing to do with the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and was already effectively contained. From this perspective, it *is* a deeply puzzling decision."² Even before the invasion, Brent Scowcroft, former national security adviser to Pres. George H. W. Bush, warned in a *Wall Street Journal* op-ed, "Don't Attack Iraq," that an invasion of Iraq would be both a diversion from and an impediment to the war against al-Qaeda. "Our preeminent security policy . . . is the war on terrorism," which a war with Iraq "would seriously jeopardize" because the unpopularity of an attack on Iraq would result in a "serious degradation in international cooperation with us against terrorism."³

Why did Pres. George W. Bush order the invasion of Iraq? Why, especially given the absence, during the run-up to the invasion (and since), of any evidence of either Iraqi complicity in the 9/11 al-Qaeda attacks on the

World Trade Center and Pentagon or an operational relationship between al-Qaeda and the Baathist regime in Baghdad?

Afghanistan's link to 9/11 was self-evident. In contrast, the administration simply asserted Iraq's connection for the purpose of mobilizing public and congressional support for a war that otherwise would have been a hard, even impossible, sell. Indeed, policy makers and commentators who had been gunning for Saddam Hussein ever since the Gulf War of 1991 successfully converted public rage over the al-Qaeda attacks into a war to bring down the Iraqi dictator. They converted the reality of Osama bin Laden as an avowed enemy of "apostate" secular regimes in the Middle East into the fantasy of bin Laden as an ally of Saddam Hussein. President Bush and other war proponents repeatedly spoke (and still do) of al-Qaeda, Saddam, and 9/11 in the same breath. As the president declared in September 2002, "You can't distinguish between al Qaeda and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror. . . . I can't distinguish between the two, because they're both equally as bad, and equally as evil, and equally as destructive."⁴ (By this reasoning the United States should have declared war on Hitler *and* Stalin in December 1941.) Thus, Saddam Hussein suddenly became a crazed, undeterrable dictator just months away from acquiring nuclear weapons and happily sharing them with bin Laden.

It is impossible to explain the road from 9/11 to the invasion of Iraq without recognizing the tremendous influence of neoconservative opinion, both inside and outside the administration, on the Bush White House.⁵ The neoconservatives had a ready explanation for the 9/11 attacks, provided the intellectual justification for the war, and persuaded Pres. George W. Bush, untutored in foreign policy and ignorant of the Middle East, that the global assault on al-Qaeda had to include regime change in Iraq. And the neoconservatives reinforced the president's predisposition to see the world in terms of "good versus evil" and to view the use of military power as the fundamental decider of relations among states.⁶ In their 2004 definitive assessment of neoconservative ideology and its influence on post-9/11 US foreign policy, *America Alone*, Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke convincingly argue:

The situation of unending war in which we find ourselves results in large part from the fact that the policies adopted after 9/11, the initial strike against the Taliban aside, were hardly specific to that event. Unlike the policy of containment that evolved in direct response to Soviet moves in Central and Eastern Europe and involved radical new thinking on the part of those involved, the post-9/11 policy was in fact grounded in an ideology that existed well before the terror attacks and

that in a stroke of opportunistic daring by its progenitors, has emerged as the new orthodoxy. The paper trail is unambiguous. Minds were already made up. A preexisting ideological agenda was taken off the shelf, dusted off, and relabeled as *the* response to terror. . . .

In neo-conservative eyes, the Iraq war was not about terrorism; it was about the pivotal relationship between Saddam Hussein and the assertion of American power. Hussein provided, in effect, the opportunity to clarify America's global objectives and moral obligations. His continued survival in power was a metaphor for all that had gone wrong with American foreign policy since the Soviet collapse in the sense that the first Bush administration's Realpolitik and Clinton's wishful liberalism had left the Iraqi dictator in power. Iraq was now the arena in which to demonstrate the crucial tenets of neo-conservative doctrine: military preemption, regime change, the merits of exporting democracy, and a vision of American power that is "fully engaged and never apologetic" (emphasis in original).⁷

President Bush's post-9/11 receptivity to the neoconservative agenda was manifest in the administration's provocative September 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, which embraced rogue-state regime change, aggressively promoted democracy, viewed American military supremacy as a given, and (in a stunning departure from traditional US foreign policy norms) asserted the right to launch preventive wars to protect national interests.

With respect to Iraq, however, a review of administration statements and of the neoconservatives' official and unofficial arguments reveals no coherent grand strategy. Such a strategy would have paid at least some attention to how a successful and friendly post-Baathist political order would be established in Iraq. Rather, what we find is a *mélange* of declared and undeclared war aims with differing appeal to various policy makers who themselves were motivated by disparate and sometimes contradictory agendas—"an 'overlapping agreement' about the wisdom of invasion among individuals who differed about the ends that an invasion promised to serve."⁸ Those individuals included the president and vice president, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, and the influential neoconservative coterie of I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas J. Feith, and Richard Perle.⁹ Administration war aims—"the ends that an invasion promised to serve"—included preventing nuclear proliferation; exploiting Iraq's weakness; completing the "unfinished business" of the 1991 Gulf War; demonstrating a willingness to use American military power and use it unilaterally; asserting the principle of preventive military action; intimidating Iran, North Korea, and other rogue states; transforming the Middle East via establishing

a model democracy in Iraq for other Arab states to emulate; creating an Arab client state alternative to Saudi Arabia; eliminating an enemy of Israel; and vindicating the Pentagon's "revolutionary" employment of force.

The very number and diversity of aims, and the mutual antagonism of some, reflect a lack of consensus on what, exactly, the war was all about, as well as a lack of confidence in the persuasiveness of any single aim. Was the war about avenging 9/11, eliminating weapons of mass destruction (WMD), knocking off an "ally" of Osama bin Laden, punishing a dictator, freeing an oppressed people, flexing America's high-tech military muscle, helping Israel, democratizing the Middle East, intimidating other rogue states, suppressing global terrorism—or all of the above? Did the multiplicity of war aims betray a felt need by war proponents to drape, for public consumption, the clothes of a war of necessity over what was in fact a war of choice?

It remains unclear how seriously war proponents took the Iraqi threat they so grossly inflated for political purposes. Bush and Cheney were certainly not alone in imagining the horror of a repetition of the 9/11 attacks conducted with WMDs; indeed, the specter of terrorists armed with destructive power heretofore monopolized by states was a legitimate fear long before 9/11. And it was certainly reasonable, given Saddam Hussein's longstanding enmity toward the United States as well as his track record of reckless miscalculation, to imagine the possibility of his collaboration with anti-American terrorist organizations.

Forestalling a Nuclear 9/11

The Bush White House probably believed what it said repeatedly—namely, that war with Iraq was necessary to prevent Saddam Hussein from acquiring nuclear weapons and possibly transferring them to al-Qaeda. Calamity terrorizes the imagination. The shock of 9/11 frightened many Americans into believing in all sorts of terrifying possibilities, but the White House had the responsibility for protecting the country from future attacks. Yet it bears repeating that by March 2003, when Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was launched, there was no evidence of Iraqi complicity in the 9/11 al-Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. And though the White House had sought to conflate al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein as a unitary threat, there was no evidence of operational collaboration between the terrorist organization and Baghdad's

Baathist regime. Nor was there, notwithstanding official talk of smoking guns and mushroom clouds, evidence of a functioning Iraqi nuclear weapons program—much less an imminent Iraqi bomb. As later recalled by Richard Haass, who in 2003 was director of the State Department's policy planning staff, "When it came to nuclear weapons, the intelligence at the time did not support acting. Iraq did not possess nuclear weapons or even a nuclear weapons program worthy of the name. Nor was it inevitable that over time Iraq would have been able to develop nuclear weapons, given the international sanctions in place."¹⁰ Saddam Hussein's purported nuclear intentions thus were simply *wished* into imminent capabilities.

Haass might have added that there was, in any event, no reason to believe that Saddam Hussein's potential use of WMDs, including nuclear weapons had he possessed them, was exempt from the grim logic of nuclear deterrence. True, he had employed chemical weapons against Iranian infantry and Kurdish villagers in the 1980s, but his victims were incapable of effective retaliation. More notable was his refusal during the Gulf War of 1991 to launch such weapons against Israel or coalition forces, both of which were capable of devastating retaliation. Saddam Hussein, to be sure, was prone to miscalculation. He ran a personality cult dictatorship in which his lieutenants eagerly told him what he wanted to hear, and he repeatedly misjudged US willingness to use force. But Saddam was homicidal, never suicidal; he always loved himself more than he hated the United States. The White House suggestion that Saddam might transfer nuclear munitions to al-Qaeda was always far-fetched. The Iraqi dictator could never be sure that such a transfer could be made undetected, and like all Stalinist-styled dictators, Saddam was not in the habit of handing over power—to say nothing of the destructive power of nuclear weapons—to any organization outside his complete control. He was certainly aware that Osama bin Laden regarded the Baathist regime in Baghdad as an "apostate" government. As Adam Cobb has observed,

no state has ever given terrorists more power than it, itself, possesses. There is no incentive for rogue regimes to hand over their hard won nuclear capabilities, prestige and power to AQ [al-Qaeda]. Regimes like Kim Jong Il's North Korea, Ahmadinejad's Iran, or Saddam's Iraq tend to be paranoid and obsessed with finding and eliminating alternative sources of power to their rule. The President and others have repeatedly said that Saddam "could" hand over WMD to AQ. It is certainly technically possible, but they have never provided more than vague innuendo to suggest what incentives Saddam might gain from doing so—this is because the proposition does not bear scrutiny.¹¹

What of nonnuclear WMDs? As war neared, it was assumed that Iraq had some chemical munitions and biological agents—i.e., residual post-Gulf War stocks that remained unaccounted for by the United Nations inspection regime when that regime was ejected from Iraq in 1998. Yet even this claim was highly suspect by the time US forces attacked Iraq on 19 March 2003. In August 1995, Gen Hussein Kamel, a son-in-law of Saddam Hussein and former director of Iraq's Military Industrial Corporation (which was responsible for all of Iraq's weapons programs), defected to Jordan, where he told debriefers that all of the country's chemical and biological weapons had been destroyed on his orders back in 1991. More instructive, in November 2002, Saddam Hussein, succumbing to the pressure of a huge US military buildup in Kuwait and the Bush administration's increasingly strident rhetoric about the necessity of regime change in Baghdad, permitted the return of UN inspectors with more or less unfettered access to suspected weapons sites. Coercive US diplomacy had in effect forced Saddam to capitulate on the very issue that formed the primary public rationale for the coming war.¹² If he had any WMDs, the inspectors, who now had access to previously off-limits presidential palaces and other government compounds, would eventually find them, and the very presence of the inspectors would forestall any attempted use of WMDs. The inspectors, who had four months to find any WMDs and inspected 141 sites before they were pulled out because of the impending invasion, reported that there was "no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons program in Iraq."¹³

How different the world might look now had Bush pocketed his enormous victory of coercing Saddam into accepting an occupation of his country by an inspection regime, an occupation that would have precluded the necessity for a US invasion and made a laughingstock of Saddam's pretensions on the world stage! It seems that the White House's obsession with removing the Iraqi dictator blocked recognition of its stunning diplomatic triumph.

So the Bush administration went to war anyway. As later recounted by Hans Blix, the director of the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), "Although the inspection organization was now operating at full strength and Iraq seemed determined to give it prompt access everywhere, the United States appeared as determined to replace our inspection force with an invasion army."¹⁴ The White House was completely indifferent to UNMOVIC's failure to discover any WMDs, even

though the suspected sites supplied to UNMOVIC by the United States and several other countries “were supposedly the best that the various intelligence agencies could give.” Blix was prompted to wonder, “Could there be 100-percent certainty about the existence of weapons of mass destruction but zero-percent knowledge about their location?”¹⁵ Clearly, a disarmed Saddam Hussein was not enough; the dictator himself would have to go.

The Pentagon’s invasion plan, which displayed a manifest indifference to seizing and securing suspected WMD sites, reinforced the conclusion that regime change always trumped WMDs as a war aim. Did administration policy makers take the Iraqi WMD threat seriously, and if not, why not? And if so, why wasn’t capturing the sites assigned top operational priority? Indeed, if the administration’s primary concern was the possibility of WMDs—especially fissile material and even finished weapons—falling into al-Qaeda hands, why wasn’t it focused on the most likely potential source of proliferation, which was hardly Iraq but the poorly guarded Soviet weapons and highly enriched uranium storage facilities in Russia?¹⁶

To seize and secure Iraq’s suspected WMDs would have required a sufficiently large and dedicated invasion force to capture the hundreds of suspected sites quickly (before terrorists and profiteers got to them) and to seal Iraq’s long borders to prevent any munitions and chemical and biological warfare substances from being taken out of the country. For example, US forces failed to secure the 120-acre Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center (believed to have contained almost two tons of partially enriched uranium) before it was ransacked by people unknown.¹⁷ If, in fact, the main purpose of the invasion was to disarm Iraq—to remove the putative threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s possession of WMDs—then the invasion plan should have reflected that objective. But it did not. Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, in their incisive assessment of the invasion plan and its implementation, *Cobra II*, discovered “a surprising contradiction”:

The United States did not have nearly enough troops to secure the hundreds of suspected WMD sites that had supposedly been identified in Iraq or to secure the nation’s long, porous borders. Had the Iraqis possessed WMD and terrorist groups been prevalent in Iraq as the administration so loudly asserted, U.S. forces might well have failed to prevent the WMD from being spirited out of the country and falling into the hands of the dark forces the administration had declared war against.¹⁸

Those who planned OIF, chief among them Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and US Central Command commander Gen Tommy Franks, either

did not take the proliferation threat seriously or were dangerously derelict in their duties. Though Rumsfeld and Franks happily dove into the minutia of planning the invasion, they apparently paid little if any attention to the requirement to seize control of Iraq's much-touted WMDs.

Iraq's conventional military forces were certainly no threat by 2003. The Iraqi air force and navy had virtually disappeared in the 1990s, and the Iraqi army had been reduced to a paper force. Crippled in 1991, further gutted by 12 years of military sanctions, commanded by professionally inferior regime loyalists, and badly positioned and trained to repel or punish a foreign invader, the army was incapable of defending Iraq, much less invading US client states in the Middle East. It quickly disintegrated upon contact with US forces.

Thus, on the eve of the US invasion, Saddam Hussein was contained and deterred. He posed no significant threat to the United States and no unmanageable threat to regional US security interests. Iraq was a nuisance, an irritant, not a deadly menace. As Colin Powell told an interviewer a week after the 9/11 attacks, "Iraq isn't going anywhere. It's in a fairly weakened state. It's doing some things we don't like. We'll continue to contain it."¹⁹

Iraq's fellow "axis of evil" states, Iran and North Korea, posed far more serious threats to US security interests in the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia, respectively. Indeed, Baathist Iraq served as a barrier to the expansion of Iranian power and influence in the Gulf, which is why the Reagan administration backed Saddam Hussein in his war against the Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran. Whatever else the secular Iraqi dictator may have been, he was an enemy of the mullahs in Teheran and of Islamist extremism in his own country. Saddam Hussein's Iraq was a suicide-bombing-free state²⁰ that effectively thwarted the establishment of an Islamist terrorist organizational presence in Iraq; al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia—the organization—emerged only in post-Baathist Iraq.

Exploiting Iraq's Weakness

Iraq's weakness relative to Iran and North Korea figured prominently among the myriad motivations that plunged the Bush administration into the present war. Clearly, by the fall of 2002 at the very latest, the White House was determined to launch a preventive war against Iraq regardless of its objectively weak case that Iraq posed a grave and gathering danger to the United States. It wanted war no matter what. Equally clearly, the administration was captivated by the speed and ease of its destruction of

the Taliban regime in Afghanistan²¹ and believed it could gain a quick and decisive victory in Iraq.

Decisions for wars of choice rest on a reasonable assumption of success; absent military feasibility, otherwise convincing arguments for war are moot. Iraq was clearly the lowest hanging fruit among the three states the president had publicly named as candidates for forcible regime change. Though Iran and North Korea were more dangerous, they were also much tougher regimes to defeat militarily than the relatively feeble regime in Iraq. Unlike Baghdad, which had virtually no means of striking back against a US attack, Teheran had regional terrorist options and could disrupt the flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf. Pyongyang was believed to have nuclear weapons and was, in any event, in a position, via its massed artillery just north of the demilitarized zone, to rain destruction on the greater Seoul area. Iraq, in short, was helpless, whereas Iran and North Korea were not.

The Bush administration, while worst-casing the threat, best-cased the costs and consequences of overthrowing Saddam Hussein. It correctly judged the overthrow of the dictator's regime to be a relatively easy military task but profoundly misjudged the potential political and strategic results of doing so. War planning focused almost exclusively on dispatching the old regime as quickly and cheaply as possible at the expense of thinking about what would replace it and how. In some cases, administration war aims amounted to little more than expectations based on wishful thinking reinforced by a self-serving embrace of faulty historical analogies.²² For example, the administration assumed that some form of democratic governance would naturally arise from the ashes of Baathist rule; after all, had not democracy emerged in Japan during America's postwar occupation? The administration further assumed that America's manifestly good intentions in Iraq and the Iraqi people's gratitude for being liberated from tyranny would foreclose the possibility of postwar armed resistance to US forces; after all, was this not the case when the Allies liberated France?

"We have great information," Cheney assured a skeptical House Majority Leader Dick Armey in the summer of 2002. "They're going to welcome us. It will be like the American army going through the streets of Paris. They're sitting there ready to form a new government. The people will be so happy with their freedoms that we'll probably back ourselves out of there within a month or two."²³ Indeed, Iraq was going to be easier than Afghanistan. "It is important for the world to see that first of all, Iraq is a sophisticated society

with about \$16 billion [in annual oil] income,” President Bush declared to a group of American conservative thinkers in the Oval Office just before the invasion. “The degree of difficulty compared to Afghanistan in terms of the reconstruction effort, or from emerging from dictatorship, is, like, infinitesimal. I mean Afghanistan has *zero*.” By contrast, “Iraq is a sophisticated society. And it’s a society that can emerge and show the Muslim world that it’s possible to have peace on its borders without rallying the extremists. And the other thing that will happen will be, there will be less exportation of terror out of Iraq.”²⁴

Confidence that a quick and easy victory lay ahead in Iraq begs the question of “how to assess the guileless optimism of the war’s architects,” observes Stephen Holmes, “especially when professed by men who vaunt their lack of illusions. Had they never heard of worst-case scenarios? What sort of foreign policy assumes that democracy has no historical, cultural, economic, and psychological preconditions?”²⁵ The apparent assumption was that democracy is society’s natural state and that it automatically resurfaces once “unnatural” tyranny is removed. “There was a tendency among promoters of the war to believe that democracy was a default condition to which societies would revert once liberated from dictators,” recounts Francis Fukuyama, a neoconservative who supported the war he now believes to have been a mistake.²⁶ The other apparent assumption was that the instrument of tyranny’s removal in Iraq—US military power—was irresistible. There was no expectation of an insurgent response, much less an appreciation of the limits of American conventional military supremacy as an instrument for affecting fundamental political change in foreign lands and for dealing with the challenges of irregular warfare. (Perhaps this was not surprising for an administration mesmerized by America’s military power and committed to a “war on terror” that from the beginning inflated the importance of military solutions to what at bottom are political problems.)

Redeeming the Hollow Victory of 1991

Preventing nuclear proliferation and exploiting Iraq’s weakness were not the only Bush administration motives for war. Right behind them was redemption of the false victory of 1991. One of the remarkable aspects of America’s two wars against Iraq is the continuity of key decision makers. Saddam Hussein provided the critical continuity on the Iraq side, whereas both Bushes (father and son), Dick Cheney, Colin Powell,

Condoleezza Rice, and Paul Wolfowitz provided it for the American side. By the late 1990s there was, on the American side (except for Colin Powell, who opposed both wars with Iraq), a growing feeling that the 1991 Gulf War had been a hollow victory. This view was especially strong among leading neoconservatives, including those who moved into the George W. Bush administration. Many had believed the stunning military victory delivered by Operation Desert Storm would provoke Saddam Hussein's internal overthrow, but the Iraqi dictator remained in power, defying the United States and the international community. He became a standing embarrassment to American foreign policy, a symbol of the limits of US conventional military supremacy, and proof, even, that Americans lacked the political will to vanquish their adversaries.

Saddam's survival, and especially his implication in a 1993 plot to assassinate George H. W. Bush during the former president's visit to Kuwait, meant that it had been a mistake not to have marched on to Baghdad. Saddam Hussein's destruction became a family matter. In 1998 the younger Bush told a friend, "Dad made a mistake in not going into Iraq when he had an approval rating in the nineties. If I'm ever in that situation, I'll use it—I'll spend my political capital." During the 2000 presidential election campaign, the younger Bush told PBS's Jim Lehrer, "I'm just as frustrated as many Americans are that Saddam still lives. I will tell you this: If we catch him developing weapons of mass destruction in any way, shape, or form, I'll deal with him in a way he won't like."²⁷

Neoconservative opinion unanimously condemned the unfinished war of 1991 as well as the Clinton administration's refusal to take Saddam Hussein down. In *The War over Iraq*, a book published on the eve of the 2003 invasion that encapsulated the neoconservative view of America's role in the Middle East and the relationship of the invasion to that role, Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol predictably condemned the George H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations' policies toward Iraq:

[The] first Bush and Clinton administrations opted for a combination of incomplete military operations and diplomatic accommodation. Rather than press hard for a change of regime, President Bush halted the U.S. war against Iraq prematurely and turned a blind eye as Saddam slaughtered the insurgents whom the United States had encouraged to revolt. For its part, the Clinton administration avoided confronting the moral and strategic challenge presented by Saddam, hoping instead that an increasingly weak policy of containment, punctuated by the occasional fusillade of cruise missiles, would suffice to keep Saddam in his box.²⁸

Indeed, many neoconservatives, seeing in George W. Bush the foreign policy son of the father, supported Senator John McCain in the 2000 Republican presidential primaries and did not hesitate, at least before 9/11, to lambaste the new President Bush for being “soft” on Saddam. On 30 July 2001, former CIA officer and neoconservative author Reuel Marc Gerecht denounced the Bush administration’s Iraq policy in the influential neoconservative journal, *The Weekly Standard*. In an essay titled “The Cowering Superpower,” Gerecht declared, “From the spring of 1996, the Clinton administration’s Iraq policy was in meltdown; under the Bush administration, it has completely liquefied. . . . It would be better to see the administration start explaining how we will live with Saddam and his nuclear weapons than to see senior Bush officials, in the manner of the Clintonites, fib to themselves and the public.”²⁹

Would there have been a second US war against Iraq had there not been a first? Had Saddam not invaded Kuwait in 1991, or had the George H. W. Bush administration decided not to reverse the invasion by force, what would the level of enmity have been between the United States and Iraq, between the Bush family and Saddam Hussein? Would the 9/11 attacks have been sufficient to trigger an American invasion in 2003? Christian Alfonsi believes that

what made the invasion of Iraq inevitable was Saddam Hussein’s triumph over the Bush national security team in 1992 [surviving the 1991 war while Bush went on to political defeat in the United States], and the fear that he would repeat the triumph in 2004. This fixation on Saddam ran through the Bush dynasty like a malignant strain of DNA, a pathogen always a threat to appear under the right conditions of crisis. . . . Once this pathogen had been released into the American body politic [following the 9/11 attacks], the views of the neoconservatives about regime change in Iraq provided a foreign policy rationale for the war, and faulty intelligence about weapons of mass destruction provided a political rationale that resonated with the American people.³⁰

Demonstrating Will to Use Decisive Force

A fourth administration objective was to demonstrate a new willingness to use force. During the 1990s, neoconservatives—many of whom entered the upper tiers of the George W. Bush administration in 2001 and pushed for war against Iraq—were openly contemptuous of the disparity between US conventional military supremacy and presidential willingness to use it aggressively on behalf of American interests and values. They worried that “the United

States, the world's dominant power on whom the maintenance of international peace and the support of liberal democratic principles depends, will shrink from its responsibilities and—in a fit of absent-mindedness, or parsimony, or indifference—allow the international order that it created and sustained to collapse. Our present danger is one of declining military strength, flagging will and confusion about our world.”³¹ They deplored post–Cold War cuts in defense spending and the Vietnam War's chilling effects on America's willingness to use force and use it decisively. The persistence of those effects long after the Soviet Union's demise, which in their view removed the principal check on the expansion of US power and influence in the world, was especially galling. The United States was mired in strategic bewilderment at a time when it ought to have been using its global hegemony to topple tyrannies worldwide.

Neoconservatives were particularly dismissive of the Weinberger-Powell doctrine, which they (rightly) believed proscribed the use of force in all but the most exceptionally favorable military and political circumstances. The doctrine was, in their view, a recipe for inaction—or worse, appeasement. They were highly critical of the manner in which the Gulf War was terminated because it left Saddam Hussein in power. As David Frum and Richard Perle succinctly put it, “Saddam had survived; therefore we had lost.”³² The neoconservatives also deplored the Clinton administration's hesitant and halfhearted uses of force in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans—all examples, they believed, of the Vietnam syndrome's persistent crippling of American statecraft.³³ They favored forcible regime change in Baghdad long before 9/11 and condemned the Clinton White House for its lack of decisiveness in dealing with Saddam Hussein.

The neoconservatives believed that the Vietnam War and subsequent US uses of force adversely affected America's strategic reputation, encouraging enemies, including Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden, to believe that the United States had become a gutless superpower (or, in Richard M. Nixon's famous characterization, “a pitiful, helpless giant”), a state whose military might vastly exceed its will to use it. The United States was defeated in Vietnam, run out of Lebanon and Somalia, and had become so casualty phobic by the time of its Balkan interventions that it placed the safety of its military forces above the missions they were designed to accomplish. Iraq offered a low-cost opportunity to demonstrate the credibility of American power and to strengthen deterrence by putting other actual and aspiring rogue states on notice that defying the United States invited military destruction.

No less a target of the neoconservatives' ire was the Clinton administration's embrace of multilateralism. Neoconservatives viewed allies, alliances, and especially the United Nations as encumbrances on US use of force—Exhibit A being the 1999 NATO war with Serbia over Kosovo, in which potentially swift and decisive military action was sacrificed on the altar of preserving the lowest common denominator political consensus within the alliance. Neoconservatives believed that the Soviet Union's disappearance reduced the strategic value of allies, whose potential military contributions to collective action were in any event declining as the US lead in advanced military technologies widened. The United States could now act alone and therefore should act alone unless there were allies available free of political charge. An attendant belief was that American power, by virtue of its service on behalf of such universal values as freedom and democracy, was inherently legitimate. In their book, *The War over Iraq*, Kaplan and Kristol condemned former vice president Al Gore for characterizing the Bush Doctrine's commitment to American preeminence as glorifying the notion of dominance. "Well," they asked, "what's wrong with dominance in the service of sound principles and high ideals?"³⁴ Neoconservatives are true believers in American exceptionalism and the universality of American values. US military action against Iraq thus required no international legitimization in the form of a UN or NATO mandate.

Thus an invasion of Iraq, in addition to demonstrating the credibility of US military power to America's enemies, would also demonstrate to America's friends and allies, many of whom opposed the war, that the United States would no longer permit its freedom of military action to be constrained by allied opinion or the perceived need for prior international legitimization—that the United States was prepared to act unilaterally even in defiance of world opinion. From the very start of its confrontation with Iraq, the Bush administration made it clear that, in the end, it would take military action against Baghdad with or without the UN, NATO, or other international institutional approval. Vice President Dick Cheney opposed the very idea of soliciting a UN mandate. As far as the Bush White House was concerned, America's allies could either follow or get out of the way.

The issue of political will gained ever greater prominence as OIF descended into a protracted war. Along with promoting democracy, the "will to victory" became a replacement war aim for that of eliminating Iraq's non-existent WMD threat. As the war dragged on and became increasingly unpopular, and as the White House searched in vain for a winning strategy,

“staying the course”—i.e., avoiding defeat—became the mantra. President Bush repeatedly declared that Iraq was a test of American will, that the insurgents’ strategy targeted America’s political stamina, and that if the United States abandoned its commitment to Iraq, horrible things would follow, including the expansion of Iranian power and influence in the Middle East. “There would be nothing worse for world peace,” he told a Pennsylvania audience in October 2007, “[than] if the Iranians believed that the United States didn’t have the will and commitment to help young democracies survive. If we left before the job was done, there would be chaos. Chaos would embolden not only the extremists and radicals who would like to do us harm, but it would also embolden Iran.”³⁵

Asserting the Principle of Preventive Military Action

A major White House objective behind OIF was to assert the principle of preventive military action. If it were imperative to demonstrate a new willingness to use force, it was equally imperative to demonstrate that the United States was prepared to strike first. The Bush administration’s loud post-9/11 embrace of preventive war as a matter of declared doctrine was the most significant American foreign policy departure since the Truman administration’s adoption of containment in the late 1940s. Preventive war, which is not to be confused with preemptive military action,³⁶ presupposes the inadequacy of such reliable Cold War policies of deterrence and containment—a conclusion President Bush drew months before ordering the invasion of Iraq. “In the Cold War,” stated the White House’s September 2002 *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, “we faced a generally status-quo, risk-averse adversary. . . . But deterrence based only upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against leaders of rogue states more willing to take risks, gambling with the lives of their people, and the wealth of their nations. . . . Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy.”³⁷ In an earlier speech at West Point, Bush declared, “Deterrence—the promise of massive retaliation against nations—means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend.” He added that “containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies.”³⁸

In the run-up to the Iraq War, President Bush made repeated statements to the effect that a nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein would be undeterrable and therefore the United States had to remove him from power before he acquired nuclear weapons.³⁹ He made the classic argument for preventive war—that since war with Iraq was inevitable (a self-fulfilling prophesy if there ever was one), the United States should initiate it before the relative military balance became adversely affected by Saddam's possession of “the Bomb.” Launching a preventive war against Iraq would not only thwart nuclear proliferation in Iraq; it would also embody US willingness to strike first against perceived emerging threats before they fully matured. “If we wait for security threats to materialize, we will have waited too long,” said Bush at West Point. “We cannot let our enemies strike first.”⁴⁰

The conflation of al-Qaeda and Baathist Iraq, and more generally “shadowy terrorist networks” and rogue states, obscured critical differences between nonstate and state actors' vulnerability to deterrence. The assumption, against all logic and the available evidence, that Saddam Hussein was as undeterrable as Osama bin Laden, constituted a strategic error of the first order because it propelled the United States into an unnecessary and strategically disastrous war as well as into endorsing a form of war that violated the central norm of the international political order the United States had established after World War II.⁴¹ As Pres. Harry Truman, in rejecting calls for preventive war against the Soviet Union in the late 1940s, declared in a 1950 radio address to the nation, “We do not believe in aggression or preventive war. Such a war is the weapon of dictators, not [of] free democratic countries like the United States.”⁴²

The administration's embrace of preventive war also promoted the centerpiece of the neoconservative agenda: preserving America's global military hegemony against any and all comers. The 2002 *National Security Strategy* declared, “Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States,” and went on to lecture China, that in “pursuing advanced military capabilities that can threaten its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated path that, in the end, will hamper its own pursuit of national greatness.”⁴³ Regional challengers who refused to be dissuaded would face the prospect of credibly demonstrated preventive military action.

Intimidating Iran and North Korea

A sixth administration war aim was to intimidate Iran and North Korea. Administration war proponents believed that knocking off one “axis of evil” regime would cow the other two into abandoning their programs to acquire nuclear weapons. OIF would provide a credible demonstration to Teheran and Pyongyang of what could happen to them if they persisted in attempts to become nuclear-weapons states. Implicit in this belief was confidence that the United States could achieve a swift and decisive victory in Iraq, followed by minimal US force deployments in that country. Writing just after Saddam Hussein had been driven from power but before the emergence of a protracted insurgency in Iraq, Frum and Perle triumphantly declared that by overthrowing Saddam, “We gave other potential enemies a vivid and compelling demonstration of America’s ability to win a swift and total victory over significant enemy forces with minimal US casualties. The overwhelming American victory in the battle of Baghdad surely stamped a powerful impression upon the minds of the rulers of Teheran and Pyongyang.”⁴⁴

It was also apparently assumed that Teheran and Pyongyang *could* be intimidated, even though both had established reputations of stern defiance in response to attempted external coercion. War proponents seemingly dismissed the possibility that OIF might scare Iran and North Korea into accelerating their drive for nuclear weapons’ capacity. Indeed, the very fact that America’s conventional military supremacy encouraged rogue state interest in neutralizing that supremacy via possession of a nuclear deterrent apparently escaped those who believed the road to a nuclear-disarmed Iran and North Korea ran through Baghdad. It can be assumed that neither Pyongyang nor Teheran were discouraged by America’s descent into a protracted war in Iraq that sapped US military power and promised to exert as chilling an effect—an Iraq “syndrome”—on subsequent US use of force as had the Vietnam syndrome before it.⁴⁵

Igniting Democracy in the Middle East

The Bush White House’s most ambitious—and arguably most naïve—war aim was to provoke the political transformation of the Middle East. To be sure, not all of the Bush administration national security decision makers believed in initiating the transformation of the Middle East via the establishment of democracy in Iraq. For Wolfowitz and other neocon-

servatives, the forceful promotion of democracy in the region was a matter of profound conviction long before the 9/11 attacks. George W. Bush and Condoleezza Rice, who before 9/11 embraced the “realist” approach to foreign policy and its attendant elevation of stability over democracy, became converts to the messianic “freedom” mission only after 9/11. Indeed, Rice, following the president’s lead, and to the surprise of her “realist” colleagues on the National Security Council staff, became a “fervent believer” in peace through democratization.⁴⁶ As she later declared to students at the American University in Cairo, “For sixty years, my country . . . pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region here in the Middle East—and we achieved neither. Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people.”⁴⁷ In contrast, Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld never displayed—and still don’t—any convincing concern over Iraq’s democratic prospects. They were always much more focused on getting rid of Saddam Hussein than on nation building, including bringing democratic governance to Iraq. They preferred, if confronted with the choice, a strategically friendly authoritarian Iraq to an unfriendly democratic Iraq. They did not believe in using US military power to remake the world in America’s image.⁴⁸ In short, they were not, to use current American political science jargon, democratic imperialists, but rather traditional nationalists.

President Bush endorsed transformation in his February 2003 American Enterprise Institute speech and again in his 17 March address to the nation in which he gave Saddam Hussein 48 hours to leave the country. “Unlike Saddam Hussein,” he said, “we believe the Iraqi people are deserving and capable of human liberty. And when the dictator has departed, they can set an example to all the Middle East of a vital and peaceful and self-governing nation.”⁴⁹ Replacing dictatorship with democracy, even democracy imposed by a foreign power (beginning with his American Enterprise Institute speech, Bush has made repeated references to the US success in transforming Imperial Japan into a democracy), would change Iraq from an aggressor into a peaceful state and therefore no longer a threat to global security. Indeed, Bush and the neoconservatives believed that Islamist terrorism was rooted in the prevalence of autocratic rule and economic stagnation in the Arab world; democratization would thus cure the disease of terrorism. In a televised address to the nation on 7 September 2003, Bush declared:

In Iraq, we are helping . . . to build a decent and democratic society at the center of the Middle East. . . . The Middle East will either become a place of progress and peace, or it will be an exporter of violence and terror that takes more lives in America and in other free nations. The triumph of democracy and tolerance in Iraq, in Afghanistan and beyond would be a grave setback for international terrorism. The terrorists thrive on the support of tyrants and the resentments of oppressed peoples. When tyrants fall, and resentment gives way to hope, men and women in every culture reject the ideologies of terror, and turn to the pursuits of peace. Everywhere that freedom takes hold, terror will retreat.⁵⁰

The combination of the 9/11 attacks and the influence of neoconservative thinking prompted both Bush and Rice, self-avowed “realists” before 9/11, to embrace the “democratic peace” theory, which holds that democracies are inherently peaceful towards one another and therefore that America’s (and the world’s) long-term security is best served by promoting the spread of democracy worldwide. For the Bush White House, this meant that the United States should use its strength to change the global status quo, including the employment of military force to overthrow tyrannical regimes. It also meant, given the inherent righteousness of America’s intentions in the world, that the United States should brook no constraints on its use of force from allies, friends, and international institutions.

Establishing a Regional Alternative to Saudi Arabia

Another objective of OIF was to create a regional alternative to Saudi Arabia. Before the Iranian revolution of 1979, the United States had relied on the “twin pillars” of Iran and Saudi Arabia to secure its oil interests in the Persian Gulf. The fall of the Shah of Iran made oil-bloated but militarily weak Saudi Arabia the centerpiece of that interest, and it was the implicit threat to Saudi Arabia that prompted President George H. W. Bush’s decision for war in 1991.

Twelve years later, neoconservatives hoped to transform Iraq into both a democracy and a surrogate for US security interests in the Persian Gulf. As such, it would replace Saudi Arabia, which Wolfowitz, Perle, and others regarded as a major ideological, financial, and recruiting source for terrorism (most of the 9/11 hijackers were Saudi nationals) by virtue of massive private Saudi financing of al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups and the Saudi monarchy’s official promotion, throughout the Muslim world, of its own extreme Wahhabist version of Islam.⁵¹ Though there is little evidence that this

view was shared by Bush or Cheney, the 9/11 attacks threatened to undermine the half-century-old security bargain between the United States and Saudi Arabia (i.e., US military protection in exchange for access to Persian Gulf oil at acceptable prices). If Islamist terrorism was, as Bush and Rice argued, rooted in Arab autocracy, then Saudi Arabia was part of the problem. It certainly became more difficult to remain silent on the Saudi monarchy's corruption, religious and gender bigotry, and propagation of the very kind of Islamist extremism that produced the 9/11 attacks (Saudi Arabia was one of only three states that recognized the Taliban regime of Afghanistan). Even were there no connection between Saudi Arabia and terrorism, there were prewar concerns about the longevity of the Saudi regime. The combination of explosive population growth, drastic decline in per capita income, and the staggering profligacy of the 30,000-member House of Saud all pointed toward inevitable collapse absent fundamental reform of the Saudi state.⁵²

Iraq's experience of liberal democratic rule . . . could increase the pressure already being felt by Teheran's mullahs to open that society. Iraq's model will be eyed warily by Saudi Arabia theocrats to the south, where male unemployment stands at 30 percent, population growth is rapid, and the populace is restive for change. Meanwhile, Iraq could even replace Saudi Arabia as the key American ally and source of in the region. A democratic Iraq would also encourage the region's already liberalizing regimes—such as those in Qatar, Morocco and Jordan—to continue on their paths toward democracy. Then too, a Baghdad *under American supervision* would surely improve its relations with the region's other democracies, Turkey and Israel.⁵³ (emphasis added)

For neoconservatives, Operation Iraqi Freedom offered an opportunity to groom a new Persian Gulf heavyweight strategic partner as an insurance policy against the political uncertainties surrounding the future US-Saudi relationship while freeing the United States to take a less tolerant and more demanding attitude toward the House of Saud. The underlying assumption was, of course, that Iraqis would be so grateful for their liberation from Saddam Hussein that they would happily agree to the establishment of their country as a regional surrogate for US strategic interests. Such a client state might even be persuaded to recognize Israel, withdraw from OPEC, and permit the establishment of US military bases on Iraqi soil as a means of containing the expansion of Iranian power and influence in the region.

Eliminating an Enemy of Israel

Yet another administration war aim was to eliminate an enemy of Israel. The personal and ideological ties of prominent neoconservatives to the state of Israel and particularly the Likud Party are matters of fact and have been much remarked upon.⁵⁴ It is also true that George W. Bush arguably has been the most pro-Israel American president since the Israeli state was founded in 1948. This does not mean that the Bush White House went to war for the sake of Israel's security interests. It does mean, however, that administration war proponents, especially the president and the neo-conservatives, believed the elimination of a declared enemy of Israel was a major benefit offered by OIF. "The neocons were American nationalists who believed it was always in America's interest to help Israel succeed over its enemies," observes Gary Dorrien. "They never claimed that the United States needed to sacrifice some interest of its own for the sake of Israel's well-being. To them, the assertion of closely related interests and identical values was an article of faith that secured Israel's protection and provided the United States with its only democratic ally in the Middle East."⁵⁵

The neoconservatives believed the United States and Israel had profound shared interests in the Middle East, especially when it came to the war on terror which, as defined by the Bush White House, made little practical or strategic distinction among al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah, or for that matter between the US campaign against al-Qaeda and Israeli counter-terrorist operations in the West Bank, Gaza, and southern Lebanon. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon certainly wasted no time asserting that Israel's war against Hamas and Hezbollah was the same as America's war against those who perpetrated the 9/11 attacks. Sharon placed Israel in the vanguard of the Bush administration's declared war on terror, and there is no evidence that the White House made any more of a distinction between Palestinian and al-Qaeda terrorism than it did between Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein.

Vindicating Rumsfeld's New Way of War

A final war aim was to vindicate the Rumsfeld Pentagon's "defense transformation." Rumsfeld came into office persuaded that new advances in reconnaissance, precision strike, command and control, and other technologies afforded the United States the opportunity to substitute speed for mass—to win future wars quickly with far less force and logistical support.

Specifically, he believed the combination of standoff precision air strikes and relatively small special operations forces on the ground could replace large and logistically ponderous regular ground forces. Army leaders resisted, believing that war could not be fought on the cheap, and that this was especially true of so-called “stability operations,” including counterinsurgency, which required large numbers of “boots on the ground” for years, even decades. The Army leadership remained wedded to the Weinberger-Powell doctrine of overwhelming force, which Rumsfeld and his neoconservative and “transformationist” allies regarded as obsolete “legacy” thinking. Iraq offered an opportunity to discredit the doctrine and, with it, the requirement for a large (10-division), heavy (six armored and mechanized infantry divisions) Army.⁵⁶ “Heartened by the small-force stunning victory in Afghanistan, the rapid defeat of Iraq on his [Rumsfeld’s] terms would break the spine of Army resistance to his transformation goal once and for all.”⁵⁷ Thus, Rumsfeld insisted on an invasion force far smaller than that deemed prudent by experienced Army planners and dismissed the need to plan for likely stability operations in post-Baathist Iraq.

Unfortunately, going in fast, relatively light, and blind to possible post-invasion military requirements created a fundamental contradiction between the war plan and the critical objectives of quickly securing Iraq’s suspected WMD sites and the provision of security necessary for Iraq’s political reconstruction. “The administration convinced itself that it could dislodge the [Saddam Hussein] regime without doing the hard work of rebuilding a new Iraq or without committing itself to troop levels that were needed in most other postwar conflicts.”⁵⁸ Though the White House repeatedly cited (and still does) the analogy of America’s success in rebuilding postwar Japan as proof that the United States could also reconstruct Iraq as a new democracy and ally, the circumstances of postwar Japan—not the least of which was the presence of *overwhelming US military force* in Japan *after Japan’s formal surrender*—bear no comparison to the situation in post-Saddam Iraq.⁵⁹

What Was the Iraq War Really All About?

The Bush White House deliberately invoked the specter of a soon to be nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein allied to al-Qaeda to mobilize public and congressional support for a regime-change war against Iraq.⁶⁰ The invocation was accompanied by no convincing evidence because there was none.

But there were *no other convincing reasons to go to war*. Only a clear and present—a grave and gathering—danger would do.

[The Bush administration] made four main arguments to persuade the public of [its] case against Saddam Hussein: (1) he was an almost uniquely undeterrable aggressor who would seek any opportunity to kill Americans virtually regardless of risk to himself or his country; (2) he was cooperating with al-Qaeda and had even assisted in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States; (3) he was close to acquiring nuclear weapons; and (4) he possessed chemical and biological weapons that could be used to devastating effect against American civilians at home or U.S. troops in the Middle East. Virtually none of the administration claims held up, and the information needed to debunk nearly all of them was available both inside and outside the U.S. government before the war. Nevertheless, administration officials persistently repeated only the most extreme threat claims and suppressed contrary evidence.⁶¹

Bush and Cheney seem to have believed in the Iraqi menace they postulated; perhaps it was a case of wish being father to the thought. But the White House also understood that the war it wanted could be sold only on the basis of Iraq as a direct national security threat.

To be sure, there were always plenty of reasons to despise Saddam Hussein and support his removal from power. But were they reasons for war, especially preventive war? A US invasion of Iraq could not be sold on purely moral, political, or reputational grounds. Singly or together, liberating Iraq from tyranny, establishing a democracy there, redeeming the botched war termination of 1991, doing Israel a strategic favor, scaring Iran and North Korea, and showing off transformed US military power were not compelling reasons for war in the marketplace of domestic public opinion. Americans were certainly not going to be led into a war solely to demonstrate a will to war.

Yet among war proponents, especially the neoconservatives and their key White House and Defense Department allies, considerations of power and reputation seemed paramount. To them, the war was less about Iraq than it was about the United States in the post-Soviet world. It was about perpetuating America's global military supremacy and mustering the commensurate political will to employ that supremacy on behalf of universal American values. It was about casting off, once and for all, the Vietnam syndrome and the crippling constraints of the Weinberger-Powell doctrine. It was about showing the world, friend and foe alike, who was boss. It was about supplanting realism and multilateralism with value exportation and unilateralism. It was

about ditching deterrence and containment in favor of military prevention. It was, in short, about the arrogance of power.

The supreme irony, of course, is that a military action aimed to awing the world degenerated quickly into an embarrassing advertisement of the limits of US conventional military supremacy and of the persistence of American public intolerance of protracted warfare against irregular enemies. The Iraq War's primary strategic beneficiaries have been al-Qaeda, Iran, and China, not Iraq or the United States.⁶² Indeed, the experience of the Iraq War is likely to exert as chilling an effect on future US use of force as did the Vietnam syndrome so deplored by the neoconservatives.⁶³ Those who wanted to rid American statecraft of the curse of the first Vietnam War succeeded only in serving up a second. (And some are now salivating for a third: war against Iran.)

In the pantheon of America's strategic blunders since 1945, the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 ranks in the first tier, alongside the Truman administration's 1950 decision to cross the 38th Parallel and attempt the forcible reunification of Korea, and the Johnson administration's 1965 decision to deploy US ground troops to the Vietnam War. And for what?

What Now?

The decision to invade Iraq may turn out to be the most adversely consequential foreign war in American history. The Iraq War has alienated friends and allies around the world; exposed the limits of American military power for all to see and exploit; raised the prospect of an Iraq Syndrome that could cripple US foreign policy for decades; soured civil-military relations to the point where retired generals are publicly indicting their former civilian superiors for mismanagement and incompetence; depleted US land power and retarded the recapitalization of US air and naval power; weakened the dollar; encouraged Russian and Chinese strategic hostility; vindicated, to millions of Arabs, al-Qaeda's story line about American imperial ambitions in the Middle East; aided and abetted the electoral victories of Hamas and Hezbollah; transformed Iraq into a recruiting and training ground for Islamist terrorism; promoted the expansion and Iranian power and influence in the region; encouraged Iran to accelerate its quest for nuclear weapons; enabled the probable establishment of a Shiite regime in Baghdad aligned with Teheran that could undermine Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab states with significant

Shiite minorities, even provoking a regional civil war along sectarian lines; and increased the chances of a Iranian-American war that could prove catastrophic to the global economy.

Given these consequences, an autopsy is imperative. Within days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt directed a no-holds-barred inquiry into what went wrong. Such an inquiry into the Iraq War—both the decision to launch it and the way it was conducted—should now be convened. The aim would be to establish the lessons of the war and to identify the organizational, policy, and other changes necessary to ensure that such a war is never repeated. The model would be the bipartisan 9/11 Commission, which was established by the Congress and which achieved a remarkable consensus in both its assessment and recommendations. The White House, which initially opposed the creation of the 9/11 Commission, is likely to oppose formation of an Iraq War Commission. But that is all the more reason for an Iraq War Commission. Unless led by an extraordinary statesman like Roosevelt, the executive branch will resist formal inquiries into its own misjudgments and mistakes. Partisan considerations, however, should not be permitted to override the profound national interest in avoiding future Iraq-style wars. Disastrous foreign policy mistakes, like fatal accidents, mandate investigation. ■■■

Notes

1. George Packer, *The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005), 46.
2. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007), 229.
3. Brent Scowcroft, "Don't Attack Iraq," *Wall Street Journal*, 15 August 2002.
4. "President Bush, Colombia President Uribe Discuss Terrorism," The Oval Office, 25 September 2002, White House press release, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020925-1.html.
5. For a succinct analysis of the neoconservatives' influence on the post-9/11 Bush White House, see Jeffrey Record, *Dark Victory: America's Second War against Iraq* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004), 17–29.
6. In 1997 leading neoconservative intellectuals and their past and future allies in government, including Cheney, Wolfowitz, and Rumsfeld, founded the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) dedicated to the following goals: increased defense spending; strong action against regimes hostile to American values and interests; promotion of political and economic freedom abroad; and acceptance of responsibility for America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to US security, prosperity, and values. In its "Statement of Principles," the PNAC noted that "the United States stands as the world's preeminent power" but asked: "Does [it] have the vision to build upon the achievements of past decades? Does [it] have the resolve to shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests?" The statement bemoaned that "we seem to

have forgotten the essential elements of the Reagan Administration's success: a [strong] military . . . ; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and a national leadership that accepts the United States' global responsibilities." The statement concluded: "Such a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity may not be fashionable today. But it is necessary if the United States is to build on the successes of this past century and to ensure our security and our greatness in the next." ("Statement of Principles," Project for the New American Century, 3 June 1997, <http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm>.) Of the 25 founding members of the PNAC, 10 entered the Bush administration in 2001: Dick Cheney (vice president), Donald Rumsfeld (secretary of defense), Paul Wolfowitz (deputy secretary of defense), Richard Perle (chairman of the Defense Policy Board), Paula Dobriansky (under secretary of state for global affairs), I. Lewis Libby (Vice President Cheney's chief of staff), Zalmay Khalilzad (special envoy to the Middle East), Elliott Abrams (NSC staffer responsible for the Middle East), and Eliot Cohen (member of the Defense Policy Board). (Tom Barry, "A Strategy Foretold," *Foreign Policy in Focus*, October 2002, 103.) Other neoconservatives who were not PNAC founders, such as Douglas Feith and John Bolton, also assumed prominent positions within the administration.

7. Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, *America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 4, 206. Quotation from Lawrence Kaplan and William Kristol, *The War over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2003), vii–viii.

8. Stephen Holmes, *The Matador's Cape: America's Reckless Response to Terror* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 108.

9. The neoconservatives' philosophy and the profound influence of neoconservative thinking and of key neoconservatives on George W. Bush and his foreign policy are detailed in Halper and Clarke, *America Alone*; Murray Friedman, *The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Gary Dorrien, *The Neoconservative Mind: Politics, Culture, and the War of Ideology* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993) and *Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana* (New York: Routledge, 2004); and James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (New York: Viking Penguin, 2004). For a comprehensive pre-9/11 declaration of the neoconservatives' foreign policy agenda and critique of the George H. W. Bush and Clinton administrations, see Robert Kagan and William Kristol, eds., *Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000).

10. Richard N. Haass, *The Opportunity: America's Moment to Alter History's Course* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 185.

11. Adam Cobb, "A Strategic Assessment of Iraq," *Civil Wars* 9, no. 1 (March 2007): 35. There were always powerful barriers to cooperation between al-Qaeda and Baathist Iraq. Al-Qaeda regards nationalism as an apostate threat, a divider of Muslims from one another. Osama bin Laden's goal is the reestablishment of the caliphate (i.e., a politically indivisible Muslim community), and he regarded Saddam and all other secular Arab leaders as infidels. For Saddam, who spent eight years waging war against the existential threat to his regime posed by the Ayatollah Khomeini, Osama bin Laden could never have been a trustworthy ally. Saddam—whose role models were Saladin and Stalin, not Mohammed—killed far more Islamic clerics than Americans. It is noteworthy that bin Laden remained silent during the first three weeks of OIF; only on 18 April 2003, as US forces entered Baghdad, did he issue a taped message calling on Muslims to mount suicide attacks on coalition forces. As two experts on Islamic terrorism observed of Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden in the context of the National Security Council's examination of who was behind the 9/11 attacks:

[Osama bin Laden] was deeply contemptuous of Saddam Hussein. For believers like bin Laden, Saddam was the second coming of Gamal Abdel Nasser, a secular pharaonic ruler who destroyed

the religion and oppressed the umma [the community of Muslim believers]. There is little evidence that Saddam viewed bin Laden and his ilk any differently than Egypt's secular rulers viewed [Islamist activists] Sayyid Qutb, Shuqri Mustafa, and their successors—as religious extremists who would enjoy nothing more than to see secular rule toppled. However attractive their anti-Americanism, they could only be handled with caution. There was nothing in the record to suggest that a central precept of the state sponsors had changed: never get into bed with a group you cannot control. Both the Iranians and the Iraqis appeared to be reluctant to cooperate with an organization that might commit some enormity that could be traced back to them. The NSC analysts found it difficult to believe that al Qaeda acted alone, but no other conclusion was warranted.

Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House, 2002), 264.

12. This compelled Saddam Hussein to readmit the UN inspection regime under threat of invasion was a triumph of coercive diplomacy for the Bush White House. One wonders how the course of events in the Middle East and the United States might have been different had the administration simply pocketed that victory and stood down the invasion force. At a minimum, the United States would have been spared a disastrous war, and al-Qaeda would have been denied a strategic windfall.

13. Chaim Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the Iraq War," *International Security* 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004), 25 (text and n. 87).

14. Hans Blix, *Disarming Iraq* (New York: Pantheon, 2004), 3.

15. *Ibid.*, 156.

16. See Graham Allison, *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe* (New York: Times Books, 2004), 61–86.

17. Barton Gellman, "U.S. Has Not Inspected Iraqi Nuclear Facility," *Washington Post*, 25 April 2003. See also Gellman, "Seven Nuclear Sites Looted," *Washington Post*, 10 May 2003.

18. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 78–83 and 503–4. See also Bob Woodward, *State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 92–96 and 100–3.

19. Karen DeYoung, *Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 76.

20. Suicide bombing was a post-invasion phenomenon. Prior to April 2003, there had never been a suicide bombing in Iraq. See Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005), 245–6. The Baathist regime monopolized terrorism in Iraq, and Saddam Hussein, for all his brutality and paranoia, ran a stable, secular regime that formed a significant barrier against the expansion of Iranian power and influence in the Middle East.

21. A qualified victory, to be sure, given the survival of Taliban leader Mullah Omar and al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, and the subsequent Taliban resurgence in southern and eastern Afghanistan. The war never really ended in Afghanistan, and the writ of the Hamid Karzai's central government doesn't extend much beyond Kabul. No less depressing has been the country's resurgence as the world's leading supplier of heroin. Launching the Iraq War while leaving the war in Afghanistan militarily and politically unfinished was a strategic blunder of the first order.

22. See Record, *Dark Victory*, 64–89.

23. Robert Draper, *Dead Certain: The Presidency of George W. Bush* (New York: Free Press, 2007), 178.

24. *Ibid.*, 189.

25. Holmes, *Matador's Cape*, 125.

26. Francis Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 116.

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27. Draper, *Dead Certain*, 173.
28. Kaplan and Kristol, *War over Iraq*, 37.
29. Reuel Marc Gerecht, "A Cowering Superpower," *The Weekly Standard* 6, no. 43 (30 July 2001): 29.
30. Christian Alfonsi, *Circle in the Sand: Why We Went Back to Iraq* (New York: Doubleday, 2006), 411.
31. William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Introduction: National Interest and Global Responsibility," in Kagan and Kristol, *Present Dangers*, 4.
32. David Frum and Richard Perle, *An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror* (New York: Random House, 2003), 17.
33. For an analysis of the impact of the Vietnam syndrome on US decision making in the 1990s on the Balkans, see Jeffrey Record, *Serbia and Vietnam: A Preliminary Comparison of U.S. Decisions to Use Force*, Occasional Paper no. 8 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College, Air University, May 1999).
34. Kaplan and Kristol, *War over Iraq*, 112.
35. Quoted in James Gerstenzang, "Bush Says Iraq Exit Would Bolster Iran," *Los Angeles Times*, 4 October 2007.
36. Though the administration used the term *preemption* in referring to the need for preventive war, there are key legal and policy differences between preemptive military action and preventive war. Preemption is an attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent. As such, it is an extension of the right of self-defense and therefore permissible under international law. In contrast, preventive war is a war initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk. The logic of preventive war runs something like this: I'm going to have a war with you sooner or later, and right now I'm a lot stronger than you, so I'm going to have a war with you right now. Preventive war is thus indistinguishable from outright aggression.
37. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), 15.
38. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point" (speech, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, 1 June 2002), www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html.
39. See Record, *Dark Victory*, 33–34.
40. White House, "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech."
41. See Jeffrey Record, "Threat Confusion and Its Penalties," *Survival* 46, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 51–72.
42. Scott Sagan, "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," *International Security* 18, no. 4 (Spring 1994): 78.
43. *National Security Strategy*, 27, 30.
44. Frum and Perle, *End to Evil*, 33.
45. See Jeffrey Record, "Back to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine?" *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (Fall 2007): 79–95.
46. Glenn Kessler, *The Confidante: Condoleezza Rice and the Creation of the Bush Legacy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2007), 91.
47. *Ibid.*, 98.
48. See Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 15.
49. "Bush's Speech on Iraq: 'Saddam Hussein and His Sons Must Leave,'" *New York Times*, 18 March 2003, A.14.

50. "Bush: 'We Will Do What Is Necessary,'" transcript of Pres. George W. Bush's address to the nation, 7 September 2003, *Washington Post*, 8 September 2003, A.16.

51. See Frum and Perle, *End to Evil*, 129–42.

52. See Robert Baer, "The Fall of the House of Saud," *Atlantic Monthly* 291, no. 4 (May 2003): 53–62.

53. Kaplan and Kristol, *War over Iraq*, 99–100.

54. See Halper and Clarke, *America Alone*, 104–8; and Dorrien, *Imperial Designs*, 195–8.

55. Dorrien, *Imperial Designs*, 203–4.

56. Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (New York: Penguin, 2006), 102.

57. Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra II*, 53.

58. *Ibid.*, 503.

59. See Record, *Dark Victory*, 85–89. In September 2002, novelist and former secretary of the Navy (and now US senator from Virginia) James Webb summarized the dangers of faulty reasoning implicit in the Japan analogy:

The connotations of "a MacArthurian regency in Baghdad" show how inapt the comparison [with the situation in Iraq] is. Our occupation forces never set foot inside Japan until the emperor had formally surrendered and prepared Japanese citizens for our arrival. Nor did MacArthur destroy the Japanese government when he took over as proconsul after World War II. Instead, he was careful to work his changes through it, and took pains to preserve the integrity of the imperial family. Nor is Japanese culture in any way similar to Iraq's. The Japanese are a homogeneous people who place a high premium on respect, and they fully cooperated with MacArthur's forces after having been ordered to do so by the emperor. The Iraqis are a multiethnic people filled with competing factions who in many cases would view a U.S. occupation as infidels invading the cradle of Islam. Indeed, this very bitterness provided Osama bin Laden the grist for his recruitment efforts in Saudi Arabia when the United States kept bases on Saudi soil after the Gulf War.

James Webb, "Heading for Trouble: Do We Really want to Occupy Iraq for the Next 30 Years?" *Washington Post*, 4 September 2002, A.21.

60. The literature on the Bush administration's deliberate inflation of the Iraqi threat is voluminous. See Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation," 5–48; James P. Pfiffner, "Did President Bush Mislead the Country in His Arguments for War with Iraq?" *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 34, no. 1 (March 2004): 25–46; Paul R. Pillar, "Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006): 15–27; John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "An Unnecessary War," *Foreign Policy*, no. 134 (January/February 2003): 51–59; Joseph Cirincione, Jessica T. Mathews, and George Perkovich, with Alexis Orton, *WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004); Craig R. Whitney, ed., *The WMD Mirage: Iraq's Decade of Deception and America's False Premise for War* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005); Michael Isikoff and David Corn, *Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2006); and John Prados, *Hoodwinked: The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War* (New York: New Press, 2004).

61. Kaufmann, "Threat Inflation," 6.

62. Al-Qaeda benefits via the seeming vindication of its story line of a predatory United States seeking to subdue a Muslim heartland and via the transformation of Iraq into a recruiting and training ground; Iran benefits via the removal of a hostile regime in Baghdad and the likely establishment of a friendly Shiite state that will facilitate the expansion of Iranian power and influence in the Persian Gulf; and China benefits via America's strategic preoccupation with Iraq and the Iraq War's retardation of the recapitalization of America's naval and air power.

Genocide and Airpower

Douglas Peifer

AS THE November 2008 elections draw ever closer in the United States, Democrats and Republicans emphasize their foreign-policy differences regarding the Iraq War, the global war on terrorism, the importance of international law and institutions, and a host of other issues. Yet, on one issue, the leading contenders from both parties as well as the outgoing administration sound a similar note: genocide is intolerable in today's interconnected world. Both Democratic candidates have taken a strong position on Darfur. Senator Barack Obama participated in the "Save Darfur" rally on the National Mall in April 2006, delivering a speech along with other speakers such as Elie Wiesel, Rwandan survivor Paul Rusesabagina, and Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to an estimated 100,000 people. He has personally visited Darfur refugee camps in eastern Chad (September 2006), and until early March 2008 listed Samantha Power—a leading crusader against genocide—as one of his foreign-policy advisers.¹ Senator Hillary Clinton has cosponsored seven acts, resolutions, and legislative measures dealing with Darfur and is described as a "champion of the cause" who has taken "crucial action to end the genocide" by the activist pressure group DarfurScores.org.² Senator John McCain, the Republican candidate for president, wrote an op-ed with Senator Bob Dole for the *Washington Post* entitled "Rescue Darfur Now" (10 September 2006); voted for the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act, Genocide Accountability Act, and the No-Fly Zone legislation; and was one of the few Republican senators to support the Clinton administration's policies to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in the late 1990s.³ Lastly, outgoing president George W. Bush, while unwilling to unilaterally commit US troops to Darfur given military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, has at least rhetorically elevated genocide prevention

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and intervention to the national security realm. In 2002, Bush listed genocide as an issue that needed to be addressed in his first *National Security Strategy*,⁴ expanding on the topic in his 2006 *National Security Strategy*. Devoting an entire page to the issue, President Bush warned:

It is a moral imperative that states take action to prevent and punish genocide. History teaches that sometimes other states will not act unless America does its part. We must refine United States Government efforts—economic, diplomatic, and law-enforcement—so that they target those individuals responsible for genocide and not the innocent citizens they rule. Where perpetrators of mass killing defy all attempts at peaceful intervention, armed intervention may be required, preferably by the forces of several nations working together under appropriate regional or international auspices.

We must not allow the legal debate over the technical definition of “genocide” to excuse inaction. The world must act in cases of mass atrocities and mass killing that will eventually lead to genocide even if the local parties are not prepared for peace.⁵

Skeptics may dismiss these statements as largely rhetorical, with little influence on US foreign policy in practice. As Samantha Power points out in her 2002 best-selling book *“A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide*, few politicians have been censured for inaction in the face of mass killings, famine, or genocide overseas.⁶ Occasionally, however, public outrage and the personal convictions of influential policy makers have generated action to stop outrageous violations of human rights, with George H. Bush, William Clinton, and George W. Bush justifying interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq, at least partially on humanitarian grounds.

This article explores how and when genocide prevention became an issue in the US political realm, how genocide was defined by the United Nations, and how scholars and activists have pushed to expand the public understanding of the term. Moving from definition to evaluation, conceptual frameworks are introduced for recognizing the warning signs and stages of genocide and mass killings. Having defined the term and provided a conceptual framework, the focus then shifts to ongoing efforts to reframe our understanding of intervention in terms of an international “responsibility to protect.” Lastly, this article tackles the difficult issue of how the United States, already stretched with commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, can best contribute to the operational success of peace enforcement operations that seek to make our rhetorical commitment to genocide prevention and intervention a reality.

The Emergence of Genocide as an Issue in the American Political Sphere

Never again. These two words captured the grim determination of Holocaust survivors, that the world should never forget what happened and never allow another cold-blooded murder of millions based on their religion, ethnicity, race, or national origin. Following Raul Hilberg's groundbreaking *Destruction of the European Jews* in 1961 and the Eichmann trial that same year, a dense network of scholars, university programs, foundations, and museums slowly developed to ensure that the Holocaust, or Shoah, would never be forgotten and to examine the causes and conditions that allowed it to happen. Parallel efforts emerged dedicated to understanding the Armenian genocide, the destruction of Native Americans, and other mass killings. Yet, despite these efforts, the international community stood by and allowed genocide to unfold in Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and elsewhere during the closing decades of the twentieth century. The twenty-first century has proved equally disturbing thus far, with perhaps as many as 400,000 lives extinguished in Darfur and some 2.3 million Darfuris displaced by the violence.⁷ Genocide Watch, an international group dedicated to raising awareness of and influencing public policies toward potential and actual genocides, lists one genocide in progress (Darfur), one region where genocide is deemed imminent (Chad), and four areas exhibiting warning signs of possible mass killings (Burma, Kenya, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe) as of January 2008.⁸

Outraged by the inaction of nations and the international community to the killing fields of Cambodia, the Rwandan genocide of 1994, the slaughter of some 7,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in July 1995, and the deteriorating situation in Kosovo in the late 1990s, concerned individuals and organizations began to network and become more active in generating pressure to prevent future genocides. The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) established a Committee on Conscience charged with alerting the national conscience, influencing policy makers, and stimulating worldwide action to confront and halt genocide, mass killings, and related crimes against humanity.⁹ Power, a war correspondent, pricked America's conscience with her frontline articles on the Balkans during the 1990s and best-selling book.¹⁰ Gregory Stanton, an international human rights lawyer who worked for the US State Department's Office of Cambodian Genocide Investigations, founded Genocide Watch. Existing nongovernmental organizations such as Refugees International became increasingly concerned about the over-

lap between humanitarian assistance, war, and genocide. Last but not least, universities became ever more engaged in genocide studies, with institutes and centers such as the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies and Yale's Genocide Studies Program generating both scholarship and activism.¹¹ Not surprisingly, among the most vocal voices pressing the US government and the United Nations for action were student groups such as Students Taking Action Now: Darfur (STAND), whose chapters have organized dozens of rallies, vigils, and teach-ins about Darfur since the first chapter was founded in Georgetown in 2004.¹²

As journalists, citizen coalitions, student action groups, university centers, and policy institutes generated public awareness of mass killings and genocides, American politicians responded. In the 1970s and 1980s, few politicians beyond William Proxmire seemed interested in the issue. Pressured by activists and shamed and shocked by the experience of Rwanda and Srebrenica, a growing number of senators, congressmen, and executive branch officials voiced a determination that future genocides would not be tolerated. While concerned citizens and activists unhappily note that mass killings continue in Darfur and threaten to unfold in southern Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, and elsewhere, the president's appointment of a special envoy to Sudan (Andrew Natsios) stands in stark contrast to US hands-off policy during the Rwandan genocide.¹³ Invoking the word *genocide*, however, has not resulted in effective action. Seeking to generate concrete "practical recommendations to enhance the U.S. government's capacity to respond to emerging threats of genocide and mass atrocities," former secretary of state Madeleine Albright and former secretary of defense William Cohen announced in November 2007 the creation of a Genocide Prevention Task Force. Madeleine Albright's opening statement captures the problems that policy makers face when confronted with mass killings: "The world agrees that genocide is unacceptable and yet genocide and mass killings continue. Our challenge is to match words to deeds and stop allowing the unacceptable. That task, simple on the surface, is in fact one of the most persistent puzzles of our times. We have a duty to find the answer before the vow of 'never again' is once again betrayed."¹⁴

Defining Genocide

One of the first steps in stopping genocide is defining what constitutes genocide and establishing the legal framework for international, coalition, or unilateral prevention and intervention efforts. Mass killings and massacres are by no means a recent phenomenon; witness Rome's solution to its Carthaginian problem, William the Conqueror's ravaging of Northumbria following the Norman conquest where it was said he "left no house standing and no man alive," and Andrew Jackson's 1814 campaign against the Red Stick Creeks in Alabama.¹⁵ Yet, by the nineteenth century, "just war" concepts that distinguished between combatants and noncombatants had moved from the sphere of philosophy, ethics, political theory, and custom and into the sphere of international law. The Hague Convention of the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1899), for example, specifically prohibited shelling undefended towns or cities and obliged an occupying power to "take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." Furthermore, contracting parties pledged that "family honors and rights, individual lives and private property, as well as religious convictions and liberty, must be respected." Subsequent treaties provided additional protections to noncombatants from air attack, naval shelling, and the like. Yet, the Hague Conventions aimed at restricting violence in wartime, and while they established a framework for protecting civilians from foreign occupiers, the conventions did not address the threat of mass violence by the state against its own citizens.

The prospect of a state employing massive violence against unarmed men, women, and children became a reality with the Armenian genocide, Stalin's campaign against the kulaks, and Nazi Germany's efforts to eradicate all Jews within its grasp. The term *genocide* was devised by Raphael Lemkin in 1944 as he struggled to convey Nazi extermination policies in his book *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*. Born in what was the Polish portion of the Czarist empire, young Lemkin had grown up under the shadow of pogrom and persecution as a Polish Jew. Graduating from Lvov law school in the 1920s, he felt drawn to the topic of mass killings, studying the fate of the Armenians and the Assyrian minority in Iraq. Well before the contours of the Holocaust became apparent, Lemkin proposed at a conference in 1933 that the League of Nations should ban the crime of barbarity, which he defined as the "premeditated destruction of national, racial, religious, and social collectives."¹⁶ The rise of the Nazi party in Germany and

deepening anti-Semitism throughout Eastern Europe signaled that the topic was of more than academic interest. When the Wehrmacht stormed into Poland in 1939, Lemkin sought refuge first in Sweden and then in the United States. Deeply concerned about the fate of those now under German rule, he devoted himself to assembling the laws, orders, and decrees that chronicled Nazi policy toward Europe's occupied peoples, particularly its Jews. His massive 712-page study sought to document Nazi policy and introduced the term *genocide* into the English vocabulary.¹⁷

At Nuremberg and in various postwar trials, the Allies charged and prosecuted German organizations and individuals with planning, initiating, and waging wars of aggression; conspiring to commit crimes against peace; committing war crimes; and committing crimes against humanity. Nazi efforts to eradicate the Jews as a people fell within the framework of the ill-defined category of "crimes against humanity." Lemkin, who advised the US chief counsel at the Nuremberg Trials, accelerated his campaign for an international law defining genocide as a crime. He believed that international law had power and felt strongly that just as the Hague Conventions had defined war crimes, the newly created United Nations should explicitly outlaw the destruction of entire groups of people based on religion, ethnicity, and group identity. In December 1946, the General Assembly of the young United Nations passed a resolution condemning genocide and tasking a committee to draft an international treaty banning it.

Committee members engaged with drafting the convention devoted much discussion and debate to defining genocide. What distinguished genocide from other forms of mass death, such as famine or war? How should the crime be defined so that the Soviets—guilty of their own mass murders—would not obstruct the treaty?¹⁸ And how could the treaty be made meaningful as a measure designed to stop the process of mass killing rather than simply punish those responsible after its completion?

By 1948 the committee had completed its task. Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defined both the concept of genocide and what acts would be deemed punishable:

Article 2

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Article 3

The following acts shall be punishable:

- (a) Genocide;
- (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
- (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
- (d) Attempt to commit genocide;
- (e) Complicity in genocide.¹⁹

The effectiveness of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide has been limited. Adopted by a resolution of the General Assembly in December 1948, the convention required ratification by 20 members of the United Nations before coming into force. By October 1950, 20 states had ratified the convention, but the United States was not among them. Initially, the American Bar Association and southern senators opposed the treaty due to the ambiguities of Article 2. Later, conservatives opposed the convention due to concerns about US sovereignty. But its supporters never abandoned the issue, with Senator William Proxmire delivering some 3,211 speeches on the topic between 1967 and 1986.²⁰ With President Reagan's strong support, the Senate finally ratified the convention in 1986, dragging its feet another two years before passing the Genocide Convention Implementation Act in October 1988.

After exerting little influence for 40-odd years, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide became an important reference point for tribunals, courts, and legal cases in the 1990s and twenty-first century. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the International Court of Justice, and the International Criminal Court have all tried perpetrators of genocide, drawing upon the convention's definition of genocide. Yet Lemkin, Proxmire, and others had hoped that the convention would be an effective tool for *preventing* genocide, with Article 7 calling for the "United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article 3."²¹

Here the record is less encouraging. During the Cold War, the international community made no effort to invoke the convention when Mao's Great Leap and Cultural Revolution killed millions of Chinese between 1958 and 1968, when Suharto's anticommunist campaign in Indonesia targeted entire villages for liquidation in 1965–66, when Pakistan's civil war veered toward genocidal mayhem in 1971, or when the Khmer Rouge eliminated an estimated 20 percent of the Cambodian population between 1975 and 1979.²² Some of these mass killings did not fall within the narrow framework of the Genocide Convention, which made no mention of targeting political groups. Others were ignored due to Cold War politics and the power of the perpetrating nation. Nonetheless, supporters of the convention believed that the United States' accession to the treaty in 1988 and the end of the Cold War might render it more effective. This was not the case: the "international community" did little to stop the slaughter of 800,000 Tutsis by Hutu extremists in Rwanda in April–July 1994, and UN peacekeepers helplessly looked on the next year as Serb forces rounded up some 7,000 Bosnian men and boys for execution at Srebrenica.²³ Indeed, during the Rwandan genocide, the State Department and the National Security Council deliberately avoided using the term *genocide* precisely because they feared that use of the term might compel some sort of action.²⁴

This fear proved misplaced. In 1995 and 1999, NATO intervened to stop ethnic cleansing and war in Bosnia and Kosovo, subsequently stationing robust peacekeeping forces in the region. Sickened by the violence on NATO's doorstep and fearful that further inaction would undermine the alliance's credibility, European and American leaders responded both out of perceived national interest and humanitarian concern without directly invoking the genocide convention. Yet, when genocide reared its ugly head in Darfur, the international community did little to stop the killing until prodded into action by various grass roots activist organizations. Ten years after the Rwandan genocide, the United Nations and the United States began to directly invoke the term as the killings in the Darfur region of Sudan mounted. On 7 April 2004 UN secretary-general Kofi Annan announced an Action Plan to Prevent Genocide, subsequently appointing a special advisor on genocide prevention.²⁵ Later that year, Secretary of State Powell specifically termed the crisis in Darfur a genocide.²⁶ Yet, only after protracted and difficult negotiations did the contours of an effective intervention force become apparent. In July 2007, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1769 authorizing a joint United Nations-African Union peacekeeping force projected to number some 20,000 troops, more than 6,000 police, and a significant civilian com-

ponent.²⁷ Three years had elapsed between Annan's Action Plan and the UN resolution. And despite rhetorical support for stopping genocide from the White House and State Department, the UN still had received no pledges for "key enabling capabilities in areas such as aviation and ground transport" as of January 2008.²⁸

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide clearly defines genocide and associated acts in Articles 1 and 2 and opens the door for contracting parties to "call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3."²⁹ Yet, the treaty has been disappointing in its effect: for much of the Cold War, nations simply ignored the convention and even during the post-Cold War era, signatories have been slow and reluctant to put speedy and effective intervention forces at the UN's disposal. Despite this, the treaty should not be dismissed as entirely ineffective: the special tribunals set up by the UN to try responsible parties for crimes of genocide, war crimes, and gross infractions of international law may well exert a deterrent effect on groups contemplating mass murder.

Recognizing the Warning Signs and Stages of Genocide and Mass Killings

The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide provides a legal framework for international action to stop genocide, yet prevention and intervention hinge on recognizing the warning signs of impending genocide. This entails understanding the stages and steps towards genocide, assessing the likelihood of genocide, and then formulating preventive and interventionist responses. The Genocide Intervention Network, the USHMM's Committee on Conscience, Genocide Watch, Prevent Genocide International, and various other nongovernmental organizations now issue specific alerts regarding potential and ongoing genocides, joining organizations with a broader mandate such as the International Red Cross, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch.³⁰ The Genocide Intervention Network and the USHMM Committee on Conscience do so by providing action alerts and listing areas of concern, with Genocide Watch ranking crisis into genocide emergencies when "genocide is actually underway," genocide warnings when "politicide or genocide

is imminent,” and genocide watches when “early warning signs indicate the danger of mass killing or genocide.”³¹

The concept of analyzing genocide structurally and identifying its stages owes much to pioneering studies of the Holocaust. Raul Hilberg’s *The Destruction of the European Jews* has proven particularly influential.³² Hilberg, like Lemkin, fled Nazi rule and settled in the United States. He attended Abraham Lincoln High School in Brooklyn, served in the US Army, and participated in the US Army’s War Documentation Project, which assembled German records for use in postwar trials and for historical purposes.³³ His Columbia dissertation (1955) broke new ground by analyzing the structure and process of the “Final Solution.” Five publishers turned down the manuscript due to its length and subject matter, but since its initial publication in 1961, Hilberg’s work has become an essential, if controversial, reference point.³⁴


The Destruction of the European Jews provoked debate because it asserted that traditional Jewish strategies for dealing with force and persecution had failed disastrously during the 1930s and 1940s. Hilberg noted that many German policies, ranging from laws banning Jews from certain jobs to decrees assembling them into ghettos to requirements for distinct clothing, had historical precedence. He asserted that Jewish communities had over the centuries focused on alleviating the impact of discriminatory policies while generally complying with rather than confronting state policies. This tendency toward alleviation, evasion, paralysis, and compliance rather than resistance served Jewish communities well during the medieval and early modern periods, but Hilberg claimed that it failed to recognize the contours of the process of genocide.³⁵ And it is here that Hilberg has been most influential: his discussion of the structure of destruction laid a model for understanding how the Holocaust had been very different from the pogroms, massacres, and communal violence to which the Jewish community had been long subjected.

Hilberg concluded that the Final Solution involved a number of steps. First, the Nazi state had to define who was a Jew. This initial step proved more complicated than anticipated, in that Nazi racial ideology had abandoned religious definitions of Jew and Christian in favor of racial categories of Jew and Aryan. If laws banning Jewish employment and ownership were to be enforced, lawyers would have to clarify the status of children of mixed ancestry, determine whether exceptions should be made for Jewish veterans, and decide whether or not converted Jews should be subjected to these policies. Next, Jews found themselves the targets of expropriation as Jewish firms were seized, special

taxes and levies were passed, and family property and savings were confiscated. Expropriation led to concentration as Jews were turned out of their houses, crowded into ghettos, and exploited as forced labor. Concentration, in turn, enabled more efficient annihilation, whether by mobile killing operations, by working Jews to death, or by the industrialized process of gassing large groups in specially designed gas chambers.

Hilberg's structural analysis of the destruction of Europe's Jews, laid out in the figure below, has been adopted and disseminated widely. Clearly laying out the stages and steps involved the murder of some six million European Jews, Hilberg provided a structural analysis to which others have turned in seeking to understand subsequent mass killings and genocides.

Hilberg's model seeks to explain the stages that led to the Holocaust, a uniquely modern horror, which prompted Lemkin to conceive of the term *genocide*. Since its publication, the world has experienced additional mass killings, establishing the necessity for a broader, more general model for understanding genocide. Gregory Stanton, drawn to the field of genocide studies due to his early involvement examining the Cambodian killing fields, has proposed the following schema, noting that "prevention of genocide requires a structural understanding of the genocidal process."³⁶ Stanton believes that genocides typically develop through eight stages, as described on the next page.



Hilberg's Stages of the Holocaust. (Reprinted from Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, rev. and definitive ed. [1st ed. 1961] [New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985], 50-1.)

Classification

Distinguishing between different groups of people, establishing “us” and “them” categories.

Symbolization

Identifying certain symbols with “out-groups,” using either customary dress or government-imposed identifying symbols or distinctive clothing.

Dehumanization

Associating targeted groups with repellent animals or microbes. Stanton gives the examples of Nazis calling Jews “vermin” and Rwandan Hutu hate radio referring to Tutsis as “cockroaches.”

Organization

Formation of groups and institutions ranging from mobs to militias to advanced bureaucracies that support and implement the genocide process.

Polarization

The deliberate, systematic effort to cut social connections between targeted groups and the broader society. Stanton notes that “the first to be killed in a genocide are moderates from the killing group who oppose the extremists.”

Preparation

Stanton borrows from Hilberg, noting that preparation involves identifying those targeted, expropriating their property, concentrating the victims, and in the most extreme cases, building facilities for extermination.

Extermination

Killing the targeted out-group.

Denial

Stanton adds an eighth stage, denial, to the process. He notes that typically records of the killing are burned, international accusations are dismissed, and efforts to cover up the killings are made.³⁷

As president of Genocide Watch, Stanton combines the attributes of activist, advocate, and scholar. His schema, fully developed on Genocide Watch's Web site, provides a conceptual model for understanding genocide, with Stanton providing examples of preventive measures that can be taken at each step.

Barbara Harff, a political scientist at the US Naval Academy, has added to our understanding of the genocide process by analyzing its causal factors. Using a comparative, empirical approach, Harff has sought to identify key factors that should provide warning signs of possible genocide. The factors she identifies as contributing to its occurrence include (1) prior incidents of genocide or politicide in the region, (2) a high degree of political upheaval, (3) a ruling elite defined in terms of ethnicity, (4) a "belief system that . . . justifies efforts to restrict, persecute, or eliminate certain categories of people," (5) an autocratic form of government, and (6) a trade system opposed to openness.³⁸

Harff notes that her social-scientific approach is "not enough to tell us . . . precisely when genocidal violence is likely to begin" but believes that an effort to systematically assess the risk of genocide improves the prospects for prevention and early response.³⁹ Her work moves beyond Hilberg's and Stanton's studies, which analyzed *how* genocide takes place, with Harff engaging the question of *why* genocides occur.

Lastly, the United Nation's Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has developed a set of indicators designed to provide early warning of the increased possibility of violent conflict and genocide. These indicators can be used as tools for assessing whether genocide is likely, with the committee further elaborating that one should take into account prior histories of genocide or violence against groups, policies of impunity, expatriate communities fostering extremism, and the presence or absence of UN or regional peacekeepers.

These indicators provide the analytical tools for anticipating genocide and mass killings, with Hilberg's and Stanton's stages of genocide providing models for understanding how far the process has progressed. Yet defining genocide and understanding its stages and indicators do not equate to preventing genocide. Increasingly, international and domestic pressure groups are arguing that recognition of impending or ongoing genocide imposes the duty to intervene. This assertion contradicts the long-standing Westphalian assumption that sovereign states are free to do as they will within the boundaries of their international borders, with advocates of intervention attempt-

CERD Indicators of Increased Possibility of Violent Conflict and Genocide

1. Lack of a legislative framework and institutions to prevent racial discrimination and provide recourse to victims of discrimination.
2. Systematic official denial of the existence of particular distinct groups.
3. The systematic exclusion—in law or in fact—of groups from positions of power, employment in State institutions and key professions such as teaching, the judiciary and the police.
4. Compulsory identification against the will of members of particular groups, including the use of identity cards indicating ethnicity.
5. Grossly biased versions of historical events in school textbooks and other educational materials as well as celebration of historical events that exacerbate tensions between groups and peoples.
6. Policies of forced removal of children belonging to ethnic minorities with the purpose of complete assimilation.
7. Policies of segregation, direct and indirect, for example separate schools and housing areas.
8. Systematic and widespread use and acceptance of speech or propaganda promoting hatred and/or inciting violence against minority groups, particularly in the media.
9. Grave statements by political leaders/prominent people that express support for affirmation of superiority of a race or an ethnic group, dehumanize and demonize minorities, or condone or justify violence against a minority.
10. Violence or severe restrictions targeting minority groups perceived to have traditionally maintained a prominent position, for example as business elites or in political life and State institutions.
11. Serious patterns of individual attacks on members of minorities by private citizens which appear to be principally motivated by the victims' membership of that group.
12. Development and organization of militia groups and/or extreme political groups based on a racist platform.
13. Significant flows of refugees and internally displaced persons, especially when those concerned belong to specific ethnic or religious groups.
14. Significant disparities in socioeconomic indicators evidencing a pattern of serious racial discrimination.
15. Policies aimed at the prevention of delivery of essential services or assistance, including obstruction of aid delivery or access to food, water, sanitation or essential medical supplies in certain regions or targeting specific groups.⁴⁰

ing to shift the debate from the “right to intervene” toward a “responsibility to protect.”

The Responsibility to Protect Argument, the UN's Action Plan to Prevent Genocide, and the Genocide Prevention Task Force

Survivors, scholars, and activists have pushed our understanding of genocide and mass killings a good deal further than the legalistic definitions of the genocide convention. We now have well-researched models that explain mass killing as a process and identify the factors that contribute to its onset. Numerous organizations provide updates on global areas of concern, issuing watches, warnings, and emergency declarations. Yet despite this knowledge, it has become clear that information alone provides neither the impetus to intervene nor guidance on how to prevent or stop mass killing. A growing community of individuals, think tanks, and governments now advocate that the international community has the “responsibility to protect,” or R2P. Rather than focusing on specific terminology, proponents of R2P argue that the international community has the responsibility to protect civilians when states fail to do so themselves. Whether victims of genocide, ethnic cleansing, intentional famine, or indiscriminate war, civilians subjected to mass killing have a right to protection. And when their governments and rulers fail to provide that basic right, then the international community has the responsibility and duty to do so.⁴¹

Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who headed the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations during the Rwandan genocide, appointed a panel in 2000 tasked with undertaking “a thorough review of the United Nations peace and security activities” and presenting a “clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the United Nations.”⁴² Among its recommendations, the panel advised that the UN should develop its “ability to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days of the adoption of a Security Council resolution establishing such an operation, and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations.”⁴³ Moreover, UN peacekeepers who witnessed violence against civilians were to presume that they were authorized to intervene.

While the panel thereby recognized the responsibility of UN peacekeepers to protect civilians from violence, it cautioned that “the United Nations does not wage war. Where enforcement action is required, it has

consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing States, with the authorization of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter.”⁴⁴ The UN’s Action Plan to Prevent Genocide, issued in 2004, emphasizes prevention, protecting civilians, ending impunity, acting early, and acting swiftly and decisively. Kofi Annan provided little detail about what form swift and decisive action should take but conceded that “by ‘action’ in such situations I mean a continuum of steps, which may include military action. But the latter should always be seen as an extreme measure, to be used only in extreme cases.”⁴⁵

The problem of confronting genocide is that the political will to act is proportionate to the extremity of the situation. Study after study has shown that the best remedies are preventive, ranging from inculcating a respect for human rights and the rule of law, to addressing basic economic needs, to resolving armed conflict before it breaks out. Scores of nongovernmental organizations, numerous international organizations, and various national offices and agencies seek to promote development, human rights, democratic values, and conflict resolution across the globe. Yet the pressure for Western governments to “do something” only becomes high once images of mass suffering flicker across the television screens of Europe, North America, Australia, and the First World. In short, while military action may be an extreme measure to be used only in extreme cases, genocide is an extreme case where traditional UN Chapter 6 peacekeeping concepts have proven inappropriate. Recognizing that Chapter 7 peace-enforcement concepts are undeveloped, the Canadian government established an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in September 2000. The commission’s report, issued in December 2001, became the blueprint for the concept of R2P.

Citing the experience and aftermath of Somalia, Rwanda, Srebrenica, and Kosovo, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty asserted that when sovereign states are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens from “mass murder and rape, from starvation . . . that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states.”⁴⁶ The commission broke down the responsibility to protect into preventive, reactive, and rebuilding components, seeking to change the terms of the international debate on intervention from right to responsibility.

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty emphasized that “prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect,” noting that “prevention options should always be

exhausted before intervention is contemplated, and more resources must be devoted to it.”⁴⁷ The commission’s report explored diplomatic, political, economic, and legal actions that could be taken to discourage the recourse to genocide. Yet, as a last resort, the commission claimed that the international community had not only the right to intervene when genocide took place but also the duty and responsibility to do so. In contrast to purely academic panels and committees, the commission went so far as to offer some general operational principles that should guide military interventions to stop mass killings. The commission held that R2P missions needed to have the following:

- A. Clear objectives; clear and unambiguous mandate at all times; and resources to match.
- B. Common military approach among involved partners; unity of command; clear and unequivocal communications and chain of command.
- C. Acceptance of limitations, incrementalism and gradualism in the application of force, the objective being protection of a population, not defeat of a state.
- D. Rules of engagement which fit the operational concept; are precise; reflect the principle of proportionality; and involve total adherence to international humanitarian law.
- E. Acceptance that force protection cannot become the principal objective.
- F. Maximum possible coordination with humanitarian organizations.⁴⁸

Since 2001, numerous other organizations, think tanks, and institutions have taken up the challenge of providing more specific operational concepts for R2P missions. In the United States, the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, DC, has a vibrant program exploring “The Future of Peace Operations.”⁴⁹ Harvard’s Carr Center for Human Rights Policy and the US Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute are cooperating on the Mass Atrocity Response Operations Project, which seeks to develop “credible and realistic operational planning for responding to genocide and mass atrocity.”⁵⁰ Most recently, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, the American Academy of Diplomacy, and the United States Institute of Peace convened a Genocide Prevention Task Force charged with issuing a report on genocide prevention and intervention by December 2008.⁵¹ The US Army and US Marine Corps have provided the primary points of contact to these various endeavors, and

one might anticipate that R2P concepts will draw heavily from ground-force peace operations doctrine.

This would be unfortunate in that the United States would be best served by encouraging other nations and regional groupings to provide the ground forces necessary for R2P missions. The US Army and Marine Corps already are stretched by commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, Korea, and elsewhere. Even as STAND and other activists groups argue that the United States should lead the way in stopping genocide in Darfur, popular support for extended military operations in Iraq is declining, and isolationist sentiment appeals to at least a fringe element of the electorate (Ron Paul supporters). Constructing operational concepts based on US leadership, Army doctrine, and the commitment of American troops would be ill advised and may simply result in American inaction. As for simply equipping African Union forces with the latest high-tech gadgetry, as one paper by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University proposes, this concept rests on shaky assumptions.⁵² A net-capable intervention force would have to be generously equipped with communication gear, computers, and C3ISR (command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) assets, a questionable proposition given funding constraints. Furthermore, its members would have to be highly trained, another questionable proposition given that UN and regional organizations are dependent on voluntary, often rotating troop commitments from member nations. Yet the concept has merit: UN and regional peacekeeping and peace enforcement troops lack precisely those sorts of capabilities we associate with network-centric warfare. US operational concepts for genocide intervention should focus on supporting and enabling UN and regional intervention missions through small expeditionary task forces that supply the capabilities they sorely lack.

Expeditionary Task Forces in Support of Regional Peace-Enforcement Missions

Regional and UN peace-enforcement missions tend to be weakest precisely in those areas where the United States and its Air Force excel: strategic airlift and theater mobility, communications, ISR, medevac and emergency care, radio suppression and broadcasting, and (as a last resort) coercive airpower.

The US Air Force already has the organizational construct to provide an expeditionary force that could support and assist regional or UN intervention ground forces engaged in genocide intervention and peace enforcement. In 1998, Gen Michael Ryan, chief of staff of the Air Force, and F. Whitten Peters, acting secretary of the Air Force, launched a reorganization of the Air Force for the very purpose of generating enhanced capability to deploy and sustain air and space expeditionary task forces (AETF). These task forces, ranging in size from wings to groups to squadrons, each have a built-in structure of command, control, staff support, and fully tailorable forces.⁵³ The Air Force has emphasized that all personnel and assets should fall within the framework of this expeditionary construct. While task forces deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan have focused on supporting US, NATO, and coalition war fighting, the concept of organizing an AETF with the sort of capabilities that lend themselves to supporting peace-enforcement and genocide-intervention operations led by others is entirely reasonable. At present, a number of platforms and assets ranging from reconnaissance aircraft to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and special operations aircraft are “low density/high demand” assets that fall outside the framework of the air and space expeditionary force construct, yet the point is that one could organize small, self-sustaining task forces that could be rapidly deployed. The Air Force is currently exploring the concept of “contingency response groups” that are designed to “respond rapidly to contingencies as well as secure and protect airfields, rapidly assess and open air bases, and perform initial airfield/airfield operations.”⁵⁴ With a little imagination, the AETF and contingency response group concepts could be molded into deployable support forces designed to help regional and international peacekeepers and peace enforcers.

Devising genocide-intervention strategies and operational concepts will be highly contextual. The concept of safe havens, for example, was appropriate for Kurdish Iraq, problematic in Bosnia, and inappropriate in Rwanda, where Tutsis intermingled with Hutus and roadblocks impeded movement.⁵⁵ Likewise, imposing “no-fly zones” depends on local conditions: a no-fly zone might have protected Shiites in southern Iraq from Saddam’s ruthless post-Desert Storm subjugation campaign in which Iraqi helicopters played a crucial role, yet even a massive Allied (largely US) air presence over Kosovo in 1999 could not stop Serbian ground forces from terrorizing and expelling Kosovar civilians. Rather than focusing on devising detailed operational plans for stopping genocide, the

United States should focus on developing small, expeditionary task forces that enhance the capabilities of non-US forces. Whether in Darfur or in other crisis areas, peace-enforcement missions could be rendered much more effective without committing large contingents of US ground troops. Instead, small joint expeditionary task forces could be assembled that provide the following capabilities to regional peace enforcers:

Strategic and Theater Mobility and Airlift Support

The US Air Force clearly understands the importance of strategic airlift in genocide intervention operations and already directly contributes to African Union operations in Darfur by transporting and supplying various AU contingents. Since 2003, for example, the 786th Expeditionary Squadron operating out of Ramstein Air Base has conducted seven missions transporting Rwandan contingents into the region. Its C-130s, along with C-17s from South Carolina, have provided the essential strategic airlift underpinning the operation, with Air Force personnel also contributing to airfield operations.⁵⁶ Yet strategic airlift is only part of the equation. Intervention forces, once transported into the region, often lack theater mobility. The joint United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) that replaced the African-Union-only operation (AMIS, the African Union Mission in Sudan) as of January 2008 has faced great difficulties in finding donor nations willing to supply helicopters and tactical airlift assets. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon commented in January 2008 that “in the past weeks and months, I have contacted, personally, every possible contributor of helicopters—in the Americas, in Europe, in Asia. And yet, not one helicopter has been made available.”⁵⁷ Ban Ki-moon attributed the difficulty of finding donors to “lack of political will,” with unnamed diplomats at the UN elaborating that “past attacks on helicopters” have dampened the enthusiasm of donor nations loathe to put their valuable aviation assets at risk. In short, the United Nations understands the need for theater mobility. It simply cannot find countries willing to contribute to filling this vacuum.⁵⁸ And as of March 2008, UNAMID has “just 9,000 of an expected 26,000 soldiers and police officers” in place, with the *International Herald Tribune* warning that the “Darfur peacekeeping force [is] at risk of failing, already.”⁵⁹

The US Air Force, which has staked the claim to be the leading organization dedicated to theorizing, organizing, and implementing airpower solutions (note that the Air Force uses the term *airpower* rather

than *air force*), should move beyond simply patting itself on the back for supplying the indispensable long-range airlift that underpins many crisis-intervention operations. Building on the mechanism of the AETF, it should cobble together an expeditionary task force that provides ground-centric UN or regional peacemakers with theater and tactical mobility as well. This may well entail drawing in US Army and USMC components, with a joint expeditionary airlift package conceivably including Air Force C-130s, Army CH-47 transportation helicopters, and Marine Corps V-22 Osprey tilt-wing rotor aircraft. The numbers required would be limited: UNAMID, currently slated to become one of the largest UN missions to date, desperately seeks 24 helicopters. Operation Licorne, the French intervention effort in the Côte d'Ivoire, supported its substantial ground forces with an initial aviation contingent consisting of "a single Fennec light helicopter, which was reinforced by two SA.330 Cougars of the COS (Commandement des Opérations Spéciales), and a Transall C.160 of ET 2.64. . . . Another Transall, four Gazelles from the 5 RHC and two Pumas were added subsequently."⁶⁰

Communications Support

While the United States Air Force can and should take the lead in providing airlift and mobility to peacemaking forces, it can contribute in many other ways, with communication support leading the way. UN and regional forces often are poorly equipped with communication gear and support and at times are dependent on contractor support, which may evaporate if the situation becomes dangerous. This is no indictment of private contractor support, but contractors who have signed up to support peacekeeping and monitoring missions may be unprepared for peace enforcement. Lt Gen Roméo Dallaire, recalling the communications capability of his small UNAMIR force (UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda) wrote that "it was difficult to get messages to troops in the field. . . . Getting messages to headquarters was equally difficult. They either had to be hand delivered—a problem when both fuel and vehicles were at a premium—or relayed over our radio network. Unfortunately, our Motorola radios (unlike those carried by both the RPF and the RGF [the Tutsi-dominated Rwandese Patriotic Front and the Hutu-dominated government Rwandese Patriotic Army]) had no encryption capability."⁶¹ As for communicating with

UN Headquarters, Dallaire depended on contractor support to operate and maintain his satellite communications. Luckily for him, six of his civilian communications staff “had insisted on staying with [UNAMIR] after the rest of their colleagues had been evacuated,” even though “they were living in squalor.”⁶² A small AETF that could provide robust, secure, and dependable communications and support personnel to regional and UN commanders engaged in genocide-intervention missions would be immensely valuable.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Support

The US Air Force excels at providing timely operational ISR support to ground commanders, a capability that many regional and international organizations sorely lack. UN and regional peacekeepers operate largely in the dark once observation posts are overrun and established separation lines are ignored. The Dutch commander in charge of the southern sector of the Srebrenica safe zone in 1995, for example, had to send out one of his armored personnel carriers “to find the enclave’s new front line” once Serbs rolled past his observation posts.⁶³ More recently, an African Union observation mission in Darfur was overrun by rebel forces on 30 September 2007, suffering 10 dead, 10 wounded, and 30 MIA. The lightly equipped African Union forces apparently had no idea of the size or strength of rebel groups forming in the area.⁶⁴ The US Air Force certainly could support intervention missions by sharing satellite imagery, launching reconnaissance aircraft, or deploying sophisticated UAVs, such as the MQ-1 Predator, RQ-4 Global Hawk, or MQ-9 Reaper.⁶⁵ This support would be costly and contested, given concurrent demands in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Far more useful would be providing less costly, lower tech ISR assets, such as the Army’s tactical hand-launched RQ-11 Raven, RQ-5/MQ-5 Hunter, or RQ-7 Shadow unmanned aerial system (UAS). To give a sense of the personnel, cost, and capabilities of these lower tech Army systems, consider that the aerial reconnaissance company that supports a package of six MQ-5B Hunters consists of 48 military personnel and five contractors, associated data terminals and control stations, and 13 vehicles. The Hunters supported by this company have a range of 125 km, an endurance of eight to nine hours, and provide live video and infrared (IR) transmissions that can be recorded or kept as still pictures (see table).⁶⁶

Table. Characteristics of RQ-5A and Extended Center Wing (ECW) Hunter UAS

Design Feature	RQ-5A	ECW
Wing Span	29 ft (8.84 m)	33 ft (10.06 m)
Weight	1,600 lb (725.75 kg)	1,800 lb (816.47 kg)
Range	125 km radius (line of sight [LOS] data link)	
Airspeed	70 kt loiter, 70 kt cruise, 100+ dash	
Altitude	15,000 ft (4,572 m)	16,000 ft (4,876.8 m)
Endurance	8–9 hours	10–16 hours
Payload(s)	Electro-optical/IR, airborne data relay and attack	
Launch/Recovery	Unimproved runway (paved or dirt). Runway length depends on air density and location surface. Up to a 1,600 ft runway may be required for takeoff. The minimum distance for a landing area is 600 ft (182.88 m).	

(Adapted from Field Manual Interim 3-04.155, *Army Unmanned Aircraft System Operations*, April 2006, 2-4, www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi3-04-155.pdf.)

If Army or Marine UASs are unavailable due to commitments elsewhere (or to interservice rivalry), the Air Force should consider the utility of substituting disposable, high-altitude observation balloons for UAV or satellite coverage. Tethered balloons have been used to monitor activity along the Mexican border and provide coverage at “a fraction of the cost of one” manned surveillance aircraft.⁶⁷ Rather than thinking in terms of US “boots on the ground” in crisis areas such as Darfur, Somalia, and the Congo, the United States should support regional and international forces by providing them with ISR capabilities so that reconnaissance rests on more than lightly armed troops in a jeep.

Medevac and Field Hospital Support

One of the key challenges to intervention forces embarked on peace-enforcement operations is providing emergency care and timely medical evacuation to peace enforcers. While blue-helmet peacekeepers can claim that both sides have acknowledged their special neutral status and therefore are obliged to assist in evacuating injured personnel, forces intervening to stop genocide must recognize that they have taken sides and may well be the target of those whose genocidal campaign they intend to thwart. Indeed, those groups conducting genocide may specifically target intervening forces in order to demoralize them, stun them into passivity, or convince the populace of the contributing country to withdraw their forces. This certainly was the case in Rwanda, with Hutu extremists inten-

tionally targeting Belgian peacekeepers in the correct belief that the Belgium government would react by withdrawing its forces.

Providing timely medical evacuation and emergency care is essential if third-party forces are expected to put their lives on the line to protect innocents. Depending on contractors to provide medevac services can be risky. When the situation deteriorated in Rwanda in 1994, for example, the two helicopters that the UN had contracted to provide this service simply disappeared. General Dallaire, force commander of the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda, later commented, "With the country exploding, the pilots had fled to Uganda. They were both contract employees, so who could blame them? But the result was that we were confined to Kigali with no ability to evacuate casualties. In all likelihood any seriously wounded would die. In every decision I was to take over the coming weeks, I had to balance the risk of the operation against the fact that we had no medical safety net."⁶⁸

The United States military leads the world in the field of medical evacuation and emergency care: in Iraq, some 90 percent of wounded US soldiers survive, compared to some 75 percent during the Vietnam and Korean Wars and around 70 percent during World War II.⁶⁹ The US Air Force's aeromedical evacuation teams and the large Air Force hospital in Balad have played an important role in saving American lives. Over 96 percent of injured service personnel who make it to the Balad Field hospital survive, with urgent/priority patients air evacuated within an average of 13.2 hours to even more capable facilities in Landstuhl or the continental United States.⁷⁰ The DoD's medical establishment is hard-pressed dealing with US casualties flowing in from Iraq and Afghanistan, but should a smaller American footprint in the Mideast result in decreased US casualties, the United States is capable of providing a critical-niche service that regional and international peace-enforcement missions lack. The United States could boost the effectiveness of these efforts by offering mobile battalion aid stations, a small field hospital, and aeromedical evacuation services. If appropriate, the United States could back intervention efforts by stationing hospital ships such as the USNS *Mercy* or *Comfort* in the region to receive injured peacemakers. These assets should not be seen as substitutes or alternatives to the large-scale efforts of nongovernmental organizations such as the Red Cross, Doctors without Borders, and Refugees International, but rather as enabling components supporting the inter-

vention forces that would create an environment where large-scale humanitarian intervention is possible.

Radio Suppression, Broadcasting Capability, and Strategic Communications Support

The case studies on Rwanda and the Côte d'Ivoire point out the importance of radio in instigating and organizing genocide (Radio RTLM in Rwanda) and in preventing it and garnering support for peace enforcement (ONUCI FM in Côte d'Ivoire). Over the course of the Cold War, the United States spent hundreds of millions of dollars on electronic warfare and has various platforms at its disposal capable of conducting offensive electronic countermeasures such as jamming. In addition, the United States has devoted considerable thought and treasure to psychological operations and strategic communications. Currently, the US military has organizations and platforms capable of both message suppression and promulgation. The US Army's 4th Psychological Operations Group and the US Air Force's 193d Special Operations Wing have specialists trained in generating positive messages in support of operations, with the EC-130J Commando Solo aircraft capable of suppressing undesired radio broadcasts and substituting alternative radio transmissions.⁷¹ One must note that the United States has only six of these aircraft in its inventory and that specific political authorization would be necessary in order to mobilize and deploy these Air National Guard assets. The likelihood of deploying these assets without direct political direction is low, and the cost is high, but the US commander in charge of supporting regional or UN peace-enforcement efforts should be aware of their potential and offer these capabilities to the mission commander if appropriate. More importantly, UN peace-enforcement missions need to be authorized to establish and deny information channels that use the electronic spectrum—during the Rwandan genocide much of the discussion about jamming centered on possible violations of international law even as Radio RTLM cheered on the *genocidaires*.⁷²

Coercive Airpower

As a final option, the United States can provide coercive capabilities to the peace-enforcement commander. The US Air Force has embraced this mission above all others, as evidenced by the pattern that every single chief of staff of the Air Force since its creation in 1947 has been either a bomber

or a fighter pilot. The US Air Force could certainly provide a wide array of coercive options to peace-enforcement commanders but should remain reticent about employing coercive airpower for three reasons.

First, the intent of offering an airpower support package for peace enforcement is to assist and support the efforts of non-US-led regional and international intervention missions. Our intent should be to act as a force multiplier for others, not to take over and lead the effort directly. Yet inevitably, once US coercive airpower is employed, our superior technology and capability will shift leadership of the intervention effort from other nations to ourselves. This might be justifiable if coercive airpower had a proven record of effectiveness in protecting civilians and stopping mass killings. This is far from the case. Airpower did, indeed, deter Saddam from crushing the Kurdish north of Iraq as he had the Shia South following his defeat in 1990, but it proved entirely ineffective in stopping Serb paramilitaries from driving out hundreds of thousands of Kosovars in 1999. Coercive airpower can act as a shield and sword for ground commanders, protecting ground forces and punishing those who attack them. It is far less effective at shielding civilians from light ground forces intent on slaughtering them, nor is it easy to distinguish perpetrators from victims from thousands of feet in the air.

There is a second reason to be wary of using coercive airpower for peace enforcement: the vaunted pinpoint accuracy of our weapon systems does not rule out civilian casualties and collateral damage. During the ill-fated UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II effort during the early 1990s, for example, the decision to target an alleged Somali National Alliance command center killed "up to 70 traditional clan leaders and civilians, most of them unassociated with Aideed."⁷³ The use of coercive airpower may well have accomplished the opposite of its intended effect, increasing Aideed's influence and prestige rather than diminishing it. As for the feasibility of demolishing the killing barricades where Hutu militias massacred Tutsi civilians, this could hardly have been done without killing many of the civilian onlookers and cheerleaders. One might make the case that humanitarian war is justified, but the United States could well find itself scapegoated and pilloried should it cause collateral damage in employing coercive airpower. We should set a high threshold before employing coercive airpower as an instrument of peacemaking: only after intervention ground forces have confronted, cajoled, and done their very best to stop

mass killings from up close should we resort to doing so from far high in the skies.

Lastly, we should be wary of employing coercive airpower because of the cascading dynamics it will introduce into the AETF or joint task force supporting genocide-intervention efforts. Air mobility, communication support, aeromedical evacuation, and psychological operations will receive a smaller proportion of the commander's attention once he or she begins to tackle the challenge of employing coercive airpower. Nonetheless, should the intervention force commander need coercive airpower, some form of it should be available. The form and level of force will depend greatly on context. If intervening against groups that have no airpower or an extremely limited air force, then armed UASs, helicopter gunships, Harrier vertical and/or short take-off and landing (V/STOL) aircraft, and AC-130 gunships will suffice. In cases where the enemy has an air force that needs to be deterred from operating, more advanced aircraft may be necessary. An element of coercive airpower should be put at the disposal of the intervening force in recognition of the wisdom of T. R. Roosevelt's adage to "speak softly and carry a big stick." However, both the force commander and the AETF commander should think hard before employing that stick.



A wide array of actors are pressing for action to stop the mass slaughter of civilians. Both domestically and internationally, the concept of R2P missions is gaining ground. While all recognize that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, the pressure to do something becomes most intense when the situation has become most challenging and genocide is imminent or in progress. Harvard's Carr Center for Human Rights Policy and the US Army's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute are working on operational concepts to combat genocide. The Albright/Cohen Task Force on Genocide Prevention has established an expert group tasked with examining concepts related to military intervention.⁷⁴ These groups should consider that while boots on the ground are essential, those boots need not be American. Instead, the United States can perform a tremendous service simply by supplying capabilities to others, whether in Darfur or some future crisis area. Our contribution should and must go beyond simply airlifting poorly equipped peacekeeping contingents into

crisis areas where they will be called to do more than keep the peace. Genocide intervention entails peace enforcement, and those tasked with enforcing the international community's will must be supported with theater mobility, ISR capabilities, medevac and emergency medical support, and, if necessary, sufficient coercive power to persuade mass killers to cease and desist. These will not be risk- and cost-free operations, but the United States can increase the prospects for successful peace enforcement on the part of others. This will serve both American values and interests. **SSQ**

Notes

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2. "Darfur Grade Report for Hillary Clinton," <http://www.darfurscores.org/hillary-clinton?download=y>.
3. "Darfur Grade Report for John McCain," <http://www.darfurscores.org/john-mccain?download=y>.
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6. Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2002). Power now teaches at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, where she was the founding executive director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy.
7. Save Darfur Coalition, "September Briefing Paper: The Genocide in Darfur," http://www.savedarfur.org/newsroom/policypapers/september_briefing_paper_the_genocide_in_darfur.
8. Genocide Watch, <http://www.genocidewatch.org/resources/newsmonitors.html>.
9. The US Holocaust Memorial Museum's Committee on Conscience maintains a Web site on "Responding to Threats of Genocide Today," <http://www.ushmm.org/conscience>.
10. Power, *Problem from Hell*.
11. Visit the Web sites of the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies and Yale University's Genocide Studies Program, <http://migs.concordia.ca> and <http://www.yale.edu/gsp>, for a sense of the interaction between scholarship and activism. Dozens of other universities have established or expanded genocide programs and institutes, among them Northwestern University, the University of Vermont, the University of Minnesota, and the University of Nevada at Reno. For a sense of the number of programs, see Yale University's links to genocide programs at <http://www.yale.edu/gsp/links/index.html>.
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Student Anti-Genocide Coalition and has become this generation's equivalent to the antiapartheid student movement of the 1980s.

13. Department of State, press release, "Appointment of Andrew Natsios as the President's Special Envoy for Sudan," 19 September 2006, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/72830.htm>.

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15. For an overview of mass killings throughout history, see Ben Kiernan, *Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).

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17. Ibid., 21, 38–40.

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30. See <http://www.genocidewatch.org> and <http://www.genocideintervention.net>.

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Book Reviews

The State of the Earth: Environmental Challenges on the Road to 2100 by Paul K. Conkin. University Press of Kentucky, 2006, 320 pp., \$32.00.

Author Paul K. Conkin, a Distinguished Professor Emeritus at Vanderbilt University, leaves the reader with the lingering theme of the destruction of our natural environment due to the unending growth in both human consumption and population. He addresses not only the problem but also potential solutions and concludes with somewhat ominous predictions. Each of five sections addresses key ecological challenges we currently face.

The first section begins with a review of how Earth came to support primitive, and then much more complex, life. Natural cycles like those of the sun, plate tectonics, or Earth's atmosphere all have enormous impacts on human life. Conkin emphasizes that humans are beginning to influence many of these natural processes, sometimes in positive, but mostly in negative, ways. Another topic is the challenges created by resource consumption and population growth. Increases in both are generating serious environmental problems—global warming, massive extinctions of species, and ocean pollution. The recurring challenge for each of these issues is equity. How will poor countries overcome poverty on a finite Earth while wealthy, resource-consuming countries show no signs of slowing their environmentally destructive utilization patterns?

The second section examines such vital resources as soil, vegetation, food, water, and energy. Soils around the world are threatened by erosion, salinization, acidification, and exhaustion. As a result, global food production could decrease in the future if the hazards mentioned previously are not mitigated, especially in India and China. There is a double peril—population expansion in poor states and unprecedented increases in water and energy usage in wealthy states are tightening the vise on both of these resources. Conkin is particularly pessimistic about the possibilities of new technologies solving future water or energy crunches. However, his investigation does not cover recent new advances in nanotechnology, renewables, or energy efficiency—an oversight. Nevertheless, one of his recommendations is for global society to begin the painful shift toward lower fertility rates in poor states and decreased consumption patterns in wealthy states. This is a valuable recommendation regardless of outcomes from breakthroughs in future energy or water technologies.

The third part investigates the immensely destructive impact human activities have had on much of our natural ecosystems. Pollution, waste, and damage to the ozone layer have created untold threats to mankind and nature. Many naturally occurring materials are accumulating in the environment at rates that far exceed the ability of normal processes to recycle them. For example, carbon

dioxide, surface ozone, sulfates, nitrogen-based pollutants, and methane are being produced at unsustainable rates—threatening humans, plants, and animals. The plethora of difficulties in maintaining global and regional biodiversity is highlighted. Threats come from unsustainable patterns of resource utilization, often unhindered by national and international legislation, that destroy habitats and eventually lead to mass species extinctions.

The fourth section centers on the multidimensional threats from global climate change. In a move away from the mainstream, the author is more concerned about the beginning of a new glacial period that is aggravated by global warming. He contends that we are nearing the end of a warm and stable interglacial period and may soon enter into another age of rapid cooling. Ramifications of a new glacial epoch are considered. To mitigate this new ice age, Conkin believes we may need our remaining supplies of fossil fuels. He clarifies many of the complex policy and scientific issues that surround the production of greenhouse gases as well as how emissions may be reduced. But lack of political will to reduce emissions coupled with the inadequate use of the power only affluent states have to moderate climate change lead him to conclude that temperatures will rise.

The fifth and final part scrutinizes policies and philosophies influencing environmental movements and environmentalists. It explores the role American environmentalists have had on reforming the current political and economic systems. Two major classes of environmentalists are discussed: reform and passionate. Reform environmentalists are less radical and are able to work within the US political and legal systems. Recently, they were able to craft powerful legislation such as the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air and Water Acts, and the Endangered Species Act. Other nation-states copied much of this groundbreaking policy. Passionate environmentalists are part of more radical and violent social movements and include deep ecologists, ecofeminists, and bioregionalists. Organizations such as Greenpeace and Earth First demonstrate this philosophy in their practice of civil disobedience and media manipulation in attempts to protect the natural world from corporate exploitation.

Conkin provides a grim “Personal Afterword.” He identifies the following five “less secure conditions” (p. 280) that he believes are vital to our future: (1) the current unusually stable interglacial period, (2) our great soil bank of nutrients, (3) our great energy bank of fossil fuels, (4) the enormous growth of human knowledge, and (5) the tremendous extension of medical knowledge and public health management. He maintains that the first three conditions are now less secure than ever before, and that the last two may collapse if the first three continue to suffer severe environmental degradation. Concluding that human society must move toward a sustainable economy, Conkin doubts that we can make the move “voluntarily and preemptively” (p. 282). In sum, the deteriorating “state of the earth” is creating an intractable moral dilemma, primarily for the citizens of affluent states.

Anyone interested in the environmental condition of our planet will find Conkin’s book enlightening. Security specialists, in particular, will find evidence

for great concern over the national security implications of these impending environmental and, subsequently, social challenges. However, he offers little that is new to the study of environmental security except for his treatment of climate change. Few scientists are concerned that the climate is about to enter into an ice age. More are concerned that we are about to overheat our atmosphere and create what Jim Hansen calls a "transformed planet" ("The Threat to the Planet," *The New York Review of Books*, 13 July 2006). Nevertheless, Conkin provides an instructive, well-researched, and easy-to-read work.

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Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey by Steven A. Cook. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007, 189 pp., \$24.95.

There is a long, if thin, line of scholarship on the military's role in political development, and Steven Cook's book adds considerably to it. Building on earlier work by giants such as Morris Janowitz and Samuel Huntington, Cook perceptively examines how the militaries in three Muslim countries—Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey—have cleverly constructed the facades of democracy while exercising considerable political influence behind the scenes. Such "pseudodemocratic" institutions, for Cook, allow the military to insulate itself from public accountability while at the same time exercising its political will. The result is states that are dominated by authoritarian modernizers but that do not actually become military dictatorships.

Cook focuses on the interests that the military hopes to preserve and advance through military "enclaves," with core interests emphasizing economic autonomy (as the best defense of state as well as a means of personal financial gains), foreign and security policies, and the maintenance of sufficient political cover. This latter objective is critical for the military establishment to achieve its interests without generating enough opposition to erode its power.

Algeria provides the first case, where the creation of pluralist facades allowed for a limited tolerance of political opposition without having to make genuine structural changes in the political order. The risks to that order included the possibility that officers could not always control the emptiness of the facades. Additionally, opposition demands for more liberalization threatened the military's enclaves and, sometimes, its economic interests protected within those enclaves. Islamist demands for accountability and reforms, such as in Islamic banking, threatened the military's privileged position and provided it a pretense to combat the rising Islamist tide in Algeria. Moreover, the Islamist Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) (Islamic Salvation Front) exploited the military's claim to be the protector of Algeria's nationalism, claiming that military corruption was a new form of colonialism.

That intervention came in January 1992, when the military members of the High Security Council dissolved the National Assembly and placed one of their

own, Gen Liamine Zeroul, as president. However, as Cook notes, the subsequent defeat of the FIS over a decade-long civil war allowed the military to conclude that it no longer needed direct rule, and it retreated from the political arena. Pres. Abdelaziz Boutiflika, elected in 2004 without military interference, has distanced himself from his armed forces.

The Egyptian political landscape is somewhat similar to that of Algeria—a military-founded political system, marked by early efforts to create a democratic facade, with a centerpiece national assembly. Still, as Cook notes, “It is the military’s crucial and intimate association with the presidency that assures the continuity of Egypt’s political system” (p. 73). For Egypt’s professional military, the purpose for holding to the reins of power behind these democratic veneers was similar to that of the Algerian military—to advance the cause of Egyptian (and Arab) nationalism along with economic development and social justice. Internally, one of the threats to the military’s hold on politics was Islamic extremism. In an ironic twist, a military ally in combating Islamic militancy was the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the moderate opposition to the regime. Again, as in the Algerian case, the MB’s position on economic reform hurt the entrenched economic interests of the soldiers. Nevertheless, hoping that the nonviolent MB might undermine the more radical Islamist groups, the military and the ruling National Democratic Party allowed it limited latitude to criticize the ruling apparatus—generating at best a rhetorical response from the military—according to Cook (though in 2007, the MB suffered a harsh crackdown on its activities by the regime).

The role of the military in the “ruling but not governing” paradigm is challenged most in Turkey, where the election of moderate Islamist governments in the past several decades has brought the military to power either to govern directly or to engineer conditions strong enough to collapse an Islamist regime. The four interventions alone make the strongest arm in the Turkish political climate the military, and its strength is reinforced by the secularist (indeed laicist) separation of religion and state that was initiated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and is upheld by the Turkish military. It was Atatürk and his fellow officers who defended Turkey during World War I and after, establishing a new political order that swept away the ashes of the Ottoman past. They authored the constitutions of 1924, 1960, and 1982, all of which constructed the constrained political sphere aimed at limiting rights for Islamists and Kurds (along with other minorities). The Turkish military held sway in selecting a majority of post-Kemal presidents, and more importantly, according to Cook, “Politicians must ensure that they do nothing to elicit the ire of the military establishment and its collaborators among the state elite” (p. 103). There were advantages to this indirect control: it protected the professionalism of the military and allowed it to play off factions (it could allow some modest Islamist participation in national politics to counter the political left, for example). When that participation grew beyond military-imposed limits, the soldiers cracked down—as they did against the ruling Islamist Refah Party in 1997 when Refah loaded the Turkish bureaucracy, a foundation of military influence,

with Islamist sympathizers. Though the military ended the Refah government, the party itself morphed into the Adalet ve Kalkinma (AKP) (Justice and Development Party), winning a majority of seats in the Turkish parliament in November 2002. The AKP-dominated legislature passed a number of measures effectively weakening military political power while at the same time couching those reforms in European Union (EU) language. Thus, the military was caught between its need for influence and its support for Turkish EU membership, forcing it to retreat somewhat from its early stance against Refah. However, the elections of July 2007 (after publication of Cook's book) that enhanced the power of the AKP might cause the professional military elite to adopt a more confrontational stance should AKP-induced policy challenge further their stance and the Kemalist legacy.

Can the United States guide these countries (and others like them) out of these patterns of military power? Cook persuasively argues that the roads taken—development of civil societies and economic development—do not necessarily lead to real, as opposed to facade, democracy. However, positive inducements (military aid tied to real military reform) might reduce military influence somewhat.

Cook might have examined in more detail the enterprise involvement of the military in the three countries he examined. In Egypt, for example, the military has broad involvement in various commercial enterprises, large and small, as Cook briefly notes, that constitute over 30 percent of Egypt's industrial output. Moreover, as Kristina Mani indicates, military involvement in a national economy can make the military even less accountable to civil and political society ("Military in Business," *Armed Forces and Society* 33, no. 4 [July 2007]: 592). But this is a minor criticism. Overall, Cook has produced a masterful synopsis of the Oz-like role of the Egyptian, Algerian, and Turkish militaries, ruling behind the facade of political institutions that serve to cover their interests with a democratic veneer.

David S. Sorenson, PhD
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Learning Large Lessons: The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power in the Post-Cold War Era by David E. Johnson. RAND Corporation, 2007, 235 pp., \$28.00. (Also downloadable for free on <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG405-1>.)

The author argues that airpower has proven itself capable of performing deep-strike operations much better than the Army: "The task of shaping the theater—strategically and operationally—should be an air component function, and joint and service doctrines and programs should change accordingly" (p. xvii). Consequently, the Army should give up its deep-attack concept as well as the battlespace that goes with it. This would allow the Army to be redesigned so that it can better conduct military operations other than war.

RAND analyst David E. Johnson's conclusions are all the more compelling because he is a retired Army colonel of field artillery, which, along with the

aviation branch, is one of the Army's main stakeholders in its deep-operations concept. Johnson holds a doctorate degree in history from Duke University. His previous publications include *Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945* (Cornell University Press, 2003), which was chosen for the US Army Training and Doctrine Command's senior leader reading list. *Learning Large Lessons* has the potential to be at least as successful because it explores contemporary interservice friction between the Army and Air Force in joint war fighting. Indeed, it has already been adopted as a textbook by the Air Command and Staff College for its airpower studies course.

Johnson's study analyzes major combat operations in five post–Cold War military operations: Iraq (1991), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003). He asks, what are the war-fighting lessons about the relative roles of air and ground power? Analysis of these post–Cold War conflicts, according to the author, suggests that a shift has occurred in the relative war-fighting roles of ground and air power, and it is most apparent in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Airpower dominates the strategic and operational levels of war fighting against large, conventional enemy forces. Exploitation at the tactical level is the domain of ground power. Moreover, successful major combat operations do not result in achieving the strategic end state. A protracted postwar US presence has been the norm, and the Army needs to be redesigned accordingly.

What makes the book especially provocative is how the author structures his analysis of each of the five post–Cold War conflicts. Johnson compares the differences in perceived “lessons learned” between the air and ground communities. In each case, the communities drew self-serving lessons based on their service cultures. In Kosovo, for example, while the ground-centric view concluded that the threat of a ground invasion was decisive, the air-centric view assessed the strategic air attacks as the key to victory. Johnson also offers a more balanced and integrated assessment of the lessons learned for each conflict.

The book's focus is on major combat operations because, the author argues, this is the arena where the greatest tension exists between the Army and Air Force. Much of this friction revolves around ownership of the battlespace. Ever since the development of the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine in the 1980s, ground commanders have demanded extensive depth for the corps' areas of operations (AO) to mount deep, shaping attacks with long-range missile fire and attack helicopters. Yet, experience has demonstrated that these high-risk attacks have been relatively ineffective. More to the point, when the Army conducts such deep operations, its relatively small and vulnerable force of attack helicopters prevents the Air Force from launching more robust and less risky attacks against the same enemy forces.

Readers interested in operational war fighting will appreciate the sophistication of Johnson's study. He shows how the “Halt Phase concept” of the 1990s, which supported the two-major-theaters war strategy, sparked the Air Force to continue to enhance its capability to destroy enemy forces on the battlefield rather than focusing all of its attention on strategic attack. This interdiction

emphasis set the stage for increasing friction with the Army over control of deep battlespace. The placement of the fire support coordination line was indeed the most obvious bone of contention. But Johnson's analysis also shows how other control measures, such as boundaries, AOs, the battlefield coordination line, and supporting/supported relationships figured in the debate. His discussion of these concepts is lucid, instructive, exemplified by his cases, and another reason his text will be useful in professional military education.

Johnson posits that Army commanders are not inclined to contract their AOs for what are largely issues of trust between the Army and the Air Force. The sort of trust that exists between the air and ground elements of the Marine Air Ground Task Force simply does not exist between the Army and the Air Force. Moreover, the Army will continue to demand expanded AOs to accommodate long-range precision strike weapons for its Future Force. Johnson maintains that the authority to establish fire support coordination measures that affect the theater campaign plan should be withheld by the joint force commander.

Why have these lessons not made their way into joint doctrine? Johnson's declaration that joint doctrine is essentially an amalgam of service doctrine rings true. "An essential first step in reforming joint doctrine is to eliminate the principle that joint doctrine must defer to that of the services" (p. xviii). Johnson's excellent study shows us that much work remains to attain a true joint war-fighting system.

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Hitting First: Preventive Force in U.S. Security Strategy edited by William W. Keller and Gordon R. Mitchell. University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006, 360 pp., \$27.95.

One of the most controversial national security issues since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 centers on the Bush administration's 2002 *National Security Strategy (NSS)* pronouncement asserting the right to preempt grave threats before suffering an attack. The controversy became more pronounced in light of how the administration used the concept to justify regime change in Iraq. The subsequent failure to uncover weapons of mass destruction (WMD), coupled with revelations of conflicting evidence prior to the decision to invade Iraq pointing to the absence of WMDs, calls into question the morality as well as the theoretical validity of the preemptive concept. The authors who contributed to this volume examine these issues to discern and to inform future policies. At issue is the credibility of US leadership when dealing with future conflicts that involve WMDs, terrorism, or rogue states.

The 2002 *NSS* asserts that international norms allow states to preempt adversaries under the customary principle of anticipatory self-defense. However, when applied to potential rather than to imminent threats, as was done in the case of Iraq, scholars argue that the Bush administration equated preemption with pre-

vention. While preemption may have a long history of acceptance in international security practice, prevention does not. The distinction is not one of mere semantics—it cuts to the heart of legitimate versus illegitimate actions among states. Dan Reiter's chapter outlines the historical experience with preventive attacks against WMD programs reaching back to World War II. The record shows that although short-term successes may occur, preventive attacks generally fail to eliminate WMD programs (p. 41). Therefore, the primary justification for preventive attacks—that they will eliminate the WMD threat—appears invalid. In more recent cases, attacks that fall short of full-scale invasion actually encouraged target states to intensify their efforts to acquire WMDs.

One of the key features of the debate surrounding the Bush administration's application of the preventive war concept is the use of information to garner congressional and public support for using force to eliminate the Ba'athist regime in Iraq. One of the key lessons military leaders and policy makers learned from experience in the Vietnam War was that national leaders must have popular support before committing the nation to war. In the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the administration conducted an aggressive campaign designed to capture both domestic and international support for deposing Saddam Hussein. As the contributors show, as far as key figures in the Bush administration were concerned, the first was critical; the second was desirable but optional. Contributors to *Hitting First* show that a succession of administration officials selected intelligence information—"cherry picking" as William Keller and Gordon Mitchell characterize it—to paint a picture of the Iraqi WMD program that posed an imminent threat.

When using information in this way, the power presidents wield to influence the debate and public opinion is remarkable. The contributors point to the Operation Iraqi Freedom case, however, to recommend caution when exercising that power. Mitchell and Robert Newman show that ad hoc groups that aggressively seek to shape public policies can truncate debate. Historically, the Committee on the Present Danger's influence on the Truman administration's framing of the communist threat in the 1950s was similar to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group's (PCTEG) influence over the debate about the threat from Iraqi WMDs. The PCTEG collected information from a wide range of sources to assemble its own assessment of the Iraqi WMD program and its relationship with terrorists. The authors cite one instance in which the "PCTEG advised policy-makers . . . to dismiss the CIA's guarded conclusions, recommending that 'the CIA report ought to be read for content only—and [the] CIA's interpretation ought to be ignored'" (p. 81, emphasis in original). The net effect of this circumventing of the intelligence community's capabilities was to allow the administration to build a convincing case for going to war with Iraq. But when the evidence proved to be suspect—and when it came to light that the administration had access to alternate interpretations—US leadership and credibility came into question at home and abroad.

While it may seem attractive to criticize the administration for its policies toward preventive war, the editors recognize that the policy is in effect. And the threat from

Iran and North Korea may require future administrations to consider using the Iraq precedent to launch a preventive (or preemptive) attack against those WMD programs. Peter Dombrowski analyzes the types of military capabilities that the nation would require to support future preventive wars. He observes that limited strikes will not accomplish desired policy goals. While the United States maintains its current dominance in conventional war-fighting capabilities, defeating conventional forces seems to be a foregone conclusion. The problem with preventive wars occurs in the aftermath of regime change—as occurred in Iraq. Dombrowski argues that the military's focus on fielding overwhelming conventional power projection and war-fighting capabilities leaves the United States ill equipped for post-conflict and reconstruction missions that are essential for achieving political objectives. He recommends rebalancing the emphasis toward providing more capabilities to deal with stability and reconstruction efforts.

The preemptive/preventive debate will likely continue. For now, US efforts appear to emphasize diplomatic initiatives to shape WMD and terrorist threats—until Iraq stabilizes, this is a prudent course. The editors and authors of *Hitting First* have provided a balanced, comprehensive analysis of the issues surrounding the policy. The individual chapters are researched thoroughly, and the editors provide an excellent bibliography that can serve as a guide for future studies. The division into four sections—Historical Context, Public Discourse Justifying the Use of Force, From Boardroom to Battlefield, and Outlook—makes it convenient to select specific topics for self-study or for framing group discussions. This is an excellent source for military, government, and academic students of policy development. As long as US policy makers encounter adversaries who seek or acquire WMDs, the issues discussed in *Hitting First* will resonate.

Anthony C. Cain, PhD

Editor-in-Chief, *Strategic Studies Quarterly*

The Color of Empire: Race and American Foreign Relations by Michael L. Krenn. Potomac Books, Inc., 2006, 147 pp., \$38.00.

Race has been an abiding theme in American life. Starting with the first contact between Europeans and New World native peoples and gaining speed with the arrival of the first African slaves in Jamestown in 1619, considerations of race have played an important role in the American historical experience. The country was born into a time when the Enlightenment interest in scientific classification joined together with European exploration and colonization to produce a seemingly irrepressible urge to categorize human beings according to their biology and behaviors. Mass migrations of (mainly European) populations thrust together large numbers of peoples formerly foreign to one another, producing the first “clash of cultures” and transforming what otherwise might have remained a hobby of intellectuals into a popular way of perceiving the world's various human tribes.

Michael Krenn provides us with a fine introduction to the ways in which a race-based understanding of humanity has colored American views of nonwhite peoples, both at home and around the world, and how this has influenced our interactions with them. Krenn, a graduate of the University of Utah and Rutgers, is chair of the History Department at Appalachian State University in North Carolina and author of a previous volume on racial integration at the US Department of State. He is well versed in his field and is able to apply his knowledge in a fashion that is both engaging and readable.

Krenn's book is divided into four chapters ("White," "Brown," "Yellow," and "Black"), each devoted to exploring how whites understood, first, themselves as a distinct and superior race (Krenn adopts the historical term *Anglo-Saxon* rather than *white*) and how they then defined and categorized other racial groups. Krenn then takes a look at how white Americans' views on race affected US interactions with nonwhite peoples abroad, focusing on events like the battles for Texas independence and the 1846 war with Mexico; our involvement in Cuba and the Philippines; US actions vis-à-vis the Chinese during the nineteenth century (Chinese Exclusion Act, Boxer Rebellion); our relations with Japan from the nineteenth century through World War II; and, lastly, the long-term US disregard for Africa and our "discovery" of the continent during the Cold War. In his conclusion, Krenn also touches on US relations with the Middle East. An appendix offers a selection of text excerpts meant to both illustrate the book's thesis and to provide evidence of the continuity of race as an element in American thinking.

In a book as short as Krenn's, many things must of necessity be left out. Such a narrowing of focus can be useful in illustrating a particular aspect within a larger complex of problems. But such a foreshortening of perspective invariably involves considerable selectivity, which can produce a one-dimensional analysis that neglects other factors and, more importantly, their oftentimes complicated interactions. Although Krenn states that his purpose is "not to suggest that race is the only determinant in U.S. foreign policy" (p. 105), he also asserts that "color—as much as economics, politics, and strategic interests—played and continues to play an important role in guiding and shaping U.S. relations with the world" (p. xiv). Indeed, in some cases, "race proved more powerful than national interest" (p. 106).

Krenn ably illuminates how white racial attitudes shaped views about and behaviors toward American Indian peoples, blacks, Chinese immigrants, Latinos, and other racial and ethnic groups living in the United States. But the link between white mentalities at home and specific US conduct abroad remains tenuous. Clearly, race influenced how we view other peoples, but its role in shaping our relations with other countries remains unclear. Was race as much of a determinant factor as Krenn suggests, or was it merely a means of presenting a case for a foreign policy action based primarily on other interests and considerations? This study provides us with too little information to make a judgement about how direct this link may be.

The book is also somewhat less than convincing in its attempt to demonstrate that racism continues to have "pernicious effects on the nation's international rela-

tions" today (p. 106). This is particularly true with regard to the discussion of "cultural racism." Pride in Western civilizational achievements, along with a belief in the benefits these may offer mankind in general and an eagerness to spread them to other peoples, obviously can run into difficulties when translated into foreign cultures. But it is not at all clear that "old ideas about superiority and inferiority," as Krenn says, indicate that "whether genetic or cultural, racism [has] survived" (p. 92). This would imply a deeply relativistic interpretation of progress—one in which most any view about human advancement could be interpreted as racist. While race may still play a subcutaneous role in our perceptions of other cultures, and we should beware of hubris in our actions abroad, cultural arrogance does not necessarily constitute another form of racism.

Michael Krenn's book offers us a very good introduction to an important issue. But one cannot help but wish for more complexity. It is well and good that Americans be aware of the racial element in their national past. And they should be urged to seek a deeper understanding of other peoples and cultures. But the same applies in reverse: others should be encouraged to better understand the United States and its people. Distorted views of America and mistaken assumptions about supposedly nefarious US intentions can motivate some abroad to (re)act in ways unproductive for all concerned. It is important, therefore, that future studies of this issue abandon the one-dimensional approach for a cross-cultural, even multicultural one, and that they move from a single-minded focus on the United States (the West) toward one that examines the *mutual* disconnects that lead to misunderstanding and conflict.

Michael Prince

Author, *Rally Round the Flag, Boys!*
South Carolina and the Confederate Flag

Predators and Parasites: Persistent Agents of Transnational Harm and Great Power Authority by Oded Löwenheim. University of Michigan Press, 2006, 280 pp., \$24.95.

Oded Löwenheim, currently a lecturer at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, raises the question of why the Great Powers counter the actions of the "persistent agents of transnational harm" (his acronym: PATH) at some points but not others. He divides PATHs into two categories: parasites (i.e., abusive/exploitive) and predators (i.e., destructive). He then argues that the Great Powers pay little attention to the parasites, such as small terrorist groups or drug cartels, since they do not undermine the international structures of authority and hierarchy. Conversely, a Great Power will tend to confront predators who present a challenge to the world system; they are posing an alternative to the world order in which Great Powers thrive and gain their authority.

Before turning to the heart of the book—three historical cases illustrating his argument—the author begins with two long theoretical chapters. The concep-

tual background of the authority of Great Powers in world politics is followed by the theoretical position of PATHs as predators and parasites of their global influence. He discusses what authority is and how Great Powers come to possess it, and provides a theory of challenges to authority in world politics. These two initial chapters certainly set a baseline for what follows, but their length drowns the reader in detail more appropriate in a textbook or dissertation.

The third chapter begins the empirical argument by looking at the Barbary corsairs in the Mediterranean in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Barbary city-states of Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers were nominally under Ottoman control but, more importantly, served as ports for pirates raiding in the Mediterranean and beyond. The author contends that as a Great Power, Spain did not counter the corsair raids since they essentially acted as parasites—dangerous and annoying—but were not a threat to the standing order, as Spain knew and accepted it.

Chapter 4 looks at the same Barbary pirates at the end of the eighteenth and in the early nineteenth centuries. By this time their actual physical danger had diminished, but Great Britain, the contemporary Great Power, viewed these pirates as predators, a fundamental danger to world order due to their practice of capturing and enslaving Europeans. Great Britain had begun a crusade against the transatlantic slave trade, and even though the Barbary corsairs did not threaten the British physically, the existence of white slavery in the Mediterranean threatened the British moral standing in the international arena. British attempts to produce international consensus on stopping the slave trade from Africa foundered upon the existence of the Barbary pirates. This was especially apparent on the side of the Spanish and Portuguese, who profited from the black slave trade and suffered from the white trade. Only after the British removed this moral challenge by sending a naval expedition to subdue Algiers in 1816 could they expect support from across Europe in ending the transatlantic trade.

The final substantive chapter brings Löwenheim's argument into the present by examining the US response to 9/11 and the current American global war on terrorism. He compares the parasitic terrorism of the 1980s with the current predatory al-Qaeda threat. The '80s threat from Libyan state-sponsored terrorism and Lebanese Hezbollah endangered American interests but did not threaten to overthrow the US-led Western system. On the other hand, al-Qaeda wants to replace the current Western-dominated system with a revived Islamic caliphate. Especially in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, this directly challenges US sovereignty and thus called for an aggressive US response, first with the military operations in Afghanistan and continuing with the ongoing global war on terrorism. Löwenheim further explains his argument by comparing the cartels and drug trade to al-Qaeda. The drug barons, while costing US society more lives and money each year than terrorism ever has, are merely parasites for they exist within the US-dominated world order and do not seek to overturn it. Thus, the United States can approach the drug threat more as a police issue than as a military problem. The author believes this is why the US military quickly became

involved in Afghanistan after 9/11 but has not, for the most part, played much of an overt role in Colombia.

Löwenheim offers a convincing argument through his examination of the relationship between Great Powers and smaller actors within the international system across time. However, the book does not flow well. His first two chapters could be better edited to appeal to a larger audience than just international relations specialists. The third chapter provides an ordered, schematic approach covering all facets of the theory with historical evidence. The reader expects this schema to continue in the next two historical chapters but is disappointed when the ordering principles change. Finally, while chapter 5 carries his argument up to the present, it does not connect very well with the previous chapters, making the reader question if the cases are more different than similar.

Ultimately, despite the inconsistency in the style and format, Löwenheim presents a unique perspective on the war on terror; he uses history to help clarify contemporary issues. He writes how in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries "Spain was a victim of corsairs but it operated against them through corsairs" (p. 129). One could dare to compare this with contemporary American operations. While the United States is certainly a victim of al-Qaeda attacks, it uses, in the opinion of many within the international system, "terroristic" methods (e.g., Guantanamo, CIA secret prisons, supporting repressive allies) to pursue its own ends. As the author often reminds the reader, a Great Power has responsibilities towards others in the international system based on its position. The question of special rights *and* duties of the leading power fills the book and, perhaps, should permeate discourse outside of academia.

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Instant Nationalism: McArabism, al-Jazeera, and Transnational Media in the Arab World by Khalil Rinnawi. University Press of America, 2006, 216 pp., \$29.95.

Radical though it may sound, most military leaders—most military people for that matter—would opt to engage in any other activity, no matter how difficult, rather than speak to the media. Generally, an internal military cultural reticence to engage the media regarding military matters and operations has, for the most part, generated a persistent vacuum in the information environment that the transglobal media must fill without the minimum benefit of comment.

Yes, this is a broad, overarching indictment that perhaps doesn't hold true in some isolated cases. And yes, military news conferences are standard fare on virtually every transglobal satellite network. However, my research—unscientific though it may be as it's based on anecdotal experiences from over a nearly 30-year career as a public affairs professional—validates the thesis that next to public speaking, people would rather succumb than talk to the media. You mention a media interview to most people, and what you witness is a poof of smoke—now you see 'em, now you don't. And to

a military person, the mere mention of al-Jazeera (the Arabic language news network based in Qatar) will be followed by a blue stream of expletives denigrating the quickly emerging transglobal satellite network as evil at its purest.

I believe our internal military cultural reticence to communicate more openly, persistently, and aggressively with the media, especially emerging media networks such as al-Jazeera, is unfortunate. I believe our unnecessary reservations regarding media engagements marginalize our ability to persuade and influence—yes, persuade and influence worldwide audiences regarding US military operations, its people, and the democratic processes our military represents. I believe our reservations in this regard are due to fear, inexperience, and basic misunderstanding of global media institutions and what motivates their news coverage.

Time's a wastin', and we're losing pathetically in the information war raging in the information battlespace. We see millions of words written about the need for better "strategic communication" throughout the government, but it appears we're making little progress in that regard. A key tool to reversing the tide is to acquire a fuller understanding of the information environment and the motivations of the transglobal media institutions that populate this burgeoning environment, and then engage in that environment vigorously. Khalil Rinnawi's scholarly dissertation leads the reader to begin that heuristic journey.

If you want a better understanding of what makes the emerging Arab satellite news networks (now estimated at over 150), and especially al-Jazeera, tick; what motivates their news coverage; and the general manner in which they endeavor to shape Arab opinions of the Western democracies, specifically the United States, read this book, period. In the parlance of readability, Mr. Rinnawi's scholarly work is for the most part an easy read. From the book's foreword to its annexes and bibliography, it's packed with interpretive observations and well-grounded analysis. The media assessments and content analysis, though somewhat dry and laborious to get through, are nonetheless extremely valuable to military and civilian leaders reaching for a better understanding of the powerful force transnational Arab satellite media now wield and the role they will play in the future in coalescing a far-flung culture.

In the foreword to this work, Augustus Richard Norton of Boston University notes that "half a century ago the currents of Arab identities flowed through the state-controlled radio stations or on the pages of the state-dominated press. In contrast, the Arab world today reveals rushing streams of information, commentary and news, not to mention burgeoning images of mass culture. The region is interconnected in the twenty-first century by a confluence of media that, in the aggregate, have sparked a new vitality of Arab nationalism" (p. 1).

In that regard, Mr. Rinnawi, a lecturer in the School of Media and the Department of Behavioral Sciences at the College of Management in Tel-Aviv, has coined the term *McArabism* to define that "unique kind of regionalization" (p. xiv) in the Arab world that is being spurred on by the emergence of new media technologies that are "reinvigorating regional imagined communities, in a communicative environment where borders and the state's ability to exert control over media content have become obsolete," (p. xiv) and the dramatic changes this has made in the Arab

media environment. What's more, "the penetration of new media technologies into the Arab world and their expansion via the transnational media has created a confrontation between the localism and tribalism of Jihad and the globalization forces of McWorld. The outcome of this confrontation in the Arab world is McArabism: a kind of regionalism quite different from the pan-Arabism(s) formulated during the 1950s and 1960s in the Arab world" (p. xv).

According to Mr. Rinnawi, McArabism generated by the emerging Arab transnational satellite networks is fusing a new nationalism of "imagined community, principally composed of Arabs inside the Arab world, but also Arabs in diasporas and indigenous Arab minorities in other Middle Eastern countries" (p. 7). So what, you may ask. Pragmatically speaking, the "so what" is that engagement with the transnational Arab satellite media is as critical to achieving success in the global information environment (ergo our strategic communication mandates) as engagement with CNN, Fox News, and the scores of other global satellite news networks. In some respects, it is perhaps more important that we understand and engage with these channels of influence in the Arab world. Consequently, that brings us to the subject of the al-Jazeera network.

Mr. Rinnawi's work is rich in "media content analysis" research and provides an extremely beneficial representation of the actual (versus perceived) editorial bent of the growing number of Arabic language transnational satellite networks, specifically al-Jazeera. The real value of this work is dispelling (or at the very least, leveling) the misperceptions regarding the content and editorial bent of al-Jazeera.

Is this the most insightful work I've read recently? No. Some of Mr. Rinnawi's arguments will be fairly intuitive to most readers, and the fact this is a scholarly work chock-full of supporting statistics and data to bear out his thesis makes the going a bit arduous at times. But his work is important, nonetheless, because it provides a unique perspective that many military leaders have yet to grasp regarding the prudent necessity to engage in the global media environment on behalf of US national interests.

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Culture, Conflict, and Mediation in the Asian Pacific by Bruce E. Barnes.
University Press of America, 2007, 184 pp., \$29.00.

Providing extraordinary insights, Barnes's work is a blend of observations on current practices of nine countries (China, Taiwan, Singapore, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand) set against a backdrop that weaves geographic, political, religious, and ethnic considerations into an integrated narrative addressing how people resolve disputes. This effort is useful for helping break the Western perception of a monolithic "Far East" approach to negotiations and develops, instead, a series of descriptive and practical frameworks for negotiations practitioners.

His motivation for this research was to help the most diverse state in the United States (Hawaii) better address the reasons for its multiple approaches to conflict resolution. Simply put, he studied the “home cultures” of the ethnically diverse Hawaiian population to examine the antecedents to their current approach to conflict resolution, all with an eye to providing a better understanding of not necessarily what they negotiated over but how and why they negotiated the way they did, and what points of friction might occur when different negotiating styles collided.

He also acknowledges that the United States perceives alternative dispute resolution (ADR) as not only something “new” but also describes ADR’s potential as an effective and efficient alternative to the Americans’ more traditional reliance on contentious, adversarial litigation. But he also presents a successful argument debunking the concept that links the American concept of “spreading [the] ADR philosophy around the globe” as the same as spreading a new concept. He presents sufficient evidence that, in many cultures, the ADR “concept” is, in fact, many centuries old and also the historically preferred method of conflict resolution.

As with any book attempting to examine human nature and behavior, generalizations under the rubric of “culture” mean that granularity is sacrificed for the sake of brevity. This is not an uncommon approach to these studies and does not discount the book’s overall quality. However, the reader must realize that as the author reports, describes, and subsequently summarizes characteristics influencing the negotiating behavior of any one of these people within a culture, he is limited by what he can observe, summarize, and report. He cannot possibly observe and report on everyone that makes up a particular group under consideration. So this book, like many others, should act as a reference framework when preparing to engage in negotiations, not as a recipe for guaranteed success. His stories, illustrations, and observations are certainly instructive, but not directive.

Since religion is a major force within most of the Pacific Rim cultures, Barnes organizes his work into three major sections, all distinctive in their religion (Confucian East Asian Cultures, Muslim Southeast Asian, and Buddhist Southeast Asian). Furthermore, the author uses 15 “themes” to provide multiple lenses as each of the nine cultures within the three religious sections is examined. Organizationally and conceptually, the themes have merit and are based on sound principles, many addressing Geert Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. However, in execution, the depth of treatment varied greatly from culture to culture, and although some variation is expected and natural, some unexpected imbalances were presented. The biggest illustration of this imbalance is the treatment of the 15th theme: “contributions to the global practice of conflict resolution and training applications.” In the chapters representing China, the Philippines, and Korea, this 15th theme was not addressed while other countries got a more robust treatment (notably, Japan, Malaysia, and Thailand). One could argue that with China’s current regional dominance and the real potential for its global dominance on many fronts, a discussion on the contributions to the global prac-

tice of conflict resolution and training applications from a Chinese perspective could have benefited a significant section of the reading audience, namely practitioners who are looking for clues and frameworks as they plan for and execute negotiations with the Chinese. This is, however, a relatively minor critique on an otherwise rich text, filled with confirming illustrations and numerous (over 30) case studies of just how geopolitics, religion, and culture have guided negotiations strategies for the subject cultures.

Another small but noticeable absence in his work is a closer examination of how these cultures define negotiations. For example, the Chinese symbol for negotiations is made up of two symbols, one representing “danger” and the other “opportunity.” In contrast, the Japanese perception of negotiations is very different. Traditionally, the Japanese perceive negotiations as a process to be avoided and minimized because of the cultural emphasis on *wa*, or harmony. Therefore, the act of negotiating demonstrates the failure of *wa*—something ingrained into Japanese culture as very negative. *Wa* is highly prized, and extensive efforts at preserving it occupy a central role in the harmonious and cooperative approach to Japanese culture. Many suggest that to successfully negotiate with the Japanese, extensive “prenegotiations” help to avoid disruption of the *wa* within the actual negotiations, thus preserving harmony.

A final simple but important critique. Dr. Barnes asserts that “culture is also very dynamic: it is always changing.” In this statement, he treats the multiple aspects of culture as a monolith, which runs counter to two arguments; one within his own book and one from other writings on culture. First, if culture changes are “very dynamic,” then the emphasis he places on tradition, history, religion, customs, and other shaping forces on culture should minimally impact a culture’s approach to conflict resolution. As a matter of course in his book, Dr. Barnes accurately suggests that culture does, indeed, heavily influence negotiating approaches; hence, culture may be changing but perhaps not as “dynamically” as he suggests. The second argument that runs counter to Dr. Barnes’s statement is research that suggests culture has multiple levels, and these levels have differing change rates. A much-cited model developed by American University’s Dr. Gary Weaver proposes that culture has multiple levels and reflects the essential characteristics of an iceberg (see “cultural iceberg” lecture slides developed by Dr. Weaver at <http://www.purdue.edu/hr/pdf/WeaverPPT.pdf>. Certain cultural elements (artifacts) are very visible (like the part of the iceberg above the waterline) and are capable of relatively rapid change (just like the part of the iceberg above the waterline changes as it is affected by its environment). However, culture also resembles an iceberg below the waterline in that these elements are hidden from view but form a proportionately large part of how individuals (consciously and subconsciously) present themselves (through the artifacts, etc.). As an additional note, Dr. Weaver adds that these elements “far below the waterline” are not only unconditionally accepted as individuals “enculturate” into their primary culture but are also slow to change, for these deeply enculturated values, just like the iceberg, are insulated from the stormy environment above the “waterline.” This model suggests that perhaps the visible artifacts may change rapidly (such as the Japanese adopting Western

dress), but the underlying cultural values (such as harmony, cooperativeness, etc.) may be much slower to change. I must emphasize that these three critiques are not meant to detract from the book's overall quality. It is instructive, well organized, and of great utility for leaders intent on improving their ability to resolve conflict and negotiate across and between cultures.

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The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War by James L. Gelvin.
Cambridge University Press, 2005, 294 pp., \$18.00.

Author Gelvin has presented a very good historical summary of this 100-year conflict. From the introduction to this book we find the author to be well studied in the areas of nationalism and the social and cultural history of the geographical area under study. His apparent knowledge of the history of the Middle East and the historical perspective gained from his research for other books provide a strong basis for some of the positions he advances throughout the document. He writes, "I have written this book for students and general readers who wish to understand the broad sweep of the history of the Israeli-Palestinian struggle and situate it in its global context." The author has, in this reviewer's mind, done a very good job of following his intent.

Gelvin does not argue but simply presents a very well-developed history of the rise of nationalism among both Israelis and Palestinians. He methodically unfolds a history of the individuals who were clearly influenced by the development of nationalism in both societies. The structure of the book is one which would help anyone who has little knowledge about these two peoples to develop a basic understanding. It is much more than you would ever learn from reading a magazine but less than you would find used in postgraduate reading. The book would be a wonderful introduction to understanding the Middle East problem—a History 101 suggested reading.

His few photographs and maps do a great deal to help the reader understand what the author presents in his analysis. He clearly builds upon the "religious" and "land" conflicts that reside between the two entities. He presents the influence of the wars fought in the European theater and the allocation of land in a postwar environment to build his case for nationalism in both parties. The picture of two groups of people, thinking they have legitimate rights to the land they live upon, is vividly presented through the eyes and words of leaders such as Theodor Herzl, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, Ariel Sharon, Yasser Arafat, and numerous others. While the author sometimes shows a bias for certain leaders and their actions, he attempts to balance his history with an open presentation of what he believes to have been major mistakes and key positive actions by leaders from both sides of the conflict. He analyzes proposals for peace for the area very clearly and leaves this reader with

a better picture of those nonnegotiable items that must be placed at the head of the list for all peace negotiations.

I recommend this book be required introductory reading to begin a more detailed study of the positions of the two peoples at the peace table negotiating for their right to exist as free and independent nations. Military personnel would benefit from the author's historical collection of data as well as his personal insights into the influence of certain individuals on the fight for nationalism. Also provided, absent a lesson on national infrastructure, is a basic concept for nation building—similar to what the United States is presently attempting in Iraq.

The narrative would have benefited from an actual list of demands presented at the peace conferences and a synopsis of those conferences. Perhaps that is material for a second book. For students who desire to know more about this part of the world and its history, the author presents a wonderful recommended reading list at the end of each chapter. I recommend this book for both the professional and layman reader because of the understandability of the presented information and the chronological order in which it is presented.

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The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq by James Dobbins et al. RAND Corporation, 2005, 344 pp., \$35.00. (Also downloadable for free at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG304.pdf.)

This is the second book in a series that looks to provide an understanding of the international community's attempts to save failed and failing states. The companion volume is *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*.

As the role of the United States in post-Saddam Iraq is debated more frequently—in the press, in politics, and in the nation's military education centers—there is a growing voice arguing that post-conflict operations should be managed by a coalition under the guidance of the United Nations (UN). While this point of view is anathema in certain quarters (recall the oil-for-food scandal, the reports of rampant rapes and child abuse by UN peacekeepers on some operations, the inability of the UN to effectively control the situation in the Middle East, and the laissez-faire attitude during the genocide in Rwanda), others make a strong case for just such an involvement. Taking an objective look at the UN's ability to supervise the rebuilding of a nation, the RAND Corporation employs a case study approach looking at eight countries—the Congo, Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Iraq—as well as the situation in Eastern Slavonia with the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. The authors' methodology follows a set format, identifying for each country the challenges being faced (holding elections, security, economics), the UN's role (peacekeeper, facilitator), the end result (whether a success wholly or in part), and the lessons learned (recommendations for approaching similar situations in the future). A final chapter then compares the UN and US approaches to nation building, highlighting the trends, strengths, and weaknesses of both.

Acknowledging that “each nation-building mission takes place in a unique environment,” the study also notes that the “objectives, instruments and techniques remain largely the same from one operation to the next” (p. 225). This premise allows the researchers to establish five inputs—military presence, international police presence, duration of mission, timing of elections, and economic assistance—that will be the same across the board. These inputs, when contrasted with the study’s five measures of output—military casualties (a negative measure), refugee returns, growth in per capita gross domestic product, a qualitative measure of sustained peace and a qualitative assessment of whether or not a country’s government became and has remained democratic—provide an objective tool whose conclusions can be seen today in Iraq. They also provide a way ahead for planners of future rebuilding operations.

Given the amount of information required for such an analysis, the study does a commendable job of presenting its findings in a clear and easy-to-follow manner. The authors’ examples are well chosen, and we see the successes and failures—to varying degrees—of the assimilation of democracy in these nations. This subject will be of interest to anyone looking to study what is required for successful nation building and to those looking for a more balanced picture of the UN’s role in today’s world.

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Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing Approach to Earning Popular Support to Theaters of Operation by Todd C. Helmus, Christopher Paul, and Russell W. Glenn. RAND Corporation, 2007, 240 pp., \$30.00. (Downloadable for free at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG607.pdf.)

“We will help you.”

What sounds like the title of a Queen rock anthem is actually a simple promise around which the US military might develop a branding strategy. It is part of 22 broad recommendations for the American armed forces in *Enlisting Madison Avenue*, aimed at leveraging the lessons of the marketing and advertising worlds to help the military win its nation’s wars.

The study’s lead author, Todd C. Helmus, is a behavioral scientist with a doctorate in clinical psychology. Thus, he is well suited to examine the cognitive side of modern combat in this monograph, prepared at the request of the US Joint Forces Command. In it, the authors contend that the United States and its allies affect popular support for stability operations in the areas they operate through the character of those operations, the behavior of their forces, and the actions of their communication professionals. As such, the authors suggest these forces stand to benefit from commercial marketing techniques—proven methods by which companies engender support for their product or service.

Such an approach has been taken before, most publicly after 9/11 when former Madison Avenue maven Charlotte Beers was put in charge of US public diplomacy efforts at the Department of State (DoS). Her Shared Values Initiative, in

which slick television advertisements extolling the happy lives of American Muslims were broadcast in numerous parts of the Islamic world, was widely derided at the time as a failure. Opinion polls tracking anti-American sentiment amongst foreign Muslims changed little in the wake of the ad campaign, and many in the US diplomatic community were more than happy that this interloper from the advertising industry had seemingly flopped. Subsequent research, most notably by Jami Fullerton and Alice Kendrick in their book *Advertising's War on Terrorism: The Story of the U.S. State Department's Shared Values Initiative*, has countered that this perceived debacle showed only the problems of mismanaged expectations and inter-DOS politics and that marketing initiatives still promise to help the United States in its war with Islamic extremism. It is therefore heartening to see a study as extensive and high profile as *Enlisting Madison Avenue* readdress the use of the marketing model in the United States' present war of ideas.

What is not so heartening is the book's first chapter following the introduction where the authors chronicle the many challenges facing the United States in the modern global information environment. Nearly one-third of the book is dedicated to this section, in which 18 major challenges—ranging from “information fratricide” to the difficulty of measuring effectiveness—are outlined in excruciating detail. In this regard, the monograph's structure does the reader no favors. Rather than present discrete problems with individual solutions, the authors choose to first cover challenges, then review marketing principles as they apply to military operations, and finally offer other solutions based on recent operational experience. While it is difficult to argue with any single one, the 18 challenges and 22 recommendations can add up to an overwhelming tangle in the reader's head. The authors seemed to have recognized this, tacking on a three-page appendix titled “Linking Shaping Challenges with Recommendations.”

Despite the structural deficiencies, there is much to be commended about this book. Whereas other recent literature on the subject tends to focus on overall US government public diplomacy efforts, *Enlisting Madison Avenue's* marketing-inspired recommendations are specific to the armed forces and provide real-life, rubber-meets-the-road suggestions. For example, in recommending better discipline and focus in military communication campaigns, the book offers 10 detailed steps inspired by marketing best practices. In this way, the authors offer not just what to do but also how to do it and get beyond the vagaries of newspaper editorials that simply demand the United States communicate better.

Additionally, the authors are sophisticated enough to understand that branding slogans alone will not win the support of the people in the areas in which the US military operates. They point out that US foreign policy and its actions on the ground often drive public opinion but do not absolve the United States from attempting to inform and influence relevant populations.

This focus on earning popular support in theaters of operation prompts today's air, space, and cyberspace strategists to consider how the US Air Force can better help the nation win today's irregular warfare fight. When service leaders describe future missions in cyberspace, they often explain them in conventional terms, suggesting

for example that the service might one day take down an enemy air defense system with the stroke of a keyboard. *Enlisting Madison Avenue* posits that the United States can win friends by encouraging indigenous soldiers to write blogs and open shielded regions to new ideas by providing free Internet access to local civilians, both of which seriously challenge current notions of just what “cyber power” really means.

Enlisting Madison Avenue is full of such evocative ideas—arguably, too many of them. “The details of how best to integrate marketing concepts throughout the US armed forces and interagency operations—and thereafter to design and conduct operations and campaigns with shaping adequately orchestrated throughout—promises to be a considerable challenge,” the authors write in their conclusion. This candidate for understatement of the year should not, however, dissuade readers from picking the book up or our military from taking on such a difficult task. During World War II, the American armed forces *transformed* from a depleted interwar shell into the powerful war machine that beat back fascism. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that it can similarly transform again, this time to beat back the extremism that so threatens the American way of life.

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State of War: The Secret History of the CIA and the Bush Administration by James Risen. Free Press, 2006, 232 pp., \$15.00.

State of War seeks to document the failure of a few key leaders in the Central Intelligence Agency and the Bush administration in preparing for and conducting the early phases of the American invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as efforts to counteract Iran’s efforts to gain nuclear weapons.

By calling his work a history, *New York Times* reporter James Risen implies that it contains most of these features: a logical, comprehensive, substantiated, and balanced discussion of some of the most important and controversial issues of this decade. Instead, this book is a very long editorial that mixes in a few lesser-known names and incidents to a rehash of sensational headlines, scattered about various chapters that concentrate on criticizing a few individuals. Little of the narrative is fresh to a reader aware of world events, and it offers nothing in the form of notes, bibliography, or suggested reading to help a researcher who wants to know more.

In short, *State of War* is a passing partisan shot at some controversial policies of a lame duck administration whose mistakes may well “bequeath nearly unbridled executive power to President Hillary Clinton” (last statement of the book). Mr. Risen’s political sympathies drench at least part of every chapter.

Although Mr. Risen critiques many government officials, he singles out George Tenet (CIA director, 1997–2004) and Donald Rumsfeld (secretary of defense, 1975–1977 and 2001–2006). Messrs. Tenet and Rumsfeld made some controversial, even dubious, decisions during their terms in high office; most readers already know this. What would be more useful is knowing what prompted them to do

these things and whether or not the circumstances that allowed such actions were unique. Risen presents the problems of Tenet and Rumsfeld as personality flaws. It would be more useful to know whether or not these flaws were accentuated by a unique combination of events (9/11, strong president, and the same party running Congress, etc.) or by recurring circumstances with dangerous potential (comparisons with the Truman, Johnson, and Nixon administrations would be useful here).

Although I think that the story line of *State of War* is choppy and poorly supported in many parts, it does a worthwhile job in other areas. The coverage of the Abu Zubaydah case and the CIA prison system (chap. 1) was interesting and plausible, as was the discussion about the odd status of Ahmed Chalabi (chap. 3). Details about the Saudi sources of funds for al-Qaeda were intriguing (chap. 8), but some background on Saudi society, its government, and the Wahhabi sect of Islam would have been useful to make this point more plausible.

Sections of *State of War* that need substantial improvement include lack of control on the National Security Agency's eavesdropping (chap. 2) and why the CIA placed so much faith in one unreliable agent ("Curveball") concerning Saddam's weapons of mass destruction (chap. 5). By focusing strictly on CIA-Pentagon differences, the author mostly ignores the influence of the US Department of State, congressional power politics and posturing, Britain, and the United Nations (chap. 6).

State of War offers little that a few selected articles from the *New York Times* or Internet could not. I do not recommend this book for purchase by either individuals or the Muir S. Fairchild Research Information Center. Perhaps Mr. Risen's next anthology of headlines will have more usable and lasting significance for our military readers.

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Chasing Ghosts: Unconventional Warfare in American History by John J. Tierney Jr. Potomac Books, Inc., 2006, 289 pp., \$26.95.

Chasing Ghosts, according to John Tierney, "is a history that covers wars lost in memory while remaining based upon issues that have resurfaced since 9/11." The author takes us through this study of unconventional warfare in American history, including occasions when Americans utilized this mode of warfare as well as when it was used against us. He has done his job well.

Carl von Clausewitz warns that failure to know and understand the war one is fighting is a recipe for disaster. Unconventional wars are hard to define, and this is America's Achilles' heel. We do not know the type of war we are currently fighting so it is near impossible for us to develop an appropriate strategy to successfully wage it. Sun Tzu tells us that it is important to know your enemy but much more so to know yourself. Unfortunately, Americans not only are unaware of who they are but they are also wedded to a paradigm of wars fought face-to-face, or head-on.

As a result, Americans see everything in those terms. Should our enemies, or allies for that matter, have different-colored glasses, the United States is in trouble.

Yet US history contains a myriad of excellent examples from which we can learn pertinent lessons that are relevant not only in Iraq but in our war against international terrorism as well. However, in order to learn and apply these lessons, we have to be willing to change the color of our glasses. And this is what US senior leaders are reluctant to do.

As I read this book, I saw principles for success emerge and then echo throughout its 260-odd pages. When the United States has followed these principles, it has been successful in accomplishing national objectives. The scary part is that the inverse is also true; when it has not adhered to these principles, it has suffered defeat. Presently, the United States does not seem to be following these principles, thereby explaining why the situation in Iraq looks rather bleak.

Tierney suggests that one of the most important factors that leads to success in a guerrilla or counter guerrilla war is knowledge of the local landscape. This means not only the geography but also local customs and culture. If one does not already possess this type of knowledge—such as the Patriots did but the British did not during the Revolutionary War—it can be mitigated through the utilization of locals. The US Army did this to great effect throughout the Indian Wars, in the Philippines, and elsewhere. The Marines have been particularly good at identifying tribal and ethnic splits in societies and taking advantage of these to divide and conquer.

Akin to this idea and one that the author repeatedly illustrates is the hiring, training, and employment of indigenous forces, thereby removing the notion of “invader” from the equation. The purpose of such forces is twofold. First, it is to provide localized security, which includes separating the guerrillas from the people. This makes it difficult for guerrillas to gather intelligence, obtain food and necessities, and maintain a source of logistical support. The second function is to use these forces as mobile strike teams designed to keep constant pressure on the guerrillas and thus give them no rest or time to reconstitute their forces.

Furthermore, everyone who reads this book will find several things that will catch their attention. Two things really grabbed my interest. The first has to do with the employment of airpower. In several instances, airpower was used with great success. However, in other situations, such as Vietnam, it was not. A corollary is those instances in which airpower was not available. If one envisions the full capabilities of airpower, the question arises, if I had airpower in (choose your war), how could I have maximized its utility? The answer would, I posit, be intuitively obvious, and one could then adapt the concept to the fight in Iraq, the war on terrorism, or some other guerrilla war. In order to do this, one has to realize that airpower would be in a supporting rather than a supported role. Could senior Air Force leadership accept such a role? I doubt it.

Another attention grabber had to do with my war, Vietnam. In that war all three services had and employed conventional war doctrines. They were not only ineffective but also outright failures. Yet at the same time, the author notes that

special forces A-teams were heavily involved in creating and employing Civil Irregular Defense Group units. These units were quite successful wherever and whenever they were utilized—just food for thought.

After reading this book and placing the lessons available in the context of Iraq or the war on terrorism, one is compelled to ask, have we learned nothing about guerrilla war in the past 200 years or so? The answer is not encouraging. As previously noted, Tierney does a marvelous job throughout *Chasing Ghosts* in illustrating these and other war-winning principles. Politicians and senior military leaders ought to read this book, and it deserves a place on every military professional development reading list. The wars we are now fighting—especially in Iraq—are not lost. We can still win, but we need to change the way we conduct business. This book will help us make the necessary changes in direction.

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The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terror by Paul J. Murphy.
Brassey's Inc., 2004, 288 pp., \$18.95.

Paul J. Murphy, a former US counterterrorism official, has added another work to the relatively small but steadily growing body of literature available in English on the Russo-Chechen War. While the Russian armed forces and security services have succeeded in tamping down much of the violence plaguing Russia's North Caucasus region, the deep roots and complexities of the conflict suggest that what Pres. Vladimir Putin has achieved is but a lull and hardly a sustainable peace. Murphy's portrait of Chechen terrorists—the “wolves” in his narrative—certainly reinforces this conclusion.

The author studied in the former Soviet Union and has taught at universities and appeared on radio and television in the United States, Australia, and Russia. His service as a congressional advisor on counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and Russia may partially explain the general pro-Russian tone of this book. Indeed, Murphy states his purpose clearly: he wants to inform the West of Chechen “corruption, greed, money and terror financing” (p. 6). Moreover, Murphy tells the reader that the book will not be a catalog of Russian atrocities. Instead, he argues that the current form of Chechen terrorism is the result of the rise of radical Islam in the region and the actions of key figures in the Chechen leadership. Thus, the author treats Russian behavior and policies largely in passing and focuses instead on a notorious “cast of characters”—important Chechen leaders—who have “individually and collectively (and for their own personal, ideological, religious, and criminal reasons) led post-Soviet Chechnya down the road to chaos, political anarchy, economic ruin, and, ultimately, war and physical destruction” (pp. 5–6).

Central to Murphy's narrative is the struggle between Chechen nationalists like the late Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov, who sought “only” independence from Russia, and the increasingly powerful—and ruthless—radical

Islamist terrorists pursuing a wider ideological war against Orthodox Russia. Indeed, Murphy ties Chechnya, through the likes of Shamil Basayev and the Saudi-born Ibn ul-Khattab, to a larger global jihad and specifically to al-Qaeda. The Kremlin is anxious to cast its war in the Caucasus as part of a wider global struggle, and there is certainly a fair amount of evidence to support such a view. Still, this should not overshadow the historical roots of Chechen resistance to Russian and Soviet rule; to do so would result in an incomplete assessment of the causes and possible long-term solutions to the region's violence.

The author provides often graphic accounts of many confirmed and alleged Chechen operations, including a chapter devoted to the seizure of the Dubrovka theater (the infamous Nord-Ost siege) in 2002, though the narrative ends prior to the slaughter at Beslan. He concludes with a brief postscript on the downing of two Russian airliners by female suicide bombers, known widely as "black widows," and issues a dire warning that these women might just as easily have boarded a flight bound for the West and that Chechen terrorism is, indeed, a global concern.

While the reader may disagree with the author's conclusions, certainly one very disappointing aspect of *The Wolves of Islam* is the complete absence of footnotes and a bibliography. Murphy writes that he drew many of his quotes and other data from Web sites, video, and audiotapes and gleaned information from a legion of otherwise nameless individuals—journalists, diplomats, and others living or working in Russia and the North Caucasus. Thus, the accuracy and veracity of many of the author's assertions or accounts must be accepted at face value.

Murphy does, however, draw two very stark lessons for the United States and the West in general. His methodology aside, the author shows how the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya in 1996 was not enough to satisfy the radical elements in Chechnya that sought to establish a Muslim state extending beyond Chechnya's borders and took the war into the Russian heartland, provoking a second Russian invasion in 1999. Those who maintain that the West can starve Islamic terrorism of support by simply withdrawing from the Middle East (or ending support for Israel) overlook an important ideological component of those engaged in such terrorism. Murphy also notes that the Russians successfully exploited the differences between Chechen nationalists and radical Islamists, especially the foreign-born fighters. As the US-led coalition has also discovered recently in Anbar province and other Sunni areas of Iraq, a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy can likewise exploit the seams between nationalist resistance movements and those fighting in pursuit of a radical religious agenda.

The Wolves of Islam is an interesting account of Russia's struggle against elements of radical Islam. Still, those in search of more balanced and intellectually rigorous accounts of the Russo-Chechen War will find those in other works such as Moshe Gammer's *The Lone Wolf and the Bear*, Matthew Evangelista's *The Chechen Wars*, or Gordon Hahn's *Russia's Islamic Threat*.

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Britain, Soviet Russia and the Collapse of the Versailles Order, 1919–1939

by Keith Neilson. Cambridge University Press, 2006, 379 pp., \$85.00.

Explanations of the origins of World War II often hinge on the interplay between the European great powers in the two decades (1919–1939) prior to the start of the war. Keith Neilson, professor of history at the Royal Military College of Canada, has provided a useful contribution to the body of knowledge of this subject by examining a key piece of the interwar puzzle—why did British leaders maintain their faith in post-Versailles notions of collective security, even as crises throughout the 1930s shattered hopes that a second global conflict could be avoided? To answer this question, Neilson delves into the intricacies of Anglo-Soviet relations to illuminate the twists and turns of interwar British foreign policy. To use Neilson's parlance, he drills an Anglo-Soviet "bore-hole" into the sediment of British strategic foreign policy to obtain a "core sample" that he hopes will reveal much about the entire topic.

Neilson argues that British foreign policy failures in this period resulted not from common explanations often put forth, such as appeasement or the gradual decline of British military, political, and economic influence following World War I, but rather from an undue faith in the structural and intellectual legacies left by the war—namely the notions of collective security and general disarmament. British reliance on what would become an increasingly outdated framework, combined with an ingrained anti-Communist mind-set on the part of many British statesmen, proscribed any meaningful accommodation with Soviet Russia, regardless of the security benefits that such collaboration could have provided by the mid-1930s.

Neilson traces Anglo-Soviet relations throughout the interwar years, but the focus of the book is on the last phase—1933 to 1939. The years 1919 to 1933 receive scant attention. He argues that this was a period in which Soviet Russia did not figure largely in British strategic thinking. As Britain recovered from World War I and the Soviet leadership consolidated its grip on the country, the USSR was an enigma in British eyes—a large, potentially destabilizing force with enormous military potential. As Josef Stalin centralized his power, the Soviets increasingly impinged on British interests in both Europe and Asia. Diplomatic relations between the two states produced little in the way of lasting agreement or understanding.

The accession of Adolf Hitler to power in Germany in January 1933 and the emergence of Japan as a major power in Asia signaled both an end to Soviet insularity and a slight softening, though not abandonment, of British adherence to the post-World War I order. British debate in this period focused on whether the Soviets could provide a useful counterbalance to both Germany and Japan despite their repugnant ideology and uncertain intentions. The arguments that consumed the British foreign-policy establishment in this period alternated between those who viewed Stalin as a practitioner of *realpolitik*, and thus someone with whom deals could be struck, and those who felt the primary Soviet objective was to spread Communist ideology abroad, and thus should be avoided. Neilson takes a nuanced view, arguing persuasively that Soviet foreign policy was ideologically based but was nonetheless flexible enough to take "one step back to take two steps forward" in the face of mounting threats. In contrast,

he argues that after 1937 British leaders, particularly Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, failed to show any flexibility in dealings with Soviet Russia. By disdaining alliances and binding treaties and sticking to increasingly outdated notions of collective security, the British spurned Soviet offers of cooperation. Neilson argues that British refusal to accept such offers eventually forced Stalin to agree to the Nazi-Soviet Pact, clearing the way for the German invasion of Poland.

Neilson's argument is persuasive and well constructed, though somewhat obscured by the painstaking attention given to the ruminations and policy debates of a succession of British officials. Rather than provide a running synopsis of the broad intellectual drivers of British policy making, he spends far too much time on the specific policy preferences of individuals. While these accounts are sometimes illuminating, the book could have benefited from a more holistic account of the intellectual evolution that drove interwar diplomacy. Likewise, while Neilson demonstrates how British notions of collective security contributed directly to foreign policy defeats, he does not provide a connection between those notions and the policy of appeasement. Chamberlain's insistence on avoiding alliance commitments and interacting on a bilateral basis with dictator states at Munich in 1938 would seem to reflect a stark evolution from the intellectual legacies of the post-Versailles order. Yet, Neilson treats appeasement as somewhat distinct from British foreign policy decisions of the previous years—a curious distinction not well explained in the book.

That said, Neilson ultimately succeeds in displaying the constraints on British foreign policy placed on it by adherence to its outmoded concept of collective security. As Neilson states, British views of power and of collective security were markedly different than Soviet views of the same concepts, with the result that the two states could approach, but never reach, a lasting accommodation. This split in ideology and the competing definitions of collective security also highlight a second strength of the book. By showing the remarkable contrast between the worldviews of the two global powers, as well as the mutual suspicion that festered throughout the interwar period, we see a foreshadowing of the ideological gulf that would separate the West and the Soviet Union after 1945. The diplomatic maneuvering between the two powers in the 1930s provides a remarkable insight into the origins of the Cold War. Perhaps unintentionally, Neilson has provided a deeper understanding of how competing ideological and intellectual paradigms constrain relations between states, even when faced with imminent and mutual threats. He also succeeds in illuminating how such a split between Britain and the Soviet Union contributed to the outbreak of not only World War II but also to the decades-long ideological conflict that followed.

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Managing Editor
325 Chennault Circle
Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6428
Tel (334) 953-1108

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